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Abstract 
To the author’s knowledge, this is the first systematic study of Hobbes’s concept of en-
mity. Examining this important category does not only elucidate the concept itself, but 
also provides an opportunity to reconnect fragments of Hobbes’s thought that are in-
creasingly being treated as disparate subjects. It is suggested here that the concept of 
enmity can shed further light on related aspects of Hobbes’s political philosophy, in-
cluding human competitiveness, the roles of fear and trust, the evil of violent death, the 
status of rebels, and his theory of international relations. 
 
Moreover, the subject invites a rethinking of Hobbes’s place in the history of interna-
tional political thought. This thesis argues that he was among the first to make enmity a 
central subject of political philosophy. This seems to be related to Hobbes’s characteris-
tic break with the traditional notion of natural sociability, as a consequence of which he 
describes the natural condition of mankind as a war of all against all. 
 
Although Hobbes depicts human beings as natural enemies, he also holds that enmity 
does not exclude the possibility of reconciliation. All individuals can supposedly over-
come their hostility through subjection to a sovereign. These views give rise to a dy-
namic distinction between public and private enmity, according to which outright hostil-
ity can be transformed into private competition if human beings renounce their natural 
right of war. Conversely, subjects of the commonwealth become public enemies if they 
rebel against the sovereign. Hobbes’s views on natural enmity and reconciliation also 
have important implications for his theory of international relations. This thesis particu-
larly highlights the possibility that states can be decomposed and reassembled after a 
successful foreign invasion, which precludes wars of annihilation. 
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[F.C. Hood’s The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes] is a 
solid foundation for every future interpretation of Leviathan. 
His approach, which strictly limits itself to the texts under 
study, is expedient and convincing. Given that Hood has 
successfully applied this method to important concepts such 
as obligation, sovereignty, and authority, the reader desires 
to have other essential Hobbesian concepts analysed and 
clarified in the same way. I particularly wish for an 
examination of the enemy concept. 
––Carl Schmitt1 
 
                                                
1 Carl Schmitt, “Die Vollendete Reformation: Zu neuen Leviathan-Interpretationen” [1965], in Der 
Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes: Sinn und Fehlschlag eines politischen Symbols, ed. 
Günter Maschke (Cologne, Germany: Hohenheim Verlag, 1982), pp. 137-178, 140 (author’s 
translation). 
1 
1. Introduction 
This chapter introduces the thesis, its wider implications, and the methodological ap-
proach. The first section makes some suggestions regarding the place of enmity in the 
current debate on politics and international relations. More specifically, it considers how 
the subject relates to ideas of Carl Schmitt, liberal political thought, and Realism in In-
ternational Relations (IR). The second section describes the approach of close textual 
reading, which is adopted by this study, and considers methodological claims regarding 
the importance of context. The third section states the main arguments of this thesis and 
indicates how they contribute to the existing literature on Hobbes. 
 
1.1 The concept of enmity as a subject of enquiry 
Why an enquiry into the concept of enmity? In view of events such as the ‘War on Ter-
ror’, one commentator has recently pointed out that political rhetoric today “is filled 
with images of danger and hostility which provide both illustrations and organising 
themes for accounts of the world”.1 However, it appears that enmity is often regarded as 
simply that: a matter of rhetoric, a divergence from ordinary politics, or a pathological 
condition.2 Thus, it seems to be under-examined as a concept in and of itself. 
 
If enmity is considered in the theoretical debate on politics and international relations, it 
is often in relation to the controversial German jurist Carl Schmitt,3 whose thought has 
received much attention in recent years. In his work The Concept of the Political, 
                                                
1 Rodney Barker, Making Enemies (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 1. 
2 Cf. Barker, Making Enemies, pp. 3f. 
3 For a critical discussion of the recent reception of Schmitt, which often loses sight of his involvement 
with the Nazi regime, see Jef Huysmans, “Know Your Schmitt: A Godfather of Truth and the Spectre 
of Nazism”, Review of International Studies 25 (1999), pp. 323-328. 
2 
Schmitt locates the essence of ‘the political’ in the friend-enemy distinction.4 Thereby, 
he emphasises the distinctiveness of political enmity: 
The political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as 
an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with him in trans-
actions. But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature 
that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that 
in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible.5 
The implication of this passage is that enmity concerns the relations between organised 
totalities, the members of which relate to each other as political friends. Therefore, ‘the 
enemy’ only exists in the collective singular. In accordance with this view, Schmitt in-
sists that political enmity must not be confused with enmity as “a psychological expres-
sion of private emotions”.6 This also appears to be Schmitt’s central objection to liberal-
ism. He argues that, in its attempt to transform enemies into economic competitors or 
intellectual opponents, liberalism fails to acknowledge the possibility of an existential 
struggle between groups, as denoted by the friend-enemy distinction.7 
 
Yet Schmitt does not merely regard enmity, along with friendship, as an essential part 
of political life. Rather, he seems to advocate a particular type of enmity––i.e. limited 
hostility between sovereign states––over other types that supposedly emerge from the 
liberal denial of ‘the political’.8 In 1927, Schmitt specifically argued that the liberal 
state is in crisis because party politics undermines its collective identity vis-à-vis for-
eign enemies. Developments such as those in the highly polarised parliamentary system 
of the Weimar Republic could ultimately lead to civil war, in which case “the domestic, 
                                                
4 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political [1927], expanded edition, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2007), pp. 26f. 
5 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 27. 
6 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 28. 
7 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 28. 
8 Cf. John P. McCormick, “Fear, Technology, and the State: Carl Schmitt, Leo Strauss, and the Revival of 
Hobbes in Weimar and National Socialist Germany“, Political Theory 22 (1994), pp. 619-652, 621-
625; and Gabriella Slomp, Carl Schmitt and the Politics of Hostility, Violence and Terror (Basing-
stoke, UK: Palgrave, 2009), pp. 6f. 
3 
not the foreign friend-and-enemy groupings are decisive for armed conflict”.9 Further-
more, Schmitt suggests in The Concept of the Political that wars which are fought in the 
name of peace and humanity might turn out to be particularly inhumane.10 
 
In his later writings, Schmitt further elaborates on different types of enmity. He con-
trasts the limited interstate hostility that occurred within the legal order of the jus publi-
cum Europaeum (the system of international law that developed after the Peace of 
Westphalia) with the absolute and unlimited hostility of modern revolutionary struggles 
and wars of national liberation.11 Schmitt highlights that, under the jus publicum Euro-
paeum, sovereign states recognised each other as ‘just enemies’, i.e. as having equal 
rights and legitimacy to make war. On this basis, they could impose regulations on the 
conduct of hostilities, including the important civilian-combatant distinction. According 
to Schmitt, the First World War, and the discriminatory peace that was subsequently 
established by the Treaty of Versailles, mark the end of the jus publicum Europaeum.12 
Although this war still began as a conventional interstate conflict, it ended with a “glob-
al civil war of revolutionary class enemies”,13 i.e. a war of annihilation. 
 
Viewed in this light, Schmitt’s definition of ‘the political’ reflects his preference, or 
perhaps nostalgia, for an international legal order that limits hostility to conventional 
                                                
9 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 32. This theme is further developed in Schmitt, The Crisis of 
Parliamentary Democracy [1923, 1926], trans. Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988). 
10 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 95. 
11 Carl Schmitt, Theory of the Partisan: Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the Political [1963], 
trans. G.L. Ulmen (New York: Telos, 2007), pp. 11, 69-72. 85-95. Also see the historical account of 
modern international law in Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus 
Publicum Europaeum [1950], trans. G.L. Ulmen (New York: Telos, 2003). On Schmitt’s distinction 
between different conceptual and historical types of enmity, cf. Slomp, Carl Schmitt, ch. 5. 
12 Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, pp. 227-239. Discriminatory peace means that the defeated party was 
no longer treated as having equal rights and legitimacy to wage war. In particular, the Versailles Trea-
ty criminalised the German Emperor, Kaiser Wilhelm II. Also see Schmitt’s discussion of the so-
called war guilt article in The Nomos of the Earth, pp. 259-280. 
13 Schmitt, Theory of the Partisan, p. 95. Cf. Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, pp. 246f. 
4 
conflicts between sovereign states, as opposed to global and domestic ‘civil war’.14 In 
this context, he portrays Hobbes as an intellectual ally. In the same way as Schmitt sees 
himself engaged in a struggle against a liberal politics of absolute enmity, Hobbes was 
supposedly attempting to overcome the power of the Church and the horrors of sectarian 
civil war.15 Thereby, Schmitt does not merely regard Hobbes as the foundational theo-
rist of the modern secular state, but also as one of the founders of the international order 
of the jus publicum Europaeum, which supposedly substituted the non-discriminatory 
legal concept of the ‘just enemy’ for the Christian notion of ‘just war’.16 
 
Schmitt’s reflections on enmity and his critique of liberalism raise issues that are still 
topical today,17 and moreover point to the significance of Hobbes’s views on this sub-
ject. Yet the latter may actually be closer to a broadly liberal perspective than Schmitt 
suggests. As Leo Strauss cogently observes in view of Hobbes’s description of the state 
of nature as a war of all against all, Hobbesian enmity is not necessarily accompanied 
by friendship.18 This marks an important difference between Hobbes and Schmitt. Other 
commentators have more recently affirmed that, whereas Schmitt insists on the inevita-
                                                
14 Reinhart Koselleck advances a remarkably similar argument in Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and 
the Pathogenesis of Modern Society (Oxford: Berg, 1988), ch. 3. 
15 This kinship with Hobbes comes out most clearly in Schmitt’s personal reflections on his experience of 
the years immediately after the end of the Second World War. See Carl Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus: 
Erfahrungen der Zeit 1945/47 [1950] (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2002). However, it needs to be 
said that there is some ambivalence in Schmitt’s appropriation of Hobbes’s political thought. In his 
1938 book on Leviathan, Schmitt also detected a “barely visible crack” in Hobbes’s theory of sover-
eignty, which he describes as the “inroad of modern liberalism”. See Schmitt, The Leviathan in the 
State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol [1938], trans. George 
Schwab and Erna Hilfstein (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1996), p. 57. 
16 Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, pp. 146f, 163. According to just war thinking, only one side could 
have a just cause to make war. By contrast, as Schmitt emphasises, the concept of ‘just enemy’ im-
plies that both sides have equal rights and legitimacy to wage war. 
17 For instance, Sergei Prozorov has recently argued that the liberal politics of enmity, which can be seen 
in developments such as the War on Terror, is characterised by a “utopian desire to eliminate enmity 
as such from the human condition”. See Sergei Prozorov, “Liberal Enmity: The Figure of the Foe in 
the Political Ontology of Liberalism”, Millennium 35 (2006), pp. 75-99, 96. 
18 Leo Strauss, “Notes on Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political”, trans. J. Harvey Lomax, in The 
Concept of the Political, expanded edition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), pp. 99-
122, 106. 
5 
bility of the friend-enemy distinction, Hobbes appears to be primarily concerned with 
hostility among individuals that should be overcome for the sake of everyone’s self-
preservation.19 Further elaborating on this theme, Stephen Holmes also finds that the 
enemy for Hobbes is not simply ‘the other’, but a fellow human being.20 
 
Having said that, there are, of course, important differences between Hobbes’s thought 
and liberal perspectives on enmity. While Hobbes is preoccupied with preventing the 
war of all against all at all costs, liberal thinkers tend to highlight dangers arising from 
the arbitrary power of governments, rather than from hostility between members of so-
ciety. This can already be seen in John Locke’s response to Hobbes: 
To ask how you may be guarded from harm, or injury on that side where the strongest 
hand is to do it, is presently the Voice of Faction and Rebellion. As if when Men quit-
ting the State of Nature entered into Society, they agreed that all of them but one, should 
be under the restraint of Laws, but that he should still retain all the Liberty of the State 
of Nature, increased with Power, and made licentious by Impunity. This is to think that 
Men are so foolish that they take care what Mischiefs may be done to them by Pole-
Cats, or Foxes, but are content, nay think it Safety, to be devoured by Lions.21 
While threats posed by the arbitrary power of governments continue to be an important 
concern today,22 liberal thinkers seem to consider hostility in the domestic realm as both 
deviant and, to some extent, unworthy of theoretical consideration.23 
                                                
19 Stephen Holmes, “Does Hobbes Have a Concept of the Enemy?”, Critical Review of International So-
cial and Political Philosophy 13 (2010), pp. 371-89, 385f; Slomp, Carl Schmitt, pp. 48f. For a collec-
tion of recent scholarship on Hobbes and Schmitt, also see Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt: The 
Politics of Order and Myth, ed. Johan Tralau (London: Routledge, 2011). 
20 Holmes, “Does Hobbes Have a Concept of the Enemy?”, pp. 387f. 
21 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government [1689], ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), §93, p. 328 (emphasis and capitalisation in the original). 
22 For instance, Judith Shklar’s ‘liberalism of fear’ highlights the danger of abuses of power and cruelty 
built into the system of coercion on which modern states undoubtedly rely to fulfil their functions. See 
Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear”, in Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy L. Rosenblum (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 21-38. 
23 It has been argued that, following John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, more recent incarnations of liberal 
political philosophy ignore the importance of conflict and opposition altogether. Yet even so-called 
‘agonistic’ critics of liberalism, who hold this view, are careful to emphasise that politics must trans-
form antagonism (outright hostility) into agonism (limited conflict). For a paradigmatic statement, see 
Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000), pp. 116-118. 
6 
This may be due to the belief in progress and civilisation, which supposedly led to an 
elimination of violence.24 Michel Foucault’s discussion of the ‘savage’ and the ‘barbari-
an’ helps to bring out in which sense hostility and violence could, from a broadly liberal 
perspective, be viewed as a deviation of ordinary politics.25 The notion of savages ap-
pears in accounts of the social contract and also serves the purpose of naturalising the 
concept of homo economicus.26 Yet, as Foucault points out, people supposedly ceased 
being savages when they entered society. By contrast, barbarians only come into exist-
ence with civilisation, which they threaten and despise.27 In either case, hostility and 
violence seem to lie beyond the boundaries of a liberal politics that presupposes societal 
pacification. This may also be why liberal democracies find it difficult to respond to a 
resurfacing of hostility, such as in the event of terrorist attacks.28 
 
Although liberal political thinkers have paid more attention to enmity in the internation-
al realm, there is also a strong sense that the latter needs to be transcended. This already 
clearly comes out in Immanuel Kant’s seminal essay “Toward Perpetual Peace”, which 
accepts Hobbes’s description of international relations as a state of nature. In this condi-
tion, there is, “if not always an outbreak of hostilities, then at least the constant threat of 
such hostilities”.29 Unlike Hobbes, however, Kant argues that lasting peace between na-
tions is possible if they adopt republican constitutions, establish a federation of peoples, 
                                                
24 Cf. Bruce Buchan, “Liberalism and Fear of Violence“, Critical Review of International Social and Po-
litical Philosophy 4 (2001), pp. 27-48, 28. 
25 For his discussion of these two notions in modern political thought, see Michel Foucault, “Society Must 
Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76, eds. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fon-
tana, trans. David. Macey (London: Penguin Books, 2004), pp. 194-197. 
26 In this context, the notion of homo economicus refers to the idea that human beings are narrowly self-
interested, utility-maximising agents. 
27 Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”, pp. 194f. 
28 Although certain counter-terrorism measures risk undermining the democratic process and the rule of 
law, there may of course be ways to respond to the threat of terrorism in accordance with liberal dem-
ocratic values. See, in particular, Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State 
Response, 3rd. ed. (Oxford: Routledge, 2011), chs. 4-7. 
29 Immanuel Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch“ [1795], in Toward Perpetual 
Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History, eds. and trans. Pauline Kleingeld and Da-
vid L. Colclasure (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), pp. 67-109, 72. 
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and grant a universal right of hospitality.30 Kant’s views are echoed in liberal IR theo-
ries today, which emphasise, among other things, the importance of international insti-
tutions for limiting conflict.31 Proponents of the so-called democratic peace theory 
maintain that, in relations between each other, liberal democracies generally avoid vio-
lent conflict, which points to the prospect of a peaceful world order.32 
 
This optimism that international hostility could be overcome is not shared by Realists in 
IR, who insist that states remain in a condition of anarchy where their attempts to in-
crease security draw them into conflicts with one another. Textbook histories of IR have 
it that, during the interwar period, classical Realists such as E.H. Carr and Hans Mor-
genthau were arguing against proponents of a so-called liberal ‘idealism’, whose at-
tempts to realise Kant’s peace plan in the League of Nations they considered doomed to 
fail.33 Yet it seems that this first ‘great debate’ of the discipline was largely a myth.34 
Moreover, it is debatable whether liberalism and Realism are best understood as entirely 
different schools of thought, as is suggested, for example, by Martin Wight’s distinction 
between the Kantian (liberal) and Hobbesian (Realist) traditions.35 Other commentators 
instead find that liberalism and Realism complement each other, or argue that both 
schools of thought have always been historically interconnected.36 
 
                                                
30 Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace”, pp. 74-85. 
31 See Scott Burchill, “Liberalism“, in Theories of International Relations, 3rd ed., eds. Scott Burchill et 
al. (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 55-83, 64-66. 
32 Burchill, “Liberalism“, pp. 59f. 
33 See, for instance, Milja Kurki and Colin Wight, “International Relations and Social Science”, in Inter-
national Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 3rd ed., eds. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Ste-
ve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 14-35, 16f. 
34 For an important reassessment of the disciplinary history of IR, see Brian C. Schmidt, The Political 
Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations (Albany, NY: State Universi-
ty of New York Press, 1998), esp. ch. 6. 
35 Martin Wight, “The Anatomy of International Thought”, Review of International Studies 13 (1987), pp. 
221-227. 
36 See, for example, John A. Hall, International Orders (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1996), pp. 29-32; 
and Michael C. Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 129-145. 
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In this regard, it is interesting to note that some Realist theorists in IR apparently share 
the aforementioned reluctance of liberal thinkers to engage with the concept of enmity. 
One of the central tenets of the Realist school of thought is the structural logic of anar-
chy, according to which the distribution of capabilities among states is supposed to lead 
to security dilemmas regardless of pre-existing state identities and dispositions.37 While 
a number of Realist theorists have adopted the assumption that some states will behave 
in a more hostile or aggressive way than others, they seem to be somewhat reluctant to 
frame such issues in terms of friendship and enmity.38 Arnold Wolfers, for instance, 
cautions against the use of terms such as ‘amity’ and ‘enmity’ in IR, because they “are 
taken from the universe of interpersonal relations and they convey a sense of emotional 
involvement”.39 Even though Wolfers grants that adverse sentiments play a certain role 
in foreign policy-making, he points out in the same breath that statesmen should rather 
proceed “by a dispassionate assessment of the national interest”.40 
 
While a comprehensive and thorough assessment of notions of enmity in the current de-
bate on politics and international relations is beyond the scope of this chapter, this dis-
cussion indicates that mainstream IR theories conceive of this subject in terms of private 
                                                
37 See Stefano Guzzini, Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The 
Continuing Story of a Death Foretold (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 35. In his critique of Realism, 
the social constructivist Alexander Wendt also emphasises that “[s]tates act differently toward ene-
mies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not”. As he further 
elucidates, not the mere distribution of power, but relational identities supposedly determine the con-
duct of states. See Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Poli-
tics”, International Organization 46 (1992), pp. 391-425, 397. 
38 See the useful overview provided by Guzzini, Realism in International Relations, pp. 39-42. While 
Guzzini suggests that theorists such as Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger, and Arnold Wolfers use an ‘am-
ity/enmity’ distinction to qualify the structural logic of anarchy, his discussion also shows that these 
thinkers do not frame differences between states in terms of ‘enmity’. 
39 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, MD: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965), p. 25. 
40 Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, p. 25f. This conception of enmity as a matter of irrational private 
emotions may also help to explain Hobbes’s somewhat ambivalent reception as a forerunner of Real-
ism in IR. While Wolfers, for example, acknowledges the well-known state-of-nature analogy, he also 
takes Hobbes’s use of the language of enmity as evidence of sweeping psychological generalisations 
that need to be avoided. See Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, p. 236. 
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emotions, or seek to transcend the condition of hostility between states. This seems to 
reflect a broader tendency to regard enmity as a deviation from ordinary politics and 
unworthy of theoretical consideration. Schmitt highlights the concept’s importance and 
points to the significance of Hobbes’s views on this subject, yet his appropriation of the 
latter’s thought also conceals important differences between both thinkers. Therefore, 
this thesis will examine Hobbes’s concept of enmity in its own right. 
 
1.2 Methodological approach 
The methodological approach chosen for this study is related to Schmitt’s comments on 
the thesis subject, i.e. Hobbes’s concept of enmity. As will be shown in this section, 
Schmitt admits that his claims about Hobbes are not grounded in a careful analysis of 
his works, which has not been done before. Yet, as will be become apparent, Schmitt 
also expresses his preference for a contextual, rather than a merely textual, exposition of 
meaning. This points to the wider methodological debate on historical contextualism, 
which will be briefly considered in order to justify the chosen approach. 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, Schmitt portrays Hobbes not only as the theorist 
of the modern secular state, but also as one of the founders of the international legal or-
der that was established in the early modern period. However, it needs to be said that 
Schmitt does not closely examine Hobbes’s views on hostility. Rather, he apparently 
draws a number of historical inferences based on the conventional narrative of the histo-
ry of modern international law, which supposedly emerged together with the system of 
mutually recognised sovereign states after the Peace of Westphalia. While Schmitt’s 
account captures important aspects of the jus publicum Europaeum, it is also problemat-
10 
ic in many respects. Commentators have not only criticised Schmitt’s own approach,41 
but also called into question the conventional notion that the modern state system origi-
nated in the Peace of Westphalia.42 It is also unclear whether Hobbes was actually 
aware of developments of positive international law at the time.43 
 
Schmitt himself acknowledges in a later review article (which has, to the author’s 
knowledge, so far not been translated into English) that an examination of Hobbes’s 
concept of the enemy based on what he actually says has yet to be done.44 Schmitt 
praises F.C. Hood’s The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes for providing close textual 
readings of the concepts of obligation, sovereignty, and authority, and points out that 
Hood’s work awakens in the reader a desire “to have other essential Hobbesian concepts 
analysed and clarified in the same way”.45 Thus, he expresses his wish for  
an examination of the enemy concept. This could illuminate Hobbes’s understanding of 
atheism, for [in De Cive] the atheist is defined as God’s enemy, and treated accordingly: 
ut hostis ab hoste; hoc est jure belli. Another question suggests itself: what does the trai-
tor or rebel actually do when he dares to declare war upon the sovereign, i.e. to confront 
the sovereign as an open enemy and thus revert back to the state of nature?46 
Schmitt praises Hood’s approach of close textual reading as a remedy for premature in-
terpretations, particularly the one of Hobbes’s Leviathan as a manifesto of totalitarian-
                                                
41 For critical studies of Schmitt’s account of the history of international law, see, for example, Martti 
Koskenniemi, “International Law as Political Theology: How to Read Nomos der Erde?”, Constella-
tions 11 (2004), pp. 492-511; and Peter Schröder, “Carl Schmitt’s Appropriation of the Early Modern 
European Tradition of Political Thought on the State and Interstate Relations”, History of Political 
Thought 33 (2012), pp. 348-371. 
42 See, for instance, Stéphanie Beaulac, “The Westphalian Legal Orthodoxy – Myth or Reality?”, Journal 
of the History of International Law 2 (2000), pp. 148-177.  
43 See David Armitage, “Hobbes and the Foundations of Modern International Thought”, in Rethinking 
the Foundations of Modern Political Thought, eds. Annabel Brett and James Tully (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2006), pp. 219-235. 
44 Schmitt, “Die Vollendete Reformation” [1965], pp. 138-141. 
45 Schmitt, “Die Vollendete Reformation”, p. 140 (author’s translation). Cf. F.C. Hood, The Divine Poli-
tics of Thomas Hobbes: An Interpretation of 'Leviathan' (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964). 
46 Schmitt, “Die Vollendete Reformation”, p. 140 (author’s translation). The Latin phrase is an abridged 
quotation from De Cive OL, XIV.19, p. 215, meaning “as an enemy [is punished] by an enemy […] 
that is, by the right of war”. This translation is from De Cive, XIV.19, p. 164. 
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ism.47 Yet he also maintains that analysing “what Hobbes really said” is only a prelimi-
nary for philosophical-historical reflection on “what he really meant”.48 
 
This statement invites a comparison with methodological claims put forward in Anglo-
phone scholarship. For instance, Quentin Skinner points out in a similar vein that “[a]s 
well as grasping the meaning of what they said, we need […] to understand what they 
meant by saying it”.49 Cambridge School intellectual historians, most notably Skinner 
and John Pocock, maintain that meaning can only be understood in its historical context, 
which needs to be reconstructed prior to the study of texts.50 This historical contextual-
ism is often compared to German Begriffsgeschichte (conceptual history), which was 
mainly developed by Reinhart Koselleck.51 The latter, in turn, acknowledges similarities 
between conceptual history and Schmitt’s jurisprudential research.52 
 
The methodological writings of the Cambridge School intellectual historians arguably 
have had a considerable impact on the field,53 yet many critics reject the claim that his-
torical contextualism is the only valid approach to the subject. For instance, Mark Bevir 
points out that, while considering contexts may be of heuristic value, it is not a ‘method’ 
                                                
47 Schmitt, “Die Vollendete Reformation”, p. 141. Schmitt does not mention any particular writers in this 
context, but might, for example, be alluding to the treatment of Hobbes in Hannah Arendt, The Ori-
gins of Totalitarianism [1951] (New York: Schocken, 2004), pp. 186-196. 
48 Schmitt, “Die Vollendete Reformation”, p. 141 (author’s translation).  
49 Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, Vol. I: Regarding Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), p. 82. 
50 For seminal methodological writings of Cambridge School historians since the 1960s, see the essays 
collected in J.G.A. Pocock, Political Thought and History: Essays on Theory and Method (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Skinner, Visions of Politics, Vol. I. 
51 Skinner himself notes important similarities between Begriffsgeschichte and his own historical contex-
tualism in Visions of Politics, Vol. I, p. 177. 
52 Reinhart Koselleck, The Practice of History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts, trans. Todd Samuel 
Presner et al. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 22. Cf. Timo Pankakoski, “Conflict, 
Context, Concreteness: Koselleck and Schmitt on Concepts”, Political Theory 38 (2010), pp. 749-779. 
53 If only to force many practitioners to reassert the validity their alternative approaches, which are con-
tested by methodologists such as Skinner. For a critical assessment of the impact of historical contex-
tualism, see David Boucher, Texts in Context: Revisionist Methods for Studying the History of Ideas 
(Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), pp. 251-260. 
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in the sense of being either necessary or sufficient for reaching accurate understand-
ings.54 Furthermore, there are doubts as to whether the methodology of historical con-
textualism is clearly articulated and internally consistent. What constitutes ‘the context’, 
for instance, remains crucially undefined.55 Given that contexts which are supposed to 
illuminate a text’s meaning need to be reconstructed on the basis of textual sources, 
Skinner’s and Pocock’s approaches also face a problem of circularity.56  
 
While Pocock, Skinner, and their followers have been admired for their historical schol-
arship, it seems questionable whether they recover history as it really was. Critics point 
out that, in making bold claims about different intellectual movements or periods and 
historical shifts between them, these scholars often ignore the intricacies of particular 
texts and philosophies.57 It has also been argued that, far from being able to free them-
selves from preconceptions about the past, historical contextualists tend to let historical 
assumptions dictate the questions to ask, and answers to expect, in their enquiries.58 
Furthermore, it appears that some narratives continue to be spread and perpetuated by 
Cambridge School historians despite effectively having been refuted by other scholars.59 
                                                
54 Mark Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 9f, 
83-85. The weaker claim, i.e. that contextual considerations are of heuristic value, appears to be be-
yond dispute. Hobbes himself also holds that the interpretation of historical texts is difficult and 
“needs the help of a context [multarum circumstantiarum]”. See De Cive, XVII.18, p. 219. 
55 Boucher, Texts in Context, pp. 255f; Preston King, Thinking Past a Problem: Essays on the History of 
Ideas (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 217. 
56 King, Thinking Past a Problem, p. 224. It has also been noted that historical contextualism, somewhat 
ironically, relies on ahistorical assumptions. See Robert Lamb, “Quentin Skinner’s Revised Historical 
Contextualism: A Critique”, History of the Human Sciences 22 (2009), pp. 51-73, 64. 
57 See, for instance, Edward Hall, “Hobbes’s Liberty and Skinner’s Discontent”, Politics 30 (2010), pp. 
11-17; Randall Lesaffer, “Review of Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought 
and the International Order From Grotius to Kant”, Journal of the History of International Law 4 
(2002), pp. 135-137; Michael Oakeshott, “Review of Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern 
Political Thought”, The Historical Journal 23 (1980), pp. 449-453; Tom Sorell, “Hobbes Overcontex-
tualised?”, Seventeenth Century 16 (2001), pp. 123-146, 142. 
58 Sorell, “Hobbes Overcontextualised?”, p. 142. On this risk, also see Kinch Hoekstra, “The de facto 
Turn on Hobbes’s Political Philosophy”, in Leviathan After 350 Years, eds. Tom Sorell and Luc 
Foisneau (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), pp. 33-73, p. 57, n. 115. 
59 In particular, this seems to be the case with regard to Richard Tuck’s thesis that Hobbes sought to over-
come an intellectual crisis due to the rediscovery of ancient scepticism. Perez Zagorin notes that, de-
spite the fact that Hobbesian scholars expressed severe objections to Tuck’s views, “it has become ra-
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This might, of course, be incidental. Yet some critics also find that the insistence on a 
certain methodology as a criterion for valid interpretations is not conducive to making 
arguments as “undogmatically open to counterargument as possible”.60 
 
The problems raised by this discussion of historical contextualism suggest that contex-
tual considerations could not be a substitute for a careful analysis of the texts under 
study. In order to examine Hobbes’s concept of enmity, this thesis therefore adopts the 
approach of close textual reading. Although this way of studying political thought is, in 
some sense, conventional and used by many practitioners, there seems to be little meth-
odological reflection on it. Peter Steinberger describes it as follows: 
Generally, the approach is one of paraphrase, reconstruction, inference, and extrapola-
tion. It is the effort to restate what has been said with a view to achieving maximum 
clarity and comprehensiveness, and this means eliminating, to the degree possible, all 
sources of ambiguity or imprecision.61 
The premise underlying such an approach is that careful analysis could improve our un-
derstanding of Hobbes’s thought, and specifically of the concept of enmity in his politi-
cal philosophy. However, a close reading does, of course, not preclude consideration of 
issues beyond the text. Rather, to concentrate on the latter is, in the words of Preston 
King, “to focus upon all that to which [the text] adverts and relates”.62 
 
The thesis can be described as a single-author study in that it only considers other think-
ers for the purpose of clarifying and situating Hobbes’s ideas. Authorship is, thereby, 
                                                                                                                                          
ther common to find authors, invariably drawing upon Tuck, who describe Grotius as a central influ-
ence upon Hobbes and picture the latter as his disciple in regard to the concept of natural rights.” See 
Zagorin,  “Hobbes Without Grotius”, History of Political Thought 21 (2000), pp. 16-40, 19. Tuck’s 
claims concerning Hobbes’s scepticism will be further considered in sec. 4.3. 
60 Dominick LaCapra, Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Language (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1983), pp. 37f. 
61 Peter J. Steinberger, “Analysis and History of Political Thought”, American Political Science Review 
103 (2009), pp. 135-146, 142. 
62 King, Thinking Past a Problem, p. 60. 
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not an objective quality but, as Michel Foucault points out, an attribute imposed upon 
texts to fulfil certain classificatory functions.63 While there might be a risk to exaggerate 
an author’s agency, there also seems to be the converse danger of overplaying the histo-
rian’s authority when discourses are reconstructed without consideration of convention-
al categories such as author and work. As Gary Browning puts it:  
A focus in intellectual history upon individuals and their texts at least has the merit of 
providing relatively determinate objects of study that are susceptible of being interpreted 
in ways that may resist accommodation into a projected explanatory narrative.64 
Undoubtedly, attributing authorship might be futile on some occasions, such as in the 
case of Socrates.65 Yet Hobbesian scholarship today does not face any such problems. 
Apart from one minor exception, it is commonly agreed that Hobbes has written, and in 
many cases circulated or published, the works we attribute to him.66 
 
That being said, interpreters take different views on how Hobbes’s works relate to each 
other. Michael Oakeshott, for example, describes Leviathan as “the greatest, perhaps the 
sole, masterpiece of political philosophy written in the English language”.67 By contrast, 
Skinner finds this work largely rhetorical in nature, and suggests that Hobbes had given 
up his earlier ambition to develop a science of politics when he was writing it.68 Rather 
than making any such general assertions, this thesis provides a comparative analysis of 
                                                
63 Michel Foucault, “What is an Author?”, trans. J.V. Harari, in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow 
(London: Penguin Books, 1984), pp. 101-120. 
64 Gary Browning, “Agency and Influence in the History of Political Thought: The Agency of Influence 
and the Influence of Agency”, History of Political Thought 31 (2010), pp. 345-365, 363. 
65 Due to the fact that Socrates himself did not leave behind any writings, his philosophy can only be ac-
cessed through the works of his disciples, or other indirect accounts. See Louis-André Dorion, “The 
Rise and Fall oft he Socratic Problem“, in The Cambridge Companion to Socrates, ed. Donald R. 
Morrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 1-23. 
66 The only exception is the so-called ‘Short Tract on Principles’, a metaphysical treatise probably written 
in the early 1630s. For opposing views on the question whether or not this text was indeed written by 
Hobbes, see Noel Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), pp. 104-139, and 
Karl Schuhmann, “Le Short Tract, première œuvre philosophique de Hobbes”, Hobbes Studies 8 
(1995), pp. 3-36. The ‘Short Tract’ will not be considered in this thesis. 
67 Michael Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975), p. 3. 
68 Quentin Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), p. 351. 
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relevant aspects of––what may be called––Hobbes’s main political works, i.e. The Ele-
ments of Law, De Cive, and Leviathan. In order to further elucidate the concept of enmi-
ty in Hobbes’s political philosophy, relevant passages from his other writings will also 
be considered.69 While these works are concerned with history, law, natural philosophy, 
and other subjects (rather than with political philosophy in a narrow sense), they relate 
to and further elaborate themes discussed in The Elements of Law, De Cive, and Levia-
than. Therefore, consideration of these texts could shed further light on Hobbes’s con-
cept of enmity and connected aspects of his political philosophy. 
 
To conclude, this study adopts the approach of close textual reading. In view of objec-
tions to methodological claims made by historical contextualists, it has been argued that 
a careful analysis of Hobbes’s works is indispensible for examining his concept of en-
mity. This approach avoids projecting historical narratives upon past thinkers and there-
by misconstruing their ideas, which appears to be the case in Schmitt’s account of the 
history of the jus publicum Europaeum. Indeed, as has been shown above, Schmitt him-
self acknowledges that his claims about Hobbes are not grounded in a close reading of 
what he actually says in his works, which he suggests has yet to be done. 
 
1.3 Thesis statement and contribution to the literature 
To the author’s knowledge, this is the first systematic study of Hobbes’s concept of en-
mity. Examining this important category does not only elucidate the concept itself, but 
also provides an opportunity to reconnect fragments of Hobbes’s thought that are in-
creasingly being treated as disparate subjects. It will be suggested that the concept of 
enmity can shed further light on a number of related aspects of Hobbes’s political phi-
                                                
69 See the list of works, editions, and abbreviations on pp. v-vi. 
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losophy, including competitiveness, the roles of fear and trust, the evil of violent death, 
the status of rebels, and his theory of international relations. 
 
Moreover, the subject invites a rethinking of Hobbes's place in the history of interna-
tional political thought. It will be suggested that Hobbes was among the first to make 
enmity a central subject of the theoretical reflection on the nature and proper organisa-
tion of political community.70 Surely philosophers have always considered issues relat-
ing to friendship and enmity, with the latter often regarded as a fact of moral life and 
understood along the lines of conventional political or cultural divisions. For example, 
Greeks and barbarians were considered ‘enemies by nature’.71 Yet it appears that enmity 
assumes a more prominent role in Hobbes’s thought due to his characteristic break with 
the notion of natural sociability. As a consequence of this, Hobbes describes the natural 
condition as a war of all against all.72 Thus, it will be suggested here that Hobbes substi-
tutes a concept of natural enmity for the notion of natural sociability. 
 
The war of all against all supposedly arises due to universal human characteristics, and 
this thesis particularly considers competitiveness and distrust as sources of enmity in the 
state of nature. It will be shown that, according to Hobbes, human competitiveness 
would naturally provoke hostility. In addition, this thesis highlights Hobbes’s peculiar 
conception of distrust, which does not require that others have previously revealed their 
hostility but merely denotes the possibility that they could become enemies in the fu-
                                                
70 This may be broadly defined as the subject matter of political philosophy, as it first emerged in ancient 
Greece. See Iain Hampsher-Monk, “Political Philosophy, History of”, in Shorter Routledge Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Craig (Oxford: Routledge, 2005), pp. 818f. 
71 See sec. 2.1. 
72 On Hobbes’s departure from traditional natural law theory, see, for instance, Norberto Bobbio, Thomas 
Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition, trans. Daniela Gobetti (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1993), pp. 1-8; Perez Zagorin, Hobbes and the Law of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 2009), pp. 36-38. 
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ture. In this context, this thesis also proposes a reassessment of the evil of violent death 
in Hobbes’s political philosophy. It will be suggested that Hobbes does not, as is often 
assumed, advance the perhaps mistaken view that death is the greatest fear of all human 
beings.73 Rather, his fundamental premise is that everybody would, under certain condi-
tions, be willing to do the ‘greatest thing’, i.e. to kill another in order to satisfy his or 
her own desires.74 This willingness also defines the state of hostility. 
 
References to natural enmity are sometimes supposed to preclude reconciliation with 
particular groups or individuals,75 yet this does not apply to Hobbes. It will be shown 
that Hobbesian enemies are generally supposed to be able to overcome hostility through 
subjection to a sovereign power. This is particularly apparent from his views on sover-
eignty acquired by conquest.76 What is more, Hobbes desribes seeking and granting 
peace as precepts of natural law. The latter also applies to people who already live in the 
civil state, and it is often suggested that Hobbes’s main persuasive aim is to encourage 
his readers to remain obedient to their sovereign. Further developing this theme, this 
thesis will argue that Hobbes deploys scepticism as a rhetorical weapon against reli-
gious doctrines that justify resistance against the state. This would indicate that his 
scepticism has a more limited scope than some intellectual historians suggest.77 At the 
                                                
73 For a useful overview of the debate on the evil of violent death, see Mark C. Murphy, “Hobbes on the 
Evil of Death”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 82 (2000), pp. 36-61. Few interpreters pay at-
tention to the fact that Hobbes is primarily concerned with violent death, and even if they do, they do 
not spell out how violence relates to hostility in the state of nature. 
74 Hobbesian interpreters usually focus on the equal ability of all human beings to do the ‘greatest thing’, 
rather than their equal willingness to kill another. See, for instance, Gabriella Slomp, Hobbes and the 
Political Philosophy of Glory (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2000), pp. 25f. 
75 See, for instance, Plato’s comments on the relations between Greeks and barbarians. Plato, Republic, 
trans. C.D.C. Reeve (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2004), 470c, p. 163. Cf. sec. 2.1 
76 Examining the distinction between subjects and enemies allows for a reassessment of the role of politi-
cal fear vis-à-vis fidelity and trust in Hobbes’s political philosophy. On this point, this thesis further 
develops views expressed by Deborah Baumgold, “’Trust’ in Hobbes’s Political Thought”, Political 
Theory 20 (2013), pp. 1-18; and Larry May, Limiting Leviathan: Hobbes on Law and International 
Affairs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 122-25, 132. 
77 For instance, Richard Tuck, Hobbes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 7, advances the view 
that Hobbes’s philosophy sought to overcome fundamental doubts regarding the possibility of secure 
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same time, Hobbes himself employs a number of different religious analogies to put 
forward his views on peace. In this regard, the thesis particularly calls attention to his 
interpretation of the biblical story of the Fall as a warning against rebellion.78 
 
In accordance with his view that subjection to a sovereign power allows human beings 
to avoid the hostility of the state of nature, Hobbes does not draw a static distinction be-
tween public and private enmity. Rather, the analysis of his Latin terminology will reval 
that he describes individuals in the state of nature as hostes,79 i.e. as public enemies that 
possess a right to use force analogous to the sovereign’s right to make war. By contrast, 
people in the civil state are inimici (private enemies), because, as will be further shown, 
the right of war and subjection to the sovereign are mutually exclusive. Subjects do re-
tain a right to resist assaults or punishment. Yet Hobbes holds that they must not use 
violence pre-emptively against one another or against the sovereign,80 because in this 
case they would pose a challenge to the sovereign’s exclusive right of war. 
 
Regarding the relationship between hostility and human competitiveness, it will be 
shown that the state does not merely keep human nature in check,81 but also provides 
                                                                                                                                          
knowledge about morality and the natural world. Cf. sec. 4.3. 
78 It has been noted before that Hobbes appropriates the doctrine of the Fall. See Oakeshott, Hobbes on 
Civil Association, pp. 58-60; Tom Sorell, Hobbes (London: Routlege, 1986), pp. 33-37; and Sheldon 
S. Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 237. However, none of these accounts considers that Hobbes lik-
ens the act of rebellion to the ‘original sin’. 
79 Holmes, “Does Hobbes Have a Concept of the Enemy?”, p. 386, speculates that, as a translator of Thu-
cydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, Hobbes might have been aware “that a hated domestic 
opponent (echthros) could easily become an all-out enemy (polemios)”. However, Holmes does not 
pay attention to Hobbes's use of the Latin terms inimicus and hostis. The latter consideration is also 
omitted in Michael Silverthorne, “Political Terms in the Latin of Thomas Hobbes,” International 
Journal of the Classical Tradition 2 (1996), pp. 499-509. 
80 Thus, this thesis also contributes to the debate on Hobbesian ‘resistance rights’. For important contribu-
tions to this debate, see Deborah Baumgold, Hobbes’s Political Theory (New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1988), ch. 2; Claire Finkelstein, “A Puzzle About Hobbes on Self-Defence”, Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2001), pp. 332-361; and Susanne Sreedhar, Hobbes on Resistance: Defy-
ing the Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
81 For this view, see David P. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 
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arenas for socially beneficial competition that are unavailable in the state of nature.82 
Despite this, however, Hobbes holds that competitiveness could, under certain condi-
tions, provoke a return of hostility. This appears to be in accordance with his aforemen-
tioned dynamic distinction between public and private enemies. This thesis will suggest 
that the latter distinguishes Hobbes’s thought from the liberal conception of economic 
competition, which does not consider the possibility that competition between private 
individuals could provoke outright hostility. Furthermore, Hobbes’s dynamic distinction 
also differs from Carl Schmitt’s view that political enmity, which concerns the relations 
between organised totalities, is strictly separate from personal rivalry. 
 
Hostility returns to the domestic realm in the event of rebellion, and it is often said that 
the English Civil War inspired Hobbes’s political philosophy. Yet it will be shown that 
Hobbes does not mainly conceive of domestic enmity in terms of actual violence, but 
instead focuses on events prior to civil war. In particular, he seeks to establish that ‘bare 
words’ are sufficient evidence for the sin of rebellion, such as when authors of sedition 
call the sovereign a tyrant.83 In addition, this thesis analyses Hobbes’s claim that the re-
bel is not merely inimicus (a private enemy) but hostis (a public enemy against whom 
the right of war can be applied).84 It will be argued that he envisions an extra-legal ju-
risdiction that may allow the sovereign to prevent the outbreak of civil war. Specifical-
                                                                                                                                          
pp. 319f; Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association, p. 38; Sorell, Hobbes, p. 125; Thomas Spragens, 
The Politics of Motion: The World of Thomas Hobbes (London: Croom Helm, 1973), p. 193; Sheldon 
S. Wolin, “Hobbes and the Culture of Despotism”, in Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory, ed. Mary 
G. Dietz (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1990), pp. 9-36, 29. 
82 For this view, see Robert Shaver, “Leviathan, King of the Proud”, Hobbes Studies 3 (1990), pp. 54-74, 
54-58; and Slomp, Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory, p. 67. 
83 Hobbes often uses the phrase ‘author of sedition’ to refer to people who incite others to rebellion, such 
as, for example, the Roman Senator Catiline. See sec. 7.3. This term will be used throughout this the-
sis when referring to Hobbes’s conception of such rebellious individuals. 
84 Some interpreters note, but do not further examine, Hobbes’s claim that that those who break the social 
contract become public enemies. Others reject the idea that individuals could thus be excluded from 
society in view of its apparent implausibility. For examples of the latter view, see Peter Hayes, “Pi-
rates, Privateers, and the Contract Theories of Hobbes and Locke”, History of Political Thought 29 
(2008), pp. 461-484, 469f; and Sreedhar, Hobbes on Resistance, p. 157. 
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ly, rulers should attribute exclusive responsibility to authors of sedition while pardoning 
other participants of a rebellion in order to restore them as subjects. By adopting such a 
strategy of divide and conquer, they might be able to prevent a civil war. 
 
On this basis, this thesis also proposes a reinterpretation of the fool passage in Levia-
than. Responding in particular to Kinch Hoekstra’s reading of the so-called ‘reply to the 
fool’,85 it will be argued that Hobbes seeks to persuade his audience that authors of sedi-
tion, who reveal their denial of justice by calling the sovereign a tyrant, ought to be 
treated as ‘enemies of mankind’. This notion, which appears in many ancient, medieval, 
and early-modern sources,86 helps to explain the persuasive aims of this passage and 
Hobbes’s views on the foolishness of rebellion.87 Like other enemies of mankind, such 
as pirates, those who deny justice cannot be trusted to keep faith.88 Consequently, as 
Hobbes clearly states in Leviathan, rebellious fools should not be admitted into any hu-
man association. This reflects his view that only people who appear trustworthy enough 
to keep the social contract could become members of the commonwealth. 
 
Lastly, the thesis examines how the concept of enmity helps to clarify Hobbes’s views 
on international relations. It is argued that the state-of-nature analogy should not be 
misconstrued as a theory of how pre-given units (i.e. states) interact within a self-
enclosed (international) system. Rather, Hobbes’s account of sovereignty acquired by 
conquest implies that commonwealths could also be decomposed and reassembled after 
                                                
85 Kinch Hoekstra, “Hobbes and the Foole”, Political Theory 25 (1997), pp. 620-654. Hoektra’s article 
reflects a broader trend to read this passage not as a philosophical argument against free-riding in gen-
eral but, more specifically, as an attempt to discourage rebellion. 
86 Cf. sec. 2.1 and 7.4. 
87 It is argued that this notion provides a more convincing account of the rhetorical nature of the fool pas-
sage than the latter’s religious symbolism, which is explored in Patricia Springborg, “Hobbes’s Fool 
the Insipiens, and the Tyrant-King”, Political Theory 39 (2011), pp. 85-111. 
88 If there is one thing that all commentators agree upon, it is the fact that as a consequence of his denial 
of justice, the fool cannot be trusted to keep his covenants. Cf. sed. 7.4. 
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a successful foreign invasion.89 He insists that once a state’s power has been entirely 
defeated, its former members ought to be admitted as equal subjects of the conqueror. It 
will be argued that this possibility is of crucial importance for his theory of international 
relations. In particular, it seems to imply that international hostility does not necessarily 
result in mutual annihilation, as does the war of all against all. 
 
In relation to this, the question of how sovereign states recognise one another will also 
be addressed. Analysis shows that Hobbes only assumes de facto recognition of sover-
eign authority and rejects the idea that rulers enjoy any privileges at war, such as being 
spared from punishment, due to their legal status.90 To the contrary, his comments indi-
cate that enemies specifically target the holder of sovereign power, whose life and liber-
ty is, therefore, always at stake in the making of foreign policy. This provides an expla-
nation for Hobbes’s claim that sovereigns are personally bound by the natural law, 
which he identifies with the law of nations.91 In accordance with this view, Hobbes also 
seems to assume that there are natural limits of international hostility due to prudential 
reasoning.92 It will be shown that, no matter whether sovereigns desire glory, gain, or 
security, they can benefit from practising restraint towards the enemy. 
                                                
89 By highlighting the possibility of conquest, this thesis expands on the finding that Hobbes’s reception 
as a forerunner of Realism presupposes an unHobbesian distinction between ‘the domestic’ and ‘the 
international’ as self-enclosed spheres of life. Cf. Armitage, “Hobbes and the Foundations of Modern 
International Thought”, p. 231; Gabriella Slomp, “The Politics of Motion and the Motion of Politics, 
in International Political Theory After Hobbes: Analysis, Interpretation and Orientation, eds. Raia 
Prokhovnik and Gabriella Slomp (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 19-41, 34-36. 
90 Contra Schmitt, this shows that sovereigns are not treated as ‘just enemies’. The question how states 
recognise one another is generally underexplored in the literature on Hobbes. For exceptions, see Da-
vid Runciman, Pluralism and the Personality of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), p. 17; William Sacksteder, “Mutually Acceptable Glory: Rating Among Nations in Hobbes”, in 
The Causes of Quarrel: Essays on Peace, War, and Thomas Hobbes, ed. Peter Caws (Boston, MA: 
Beacon Press, 1989), pp. 97-113, 111f. 
91 A number of interpreters highlight this feature of his conception of the law of nations. See, for example, 
S.A. Lloyd, “International Relations, World Government, and the Ethics of War”, in Hobbes Today: 
Insights for the 21st Century, ed. S.A. Lloyd (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 288-
303, 298-301; Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes, pp. 443-446. However, existing accounts fail to 
acknowledge that sovereigns are liable with their lives and liberty. 
92 That there are limits of hostility between Hobbesian states is mentioned or implied, although not further 
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This reading points to a vision of international order that crucially differs from the so-
called ‘Westphalian system’ of sovereign states. Contrary to what Schmitt suggests in 
his account of the jus publicum Europaeum (the system of positive international law 
that developed after the Peace of Westphalia), Hobbes does not hold that sovereign 
states recognise each other as  ‘just enemies’, i.e. as compound moral persons that have 
equal rights and legitimacy to make war. Rather, he seems to envision an international 
order in which the de facto authority of sovereigns, their personal liability, and the im-
perative of self-preservation provide a basis for prudential self-restraint, the coexistence 
of states, and––in the extreme case––the reconciliation of former enemies. 
 
Hobbes’s concept of enmity and related aspects of his political thought will be consid-
ered in chapters 3–8. These chapters will focus on natural enmity, human competitive-
ness, and the evil of violent death (chapter 3); natural reason and the good of peace 
(chapter 4); trust, subjection, and the rights of sovereigns and subjects (chapter 5); com-
petiveness in the civil state (chapter 6); rebellion (chapter 7); and international relations 
(chapter 8). Prior to the examination of Hobbes’s views on these themes, the following 
chapter will situate his ideas vis-à-vis other conceptions of enmity. 
                                                                                                                                          
examined, by many interpreters. See, for instance, Stanley Hoffmann, “Rousseau on War and Peace”, 
American Political Science Review 57 (1963), pp. 317-333, 320. 
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2. Conceptions of enmity 
This chapter offers some preliminary suggestions regarding different conceptions of 
enmity in order prepare the ground for the subsequent exposition of Hobbes’s views. 
This treatment of the subject must remain cursory and selective, for a comprehensive 
account of the enemy concept in the history of international political thought is clearly 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Yet considering a limited number of thinkers with 
whom Hobbes was familiar, or who have obvious points of contact with his thought, 
may suffice to bring out the significance of his views on this subject. 
 
The first section of this chapter looks at aspects of Greek and Roman political thought. 
It is shown that, although ancient philosophers consider issues relating to enmity, they 
usually regard the latter as a fact of moral life and understand it along the lines of con-
ventional political or cultural divisions. The second section introduces Augustine’s 
views on the Fall and his reflections on just war. It is suggested that, while Augustine 
reflects upon the political function of fear, his concern remains ultimately with issues 
which transcend the realm of temporal existence. The third section considers views on 
hostility by the late scholastic theologian Francisco Vitoria and the early modern jurist 
Alberico Gentili. It is argued that these near contemporaries of Hobbes begin to think 
about enmity in more explicitly political terms as entirely the result of human agency. 
The fourth suggests that, in breaking with the notion of natural sociability, Hobbes is 
among the first to make enmity a central subject of political philosophy. 
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2.1 Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics: enmity and civilisation 
Along with friendship, enmity may have always been part of human life. As such, it 
does not only appear in the writings of poets and historians, such as Homer and Thucyd-
ides,1 but is also considered by ancient Greek philosophers. However, this section will 
suggest that enmity did, in Antiquity, not yet become a central part of the theoretical 
reflection on the nature and proper organisation of political community.2 
 
In particular, it will become apparent that ancient Greek philosophers did not yet con-
ceive of enmity as something that could be transformed or transcended through human 
agency, rather accepting it as a fact of moral life. What is more, it seems that political or 
cultural divisions that existed between different peoples were frequently taken for 
granted. Although ancient Greek philosophers conceived of the world as a unified cos-
mos and were the first to develop the notion of the unity of humanity, it is often noticed 
that such ideas had little practical bearing. Specifically, it appears that thinkers at the 
time saw no problem in reflecting upon humanity in universal terms, while also accept-
ing the seemingly natural enmity between Greeks and barbarians (non-Greeks).3 
 
This can be illustrated with regard to Plato’s Republic.4 In a much-cited passage from 
Book 5 (which consists of a dialogue between Socrates and different interlocutors), Pla-
                                                
1 As one historian puts it, from the time of Homer onwards, “Greek popular thought is pervaded by the 
assumption that one should help one’s friends and harm one’s enemies”. Mary Whitlock Blundell, 
Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: A Study in Sophocles and Greek Ethics (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1989), p. 26. Hobbes was certainly familiar with the culture of ancient 
Greece, as he translated Homer and Thucydides into English. 
2 This may be broadly defined as the subject matter of political philosophy, as it first emerged in ancient 
Greece. See Hampsher-Monk, “Political Philosophy, History of”, pp. 818f. 
3 H.C. Baldry, The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 
pp. 1-5; David Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), pp. 174f. On the historical development of the notion of barbarians (non-Greeks), which 
presupposes a shared Hellenic identity, also see Edward Keene, International Political Thought: A 
Historical Introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), pp. 27-31. 
4 Hobbes’s writings contain a number of references to Plato. In Lev. XXXI.41 (OL), n. 15, p. 244, he spe-
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to seeks to establish a distinction between, on the one hand, conflicts among Greeks, 
and on the other, conflicts between Greeks and barbarians: 
SOCRATES: When Greeks fight with barbarians […] or barbarians with Greeks, we will 
say that that is warfare, that hey are natural enemies, and that such hostilities should be 
called war. But when Greeks engage in such things with Greeks, we will say they are 
natural friends, that Greece is sick and divided into factions in such a situation, and that 
such hostilities should be called faction [stasis].5 
In other words, only conflicts with barbarians should be called war, while hostilities 
among Greeks are a pathological condition. As it is evident from the context of this pas-
sage, however, Plato is not primarily concerned with relations towards foreign peoples. 
Rather, he is arguing for restraint towards fellow Greeks, and specifically seeks to dis-
courage the destruction of cities and enslavement of their populations. Apparently for 
this purpose, Plato invokes the conventional distinction between Greeks and barbarians 
as different kinds of human beings, even though the latter does not sit easily with his 
philosophical views on the unity of humanity. As commentators have pointed out, the 
account of human nature presented in other parts of the Republic rather suggests that 
distinctions between Greeks and non-Greeks are not rooted in nature.6 
 
Aristotle also makes some references to the conventional distinction between Greeks 
and barbarians, most notably when he argues in the Politics that “against those human 
beings who are unwilling to be ruled, but naturally suited for it, […] warfare is naturally 
                                                                                                                                          
cifically mentions Plato’s Republic. While Hobbes is generally critical of Greek philosophy, he de-
scribes Plato in Lev., XLVI.11, p. 456, as “the best philosopher of the Greeks”. 
5 Plato, Republic [written around 380 BC], 470c, p. 163 (emphasis added). It remains unclear whether 
Plato faithfully reports Socrates’ views or merely states his own ideas in dialogical form. On the no-
tion of stasis and its English translation, see the discussion in this section below. 
6 Baldry, The Unity of Mankind, pp. 81, 87; Owen Goldin, “Conflict and Cosmopolitanism in Plato and 
the Stoics”, Apeiron 44 (2011), pp. 264-284, 266-270. For a comparison between the Republic and 
statements on this matter in Plato’s other writings, see Rachana Kamtekar, “Distinction Without a Dif-
ference? Race and Genos in Plato”, in Philosophers on Race: Critical Essays, eds. Julie K. Ward and 
Tommy L. Lott (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 1-13. 
 26 
just”.7 Given that there is clear evidence of Hobbes’s familiarity with Aristotle’s views 
on slavery, this is particularly relevant for the purpose of this thesis.8 Interpreters today 
often regard Aristotle’s justification of natural slavery as an anomaly in his system of 
thought.9 However, his reflections on this subject may be indirectly connected to the 
central contention of his political philosophy, i.e. that the polis (city-state) is the perfect 
form of human association and constituted for the sake of the good life. Some commen-
tators thus argue that the institution of slavery gives a relatively small number of citi-
zens the leisure they need to participate in public life, develop virtuous characters, and 
achieve true happiness, as envisioned by Aristotle.10 By contrast, all that natural slaves 
can hope for is self-preservation, which is not the end of the polis.11 
 
In other words, the purpose of political community is not primarily to transcend a condi-
tion of enmity, as Hobbes would have it. This suggests that Aristotle’s political philoso-
phy does not only conceive of enmity in terms of the conventional distinction between 
Greeks and barbarians, but also largely excludes it as a subject of theoretical reflection 
due to its concern with the good life. Having said that, Aristotle is naturally keen to 
nourish friendship and prevent enmity among members of the polis. Like many other 
Greek philosophers, poets, and historians, he conceives of internal disorder as stasis. 
Signifying a kind of disease of the polis, this term has a broader meaning than English 
                                                
7 Aristotle, Politics [c. 320 BC], translated with introduction and notes by C.D.C. Reeve (Indianapolis, 
IN: Hackett, 1998), 1256b24-25, p. 14. Aristotle, thereby, identifies ‘natural slaves’ with barbarians 
on the basis that only they are usually called slaves. See Politics, 1255a28-32, p. 11. 
8 See Hobbes’s critical comments on Aristotle in De Cive, III.13, pp. 49f and Lev., XXI.9, p. 140. Hobbes 
engages with, and frequently criticises, Aristotle’s thought on many different levels. Above all, he re-
jects the Aristotelian notion of natural sociability. Cf. sec. 3.1. 
9 See, for instance, Malcolm Schofield, “Ideology and Philosophy in Aristotle’s Theory of Slavery”, in 
Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays, eds. Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (Lanham, MD: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 2005), pp. 91-119, 94. 
10 Peter Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), pp. 105-127; Eugene Garver, Aristotle's Politics: Living Well and Living Together (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2012), pp. 17-41. 
11 Aristotle clearly states in Politics, 1280a30-34, p. 80, that if it was for the sake of life, rather than the 
good life, then an association of slaves or animals could be considered a polis. 
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words such as ‘faction’, ‘sedition’, or ‘civil war’, also covering developments prior and 
leading to the eventual outbreak of violence.12 For this reason, stasis is also frequently 
linked to moral deficiencies. This can be seen, for instance, in a passage of Plato’s Re-
public, according to which “injustice causes factions [stasis], hatreds, and quarrels […], 
while justice brings friendship and a sense of common purpose”.13 
 
The connection between stasis and moral deficiencies also comes out in Thucydides’ 
account of the stasis in Corcyra, which particularly emphasises the corruption of moral 
language. In Hobbes’s translation of Thucydides’ work, we read: 
The received value of names imposed for signification of things, was changed into arbi-
trary. For inconsiderate boldness, was counted true-hearted manliness: provident delib-
eration, a handsome fear: modesty, the cloak of cowardice: to be wise in every thing, to 
be lazy in every thing. A furious suddenness was reputed a point of valour. […] In brief, 
he that could outstrip another in the doing of an evil act, or that could persuade another 
thereto that never meant it, was commended.14 
The corruption of language in Corcyra, as described by Thucydides, can be regarded as 
evidence of society’s moral decline.15 During this stasis, people “prosecuted their re-
venges still farther, without any regard of justice or the public good”.16 
 
Aristotle’s theory in the Politics also links stasis to injustice. In particular, Aristotle ar-
gues that stasis arises out of disagreement over the principles of justice embodied in a 
city’s constitution,17 implying that a certain degree of agreement is indispensible for life 
in the polis. As Aristotle states elsewhere, “[political] community involves friendship, 
                                                
12 Kostas Kalimtzis, Aristotle on Political Enmity and Disease (Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press, 2000), pp. 3-6. 
13 Plato, Republic, 351d4-6, p. 51. 
14 History 1, pp. 348f. I am referring to Hobbes’s translation, titled The History of the Grecian War, as 
this seems to be most relevant here. Apparent similarities between Thucydides’ description of the sta-
sis in Corcyra and Hobbes’s account of the state of nature will be considered in sec. 2.4. 
15 Cf. Clifford Orwin, “Stasis and Plague: Thucydides on the Dissolution of Society”, The Journal of 
Politics 50 (1988), pp. 831-847, 834-838. 
16 History 1, p. 350. 
17 Aristotle, Politics, 1301a35-38, p. 134. Cf. Aristotle, Politics, 1262b5-10, pp. 30f. 
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since enemies do not wish to share even a journey in common”.18 Modern interpreters 
often emphasise the close connections between friendship, agreement, and justice in Ar-
istotle’s political philosophy.19 Moreover, it has been argued that stasis should be un-
derstood as a privation of friendship.20 However that may be, enmity within a city-state 
appears to be mainly a symptom of moral deficiencies that would not occur if citizens 
had sufficient friendship ties and were in agreement on the common good.  
 
After Aristotle, the focus of theoretical reflection on ethics and politics increasingly 
shifted away from the polis. Denying natural differences between Greeks and barbari-
ans, Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic school of philosophy, appears to have 
been the first to advance cosmopolitan principles. According to Plutarch: 
[T]he much-admired Republic of Zeno, the founder of the Stoic sect, may be summed up 
in this one principle: that all the inhabitants of this world of ours should not live differ-
entiated by their respective rules of justice into separate cities and communities, but that 
we should consider all men to be of one community and one polity, and that we should 
have a common life and an order common to us all […].21 
While this may sound like a description of the ideal cosmopolitan state to modern ears, 
the political implications of Stoicism remain somewhat ambiguous. In practice, Stoi-
cism did certainly not inspire universal friendship towards all human beings. The Greek 
historian Plutarch, who is also one of the main sources of knowledge about the Old 
Stoa, points out “that it was Alexander [the Great] who gave effect to [Zeno’s] idea”.22 
                                                
18 Aristotle, Politics, 1295b22-24, p. 119. 
19 However, there is disagreement as to how exactly they relate to each other, and what kind of friendship 
political friendship is. See Richard Mulgan, “The Role of Friendship in Aristotle's Political Theory”, 
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 2 (1999), pp. 15-32, 24-28; Paul 
Schollmeier, Other Selves: Aristotle on Personal and Political Friendship (Albany, NY: State Univer-
sity of New York Press, 1994), pp. 97-11; Lorraine Smith Pangle, Aristotle and the Philosophy of 
Friendship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 80-81, 99-104. 
20 Kalimtzis, Political Enmity and Disease, pp. 87-101. 
21 Plutarch, “On the Fortune or the Virtue of Alexander”, in Plutarch’s Moralia with an English transla-
tion by Frank Cole Babbitt, Vol. 4 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936), p. 397. 
22 Plutarch, “On the Fortune or the Virtue of Alexander”, p. 397. 
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However, this statement is clearly part of an idealised account intended to portray the 
emperor as a true philosopher who spread Hellenic civilisation.23 
 
The same ambiguity can be encountered in Roman Stoicism, which flourished at a time 
when the Republic engaged in some of its most brutal conquests. Cicero, who to some 
extend followed Stoic ethical ideas, is a case in point. In On Obligations, he endorses 
the notion of a “fellowship of the whole human race” and argues that wars ought to be 
waged only for the sake of peace and justice.24 At the same time, Cicero points out that 
the Roman Empire should be understood as a “protectorate of the world”.25 Modern ad-
vocates of cosmopolitanism tend to downplay this apparent tension between Stoic prin-
ciples and justifications of imperialism.26 Yet it has also been suggested that it was ex-
actly due to its abstract moral nature and opposition to the reality of particularistic poli-
tics that Stoicism could easily be exploited by hegemonic powers.27 
 
In any case, it seems safe to assert that Cicero endorses the Roman ambition to speak 
and act in the name of humanity. Thus, he also famously describes pirates as communis 
hostis omnium (a common enemy of all).28 After noting in On Obligations that fidelity 
is required even in times of war, he argues that pirates have a special status, because 
                                                
23 For Plutarch’s portrayal of Alexander as a philosopher-king, see esp. “On the Fortune or the Virtue of 
Alexander”, pp. 389-399. Cf. Tim Whitmarsh, “Alexander’s Hellenism and Plutarch’s Textualism”, 
Classical Quarterly 52 (2002), pp. 174-192, 179f. The alternative view that Alexander, indeed, sought 
to realise a cosmopolitan ideal is now widely considered inaccurate. 
24 Cicero, On Obligations [De officiis, 44 BC], trans. P.G. Walsh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), I 34-35, pp. 13f; I 50, p. 19. 
25 Cicero, On Obligations, II 27, p. 63. On the relationship between Stoicism and imperialism in Cicero’s 
thought, cf. Goldin, “Conflict and Cosmopolitanism”, pp. 281-285. 
26 See, for example, Martha C. Nussbaum, “Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism”, The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 5 (1997), pp. 1-25, 14. 
27 Anthony Pagden, “Stoicism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Legacy of European Imperialism”, Constella-
tions 7 (2000), pp. 3-22, 6; Wolin, Politics and Vision, pp. 73-75. 
28 Walter Rech suggests that the Latin genitive omnium may, in this context, also be translated as ‘of all 
humans’. See Rech, Enemies of Mankind: Vattel’s Theory of Collective Security (Leiden, The Nether-
lands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), p. 31. Later writers who appropriated Cicero’s phrase 
commonly refer to hostis humani generis (‘enemy of mankind’). See sec. 7.4. 
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their oaths cannot be trusted.29 As he further points out in this regard, “if you fail to pay 
ransom on your life when you have agreed it with pirates, that does not constitute de-
ception, even if before you failed to pay you had sworn an oath”.30 In other words, uni-
versal obligations do not apply to those who are common enemies of all. Yet Cicero 
neither provides any sustained reflection on the nature of the latter, nor restricts his ap-
plication of this notion to those who engage in piratical activities. Rather, as some 
commentators have recently suggested, Cicero describes particular opponents of Rome 
as communis hostis omnium in order to disqualify them as unlawful enemies.31 
 
To conclude, this section has suggested that ancient Greek and Roman political thinkers 
often take for granted the seemingly natural division between civilisation and its ene-
mies. Moreover, they frequently conceive enmity as a fact of moral life. Plato and Aris-
totle consider domestic hostility as evidence of a city’s moral decline, while Cicero em-
phasises the moral deficiencies of particular enemies. However, it may be said that en-
mity did not become a central subject of political philosophy in Antiquity. 
 
2.2 Augustine: fear of enemies and just war 
In Late Antiquity, Augustine of Hippo offers some particularly interesting reflections on 
enmity. Illuminative in this regard is above all his account of Roman history in The City 
of God,32 which was intended to refute the view that the sack of Rome in 410 was relat-
                                                
29 Cicero, On Obligations, Book 3.107, pp. 120f. 
30 Cicero, On Obligations, Book 3.107, pp. 120f. 
31 See especially Daniel Heller-Roazen, The Enemy of All: Piracy and the Law of Nations (New York: 
Zone Books, 2009), pp. 100-102; and Rech, Enemies of Mankind, pp. 32-35. The distinction between 
lawful and unlawful enemies also plays an important role in the early modern period, and will be fur-
ther addressed in sec. 2.3. In addition, it will be suggested in sec. 7.4 that Hobbes, in his ‘reply to the 
fool’, appropriates the notion of an enemy of mankind. 
32 Hobbes had access to Augustine’s Opera and The City of God. See James Jay Hamilton, “Hobbes’s 
Study and the Hardwick Library”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 16 (1978), pp. 445-453. 
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ed to the Empire’s Christianisation.33 In addition, this section indicates how enmity re-
lates to Augustine’s interpretation of the Fall and reflections on just war. 
 
Augustine wrote at a time when the Western Roman Empire disintegrated, which was 
formative for the subsequent development of Western Christianity. In response to the 
Roman historian Sallust, he writes in The City of God: 
[Sallust] notes first that, between the second and last Carthaginian wars, the Romans 
displayed the highest morals and the greatest harmony. The cause of this happy state of 
affairs, however, was not the love of justice, but the fear of an uncertain peace while 
Carthage remained standing. (This is also why Nascia opposed the destruction of Car-
thage. He wished to suppress wickedness and to preserve those outstanding morals by 
restraining vice through fear).34 
Like Sallust, Augustine blames Rome’s moral corruption and discord on the annihila-
tion of its principal enemy.35 Thereby, he also recalls the well-known story about the 
debate between Cato the Elder and Nasica in the Roman Senate. According to Plu-
tarch’s version of this tale, Cato kept demanding that “Carthage must be destroyed”, 
while Nascia ended his speeches with the request that it “must be spared”. This was ap-
parently in view of the beneficial effects of the fear of Carthage.36 
 
The idea that fear of enemies can benefit a political community has been described as a 
“prudential commonplace rooted in ancient Greek and Roman culture”.37 Yet Augustine 
does not merely reiterate this view, but also provides his own reflections on the sources 
                                                
33 Paul J. Weithman, “Augustine’s Political Philosophy”, in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, 2nd 
ed., eds. David Vincent Meconi and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 
pp. 234-252, 241. 
34 Augustine, The City of God against the Pagans [written 413–426 AD], ed. and trans. R.W. Dyson 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), II 18, p. 71. Cf. III 21, pp. 129f. 
35 For Sallust’s account, see Catiline’s War, The Jugurthine War, Histories, trans. A.J. Woodman (Lon-
don: Penguin Books, 2007), p. 144. Also see Catiline’s War, 10, pp. 8f. 
36 See Plutarch, “Marcus Cato”, in Plutarch’s Lives with an English translation by Bernadotte Perrin, 
Vol. 2 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935), XXVII, p. 383. To the author’s knowledge, 
Sallust himself does not mention this story in his works. 
37 Neal Wood, “Sallust’s Theorem: A Comment on ‘Fear’ in Western Political Thought”, History of Polit-
ical Thought 16 (1995), pp. 174-189, 175. 
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of Rome’s moral energy and political cohesion. In this regard, he disagrees with Sallust 
on the inherent virtue of the early Romans and argues that it was only through the fear 
of Carthage that they lived “by the highest morals and in the greatest concord”.38 Under-
lying this claim seems to be Augustine’s interpretation of the biblical story of the Fall, 
which he develops in Books XI-XXII of The City of God. According to his narrative, all 
human beings became sinful mortals after Adam’s ‘original sin’, i.e. his eating from the 
forbidden tree of knowledge of good and evil in the Garden of Eden. 
 
Augustine’s conception of human nature after the Fall has important implications for 
the role of politics. In particular, it seems that such people need to be humbled and re-
strained,39 which is also the function of the fear of Carthage that Augustine so clearly 
discerns. If one accepts the idea of an inherited sin, the flourishing of a temporal city 
like Rome must entirely be due to the fear of enemies, as opposed to any inherent virtue 
of the Romans. Thus, Augustine may be said to offer some more general reflections on 
enmity and its implications for the nature of political communities. Naturally, his inter-
pretation of the Fall has reminded some readers of Hobbes’s political thought, and spe-
cifically of the latter’s account of human beings in the state of nature. Yet there also 
seem to be obvious differences between the perspectives of both thinkers.40 
 
Being considered one of the earliest sources of the just war tradition,41 Augustine does 
not only consider enmity in the context of beneficial effects of the fear of enemies. Ra-
                                                
38 Augustine, The City of God, III 21, pp. 129f. Cf. II 18, pp. 71-73. It is interesting that in ancient Greek 
and Roman thought, ideas on the political utility of fear appear to have been closely related to reflec-
tion on its persuasive uses by skilled orators. See Daniel Kapust, “On the Ancient Uses of Political 
Fear and Its Modern Implications”, Journal of the History of Ideas 69 (2008), pp. 353-373. By con-
trast, Augustine seems to be less concerned with the rhetorical evocation of fear. 
39 Cf. Weithman, “Augustine’s Political Philosophy”, p. 238. 
40 Claims about Hobbes’s appropriation of the story of the Fall, and similarities and differences between 
both thinkers in this regard, will be considered in sec. 4.4. 
41 Commentators sometimes refer to Augustine or Aquinas as proponents of the classical just war doc-
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ther, he also pays great attention to the question when using force is compatible with 
Christian faith. Due to the pacific counsels of the New Testament, culminating in the 
‘Love your enemies’ precept,42 early Christians refused to engage in warfare. Just war 
thinking can be described as an attempt to reconcile divine commands with the theory 
and practice of Roman law, which permits making war.43 It is sometimes also contrasted 
with the idea of holy war, yet there are different views on this matter.44 
 
One characteristic idea of the just war tradition that clearly comes out in Augustine’s 
thought is that war should be regarded as an instrument of justice. Apparently based on 
his understanding of human nature after the Fall, Augustine conceives of war both as a 
consequence and a remedy for sin.45 This seems to suggest that, if violence is inflicted 
with the right intention,46 making war could be interpreted as a benevolent act. As Nigel 
Biggar sums up this view of Augustine, ”just war is waged out of a benevolent concern 
for the interests of the unjust enemy”.47 While this perspective differs from Greco-
Roman conceptions, it still seems to accept enmity as a fact of moral life. 
                                                                                                                                          
trine, rather than the just war tradition. However, it seems that a distinctive doctrine on just war was 
only articulated at the end of the Middle Ages. See James Turner Johnson, Ideology, Reason and, the 
Limitations of War: Religious and Secular Concepts, 1200-1740 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1975), pp. 7f. Also see Nicholas Rengger, Just War and International Order: The Uncivil Con-
dition of World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 71. 
42 Matt 5:44. For an interesting discussion of how the ‘Love your enemies’ precept compares to the 
Greco-Roman tradition, see Marius Reiser, “Love of Enemies in the Context of Antiquity”, New Tes-
tament Studies 47 (2001), pp. 411-427. 
43 Frederick H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1975), pp. 16-26. 
44 For instance, Russell, The Just War in the Middle, pp. 29-32, presents the idea of just war as an alterna-
tive to justifications of holy war by Carolingian writers in the Early Middle Ages. By contrast, Turner 
Johnson, Ideology, Reason and, the Limitations of War, p. 82, holds that the concept of holy war arose 
out of the just war tradition in the late medieval and early modern period. 
45 Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages, pp. 16-18. 
46 Along with a just cause and legitimate authority, right intent is usually regarded as one of the three nec-
essary conditions of a just war. For a comparative analysis of Augustine’s and Aquinas’ views on 
right intent, see Joseph Boyle, “The Necessity of ‘Right Intent’ for Justifiably Waging War”, in Just 
War: Authority, Tradition, and Practice, eds. Anthony F. Lang Jr., Cian O’Driscoll, and John Wil-
liams (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), pp. 181-196, 183-189. 
47 Nigel Biggar, “Natural Flourishing as the Normative Ground of Just War: A Christian View”, in Just 
War: Authority, Tradition, and Practice, eds. Anthony F. Lang Jr., Cian O’Driscoll, and John Wil-
liams (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), pp. 49-61, 58, n. 2. 
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Despite his reflections on the political function of the fear, it therefore seems that Au-
gustine does not conceive of enmity as something that could be politically transformed 
or overcome. Rather, it may be said that Augustine is principally interested in moral and 
theological questions which transcend the realm of temporal existence. In particular, his 
concern is with the city of God, i.e. a “social ideal [of] rightly ordered love, peace, and 
justice” that cannot be realised in any earthly city.48 Instead of envisioning some sort of 
political salvation from earthly suffering, as Hobbes later does,49 Augustine holds that 
human beings could ultimately only be redeemed by divine grace. 
 
To conclude, this section has shown that enmity plays an important role in Augustine’s 
political thought. In particular, it has been argued that his views on human nature after 
the Fall provide a theoretical foundation for the idea that enemies are a source of moral 
energy and political cohesion. Despite this, however, Augustine’s reflections on just 
war suggest that his concern is ultimately with moral and theological questions, rather 
than with the nature and proper organisation of political community. 
 
2.3 Vitoria and Gentili: hostility, hospitality, and trust 
This section looks at ideas on enmity that developed closer to Hobbes’s time. Specifi-
cally, it considers aspects of the thought of the late scholastic theologian Francisco Vi-
toria and the early modern jurist Alberico Gentili, who theorised encounters between 
European and non-European opponents. It will be shown that, in this context, these 
                                                
48 Weithman, “Augustine’s Political Philosophy”, p. 248. 
49 See sec. 4.4. 
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thinkers conceive of enmity as being entirely the result of human agency. Unlike 
Hobbes, however, they are still indebted to the idea of natural sociability. 
 
To what extend Hobbes was familiar with the thought of Vitoria is not entirely clear. 
Hobbes undoubtedly knew traditional natural law theory, and he expresses his objec-
tions to scholastic philosophy more generally throughout his works. To the author’s 
knowledge however, he never mentions Vitoria by name.50 Neither does Hobbes explic-
itly refer to Gentili in any of his writings. However, the latter was Regius Professor of 
Civil Law at the University of Oxford while Hobbes was a student there, and Richard 
Tuck speculates that Hobbes might have attended his lectures.51 This may or may not be 
true, yet there is clear evidence that Hobbes was familiar with some ideas that were par-
adigmatically expressed by Gentili, including the notion of ‘just enemies’, which is par-
ticularly relevant for the purpose of this thesis.52 Given that Vitoria and Gentili feature 
prominently in Schmitt’s account of the jus publicum Europaeum (the system of law 
that developed after the Peace of Westphalia), which was mentioned in sec. 1.1, these 
thinkers further provide a useful point of comparison with Hobbes.53 
  
To begin with, Vitoria may be regarded as a thinker who was, on the one hand, indebted 
to the Christian just war tradition, and on the other hand, adapted ideas of this tradition 
in order to come to terms with a changing international political order. For instance, he 
argues in his lecture De iure belli that “except in ignorance” war cannot be just on both 
                                                
50 Yet on a number of occasions he refers to Vitoria’s fellow from the School of Salamanca, Francisco 
Suárez. See Lev., VIII.27, p. 46; EW 5, pp. 11, 18, 37, 176, 266; Behemoth, p. 17. 
51 Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Gro-
tius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 17. 
52 Cf. sec. 1.1. Hobbes’s critical comments on the idea that sovereign states recognise each other as hav-
ing equal rights and legitimacy will be discussed in sec. 8.2. 
53 This is the main reason why this section’s focus lies on Vitoria and Gentili, rather than other writers on 
international law, such as Hugo Grotius. However, Grotius will be mentioned in the footnotes. Claims 
about Grotius’ influence on Hobbes will be briefly addressed in sec. 3.2. 
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sides.54 While Vitoria thus confirms the principle that only one side could have a just 
cause, he also considers the possibility of doubt. This seems to be of great importance,55 
for it lets Vitoria emphasise the role of public authority: 
I admit that it is never lawful to act against conscientious doubt […]. But it is incorrect 
to deduce that if I am in doubt as to whether the cause of war is just, I must therefore 
doubt whether I may lawfully make war, or fight in that war. In fact, we must deduce 
just the opposite: if I am in doubt about the justice of war, it follows that it is lawful for 
me to go to war at the command of my prince.56 
Vitoria’s principal concern arguably remains under what conditions Christians are per-
mitted to go to war, a question that had particular significance in view of the conquest 
of the New World, yet he invokes juridical terms to settle this issue.57 Specifically, he 
maintains that public authority must ultimately decide the justice of war. 
 
Regarding colonial wars in America, Vitoria further advances the view that “difference 
of religion cannot be a just cause of war”.58 Yet he provides an alternative argument to 
legitimise colonial wars, which reveals his conception of enmity. Vitoria reasons that 
war would be justified if Native Americans failed to act in accordance with the natural 
law that stipulates friendship towards all human beings, and specifically if they did not 
                                                
54 Francisco de Vitoria, “On the Law of War” [1539], in Political Writings, trans. and eds. Anthony 
Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), II 4, pp. 312f. 
55 Cf. Peter Schröder, “Vitoria, Gentili, Bodin: Sovereignty and the Law of Nations“, in The Roman 
Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire, eds. Benedict Kings-
bury and Benjamin Straumann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 163-186, 168f. 
56 Vitoria, “On the Law of War”, II 3, p. 312. 
57 For this reason, Vitoria has also been regarded as the founder of modern international law. See James 
Brown Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law: Francisco de Vitoria and his Law of Nations 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934). By contrast, other commentators emphasise the distinction between 
Vitoria’s still largely theological perspective and later juridical thought. See, for instance, Murray For-
syth, “The Tradition of International Law”, in Traditions of International Ethics, eds. Terry Nardin 
and David R. Mapel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 23-41, 25f; and Schröder, 
“Vitoria, Gentili, Bodin“, pp. 167-169, 177. 
58 Vitoria, “On the Law of War”, I 3, p. 302. This position, which was already expressed by Pope Inno-
cent IV, can be traced back to earlier developments in Thomistic thought. See Brett Bowden, “The 
Colonial Origins of International Law: European Expansion and the Classical Standard of Civiliza-
tion”, Journal of the History of International Law 7 (2005), pp. 1-23, 4-9. Grotius later advanced a 
similar view, thereby criticising Aristotle’s doctrine of natural slavery (which was mentioned in sec. 
2.1). See Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, edited and annotated by Stephen C. Neff 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), II.22 12, p. 304. 
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grant the Spanish a right of hospitality. The latter prescribes, among other things, free 
travel and free trade.59 This argument is certainly problematic as a justification of Euro-
pean colonial endeavours, which are inadequately described in terms of trade and travel-
ling.60 However, Vitoria’s reasoning shows that he does not conceive of the universal 
community of mankind in abstract moral terms. Rather, he appears to politicise this no-
tion by drawing a distinction between hostility and hospitality.61 Consequently, enmity 
is no longer regarded as natural, but entirely as the result of human agency.  
 
Similarly, it may be said that the jurist Gentili does not only put forward a formal legal 
doctrine, but also begins to theorise enmity, in more explicitly political terms, as the 
product of human agency. At the outset of his main work on international law, De iure 
belli libri tres, Gentili notes that previous moral and political philosophers did not pro-
vide “an account of the laws which we have in common with our enemies and with for-
eigners”.62 Invoking the Roman legal notion of hostis (the enemy), defined as a “for-
eigner who had equal rights”,63 he sets out to develop such a theory. The laws of war 
are, thereby, meant to regulate relations between sovereign states which, because of 
their sovereignty, must necessarily become hostile towards one another.64 At the same 
time, states recognise each other as ‘just enemies’ that have equal rights and legitimacy 
to make war. Schmitt suggests in his history of modern international law that the latter 
                                                
59 Vitoria, “On the Law of War”, III 1, pp. 278-284. 
60 Georg Cavallar, The Rights of Strangers: Theories of International Hospitality, the Global Community, 
and Political Justice since Vitoria (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2002), pp. 107-112; Pagden, “Stoicism, 
Cosmopolitanism, and the Legacy of European Imperialism”, pp. 7-9. 
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63 Gentili, De iure belli libri tres, I.II 18, p. 12. 
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notion marks a turn away from just war thinking, and led to a rationalisation and hu-
manisation of war.65 While this appears to be an idealised account,66 it is true that Gen-
tili’s theory captures the reality of European states engaging in treaties, customs, and 
regular warfare on the basis of their mutually recognised legal equality.67  
 
Yet Gentili is not solely concerned with European wars but also theorises relations to-
wards those who, for some reason, do not qualify as equal opponents. Agreeing with 
Vitoria on this point, he adopts the natural law idea of universal friendship and denies 
that Christians and infidels are enemies by nature. Rather, hostility supposedly results 
from “acts and customs”.68 The archetypical opposite of the just enemy appears to be 
the pirate, whom Gentili––drawing on Cicero––describes as a common enemy of man-
kind.69 Gentili insists that such opponents are not subject to the laws of war, and that 
conflict with them never ended by agreement. Instead, “the pirates have either saved 
their lives by victory, or have been conquered and compelled to die”.70 
 
However, the absolute and irrevocable enmity implied by this status is not restricted to 
robbers of the sea.71 Gentili also writes that Native Americans “divest themselves of 
human nature” by breaking fundamental natural laws, such as for instance through their 
                                                
65 In this context, Schmitt particularly highlights the break between Gentili and Vitoria, whose thought 
supposedly still “belongs to the Christian Middle Ages, rather than to the modern international law 
among European states”. Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, pp. 121f. 
66 See Koskenniemi, “International Law as Political Theology”, pp. 493-497; and Schröder, “Schmitt’s 
Appropriation of the Early Modern European Tradition”, p. 369. 
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Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire, eds. Benedict Kings-
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70 Gentili, De iure belli libri tres, I.IV 35, p. 22. 
71 Schmitt erroneously suggests in The Nomos of the Earth, pp. 64f, that the ‘enemy of mankind’ concept 
is theological in origin, and that it was only applied to non-state enemies at sea. 
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alleged lack of any kind of religion.72 Moreover, he conceives of the major non-
European power at the time, the Ottoman Empire, in similar terms: 
War is not waged on account of religion, and war is not natural either with others or 
even with the Turks. But we have war with the Turks because they act as our enemies, 
plot against us, and threaten us. With the greatest treachery they always seize our pos-
sessions, whenever they can.73 
This association may be related to the piratical activities of the Barbary Corsairs, whose 
states were nominally vassals of the Ottoman Empire.74 Furthermore, Gentili’s attitude 
towards imperialism is generally ambivalent, which is understandable in view of the 
fact that expansionist empires pose a threat to an international legal order based on the 
equality of sovereign states.75 With regard to the Ottoman Empire, he also points out 
that “he who injures one, threatens many”.76 However that may be, Gentili apparently 
seeks to establish that ‘the Turks’ should not be treated as just enemies. 
 
The criteria by which Gentili excludes pirates, Native Americans, and Ottomans alike 
from the laws of war, thereby, are neither overtly religious nor strictly legal, because at 
least the last-mentioned would surely qualify as a sovereign state.77 Rather, as some 
writers have recently suggested, Gentili seems to exclude particular opponents from the 
class of just enemies on the ground of them having revealed their fundamental untrust-
                                                
72 Gentili, De iure belli libri tres, I.XXV 204, p. 124. 
73 Gentili, De iure belli libri tres, I.XII 92, p. 22. 
74 Walter Rech provides a useful overview of theoretical responses to the ‘Barbary issue’ in the early 
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76 Gentili, De iure belli libri tres, I.XIV 103, p. 64. 
77 Jean Bodin, for instance, did not only recognise the status of the Ottoman Empire as a ‘well-ordered 
commonwealth’, but also acknowledged the regular legal status of some of the Barbary States on the 
north coast of Africa. Cf. Rech, Enemies of Mankind, pp. 50-54. 
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worthiness.78 This would suggest that enemies either trust each other to the degree that 
they can limit hostility through customs and agreements, or must face the other in an 
irreconcilable struggle. In any case, it seems that Gentili does not only put forward a 
formal doctrine of the laws of war, but also considers different types of hostility as part 
of his reflections on the nature of political order beyond the sovereign state. 
 
To conclude, late scholastic theologians like Vitoria and early modern jurists such as 
Gentili reject the view that cultural or religious divides, such as the one between Chris-
tians and infidels, imply natural enmity. What is more, it seems that these thinkers no 
longer conceive the unity of humanity as merely a moral ideal, but begin to theorise 
how hostile relations materialise despite the precept of universal friendship. 
 
2.4 Hobbes: the political deliverance from natural enmity 
This section introduces Hobbes’s concept of enmity in relation to previous perspectives 
on this subject, as outlined in the last sections. Hobbes’s break with traditional natural 
law theory, which––following Aristotle––conceived of human beings as naturally so-
ciable, thereby, seems to be particularly important for situating his ideas. Conceptions 
of a pre-political condition were, of course, common in the early modern period. Yet it 
has been noted that only Hobbes abandons the idea of natural sociability and, instead, 
posits the concept of the state of nature as a war of all against all.79 As will be shown in 
this section, enmity therefore plays a more prominent role in his thought. 
 
                                                
78 Noel Malcolm, “Alberico Gentili and the Ottomans”, in The Roman Foundations of the Law of Na-
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All of Hobbes’s main political works contain versions of the so-called bees-and-ants 
argument, which is an attempt to refute Aristotle’s view that, along with these creatures, 
man can be considered a political animal.80 In De Cive, Hobbes also criticises that pre-
vious natural law theorists take this notion as their point of departure: 
The majority of previous writers on public Affairs either assume or seek to prove or 
simply assert that Man is an animal born fit for Society,––in the Greek phrase, Ζωον 
πολιτικòν [political animal]. On this foundation they erect a structure of civil doctrine, 
as if no more were necessary for the preservation of peace and the governance of the 
whole human race than for men to give their consent to certain agreements and condi-
tions which, without further thought, these writers call laws.81 
In this passage, Hobbes does not only identify the notion of natural sociability as the 
target of his critique. He also objects that previous writers mistake prescriptions derived 
from this idea for a system of ‘laws’. As is well known, Hobbes denies that the laws of 
nature could effectively regulate human interaction outside the civil state.82 For this rea-
son, his version of the natural law dictates, first of all, to abandon the liberty of the state 
of nature and constitute an absolute and undivided sovereign power.83 
 
Hobbes’s account of the natural condition has reminded some interpreters of the Greek 
notion of stasis, particularly the stasis in Corcyra as described by Thucydides.84 Moreo-
ver, interpreters have associated Hobbes’s political thought with Augustine’s views on 
human nature after the Fall.85 While it is true that Hobbes portrays human beings in 
negative terms and thinks of civil war as a return to the state of nature however, he also 
conceives of the latter––which is often considered a thought experiment––as the (fic-
                                                
80 EL, XIX.5, pp. 105f; De Cive, V.5, pp. 71f; Lev., XVII.6-12, pp. 108f. 
81 De Cive, I.2, p. 22 (capitalisation in the original). 
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84 See, for example, Orwin, “Stasis and Plague”, pp. 839f; and Richard Schlatter, “Hobbes and Thucydi-
des”, Journal of the History of Ideas 6 (1945), pp. 350-362. 
85 Cf. sec. 2.2. Parallels between Hobbes and Augustine will be further examined in sec. 4.4. 
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tive) origin of a rationally constructed, artificial political order, which allows us to avoid 
the war of all against all. Hence, Hobbes does not primarily regard enmity in the domes-
tic realm as evidence of moral decline, as did Greek accounts of stasis.86 Nor does he 
share Augustine’s conception of war as a remedy for sin.87 Rather, hostility for Hobbes 
is part of a natural predicament that calls for a political deliverance.88 
 
It follows from what has been said that enmity can be regarded as a central category of 
Hobbes’s political philosophy. What the latter entails, however, is a matter of debate, 
given Hobbes's scientific ambitions and aim to build a system of thought that incorpo-
rates natural, moral, and political philosophy. For a long time, readers of Hobbes have 
taken for granted that he, indeed, derives morality and politics from his mechanistic 
psychology. This ‘received view’ is aptly summarised by Robert Shaver: 
We are self-interested, valuing our self-preservation above everything else. This leads 
us, in the state of nature, to a war of all against all, in which there is no right or wrong. 
Moral philosophy is no different than prudence; it tells us how to avoid that war. The 
laws of nature are justified because following them lets us preserve ourselves. They 
could have no other justification, for all value is subjective, stemming from our interests, 
and reason is purely instrumental. Neither value from some other source nor the pro-
nouncements of other beings, such as God, are relevant. All obligation is self-imposed. 
The most important law of nature tells us to establish a sovereign, to keep peace be-
tween us. For the sovereign to succeed in this task, and because the sovereign represents 
each of us, the sovereign must be absolute. It does not follow, however, that we have no 
right to defend ourselves against the sovereign; this right is inalienable.89 
To this characterisation one may add Hobbes's description of international relations as a 
condition of anarchy that replicates the state of nature, thus excluding moral considera-
tions from the conduct of commonwealths towards one another.90 
                                                
86 Cf. sec. 2.1. As Gabriella Slomp, Thomas Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory, pp. 56f, points 
out, there is also a difference between Hobbes and Thucydides. While the latter regards stasis as a 
matter of fate, Hobbes holds that civil war can be avoided through political philosophy. 
87 Cf. sec. 2.2. 
88 The terms ‘predicament’ and ‘deliverance’ are borrowed from Michael Oakeshott, who uses them to 
describe the argument of Leviathan. See Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association, pp. 5f. 
89 Robert Shaver, “Introduction”, in Hobbes (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1999), pp. xi-xvi, xi. 
90 For a cogent summary of this reception of Hobbes in IR, see Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes, pp. 433-435. 
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However, interpreters such as Leo Strauss, A.E. Taylor, and Howard Warrender have 
argued that natural science is not the basis of Hobbes’s political philosophy. Instead, 
they suggest that there is a moral dimension in Hobbes’s thought that cannot be reduced 
to prudence and self-interest.91 Taylor advances the view that Hobbes's ethical doctrine 
is logically independent from his views on human nature, rather constituting “a very 
strict deontology”.92 Building on this argument, Warrender develops an interpretation 
according to which the natural laws oblige Hobbesian individuals on the ground of them 
being commanded by God.93 It is true that Hobbes uses religious parallels and analogies 
to show that the laws of nature can also be confirmed in Scripture. Yet the claim that 
divine command is the ground of obligation is widely rejected today.94 
 
Michael Oakeshott takes a distinctive and different position, arguing that it is not the 
content but the form of reasoning that gives unity to Hobbes’s philosophy. On this view, 
Hobbes is systematic because he applies the method of rational enquiry to otherwise 
autonomous subjects.95 Other interpreters, such as Richard Peters, John Watkins, and 
Thomas Spragens, have gone further than Oakeshott and claim that, while the unity of 
the system is surely not a matter of simple deductive derivation, there is considerable 
interaction between Hobbes’s mechanistic principles and his political ideas.96 In effect, 
both approaches draw out similar themes. For instance, Oakeshott suggests that 
                                                
91 Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis, trans. Elisa M. Sinclair 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936); A.E. Taylor, “The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes”, Philosophy 13 
(1938), pp. 406-24; Howard Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of Obliga-
tion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957). 
92 Taylor, “The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes”, p. 408. 
93 Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, pp. 97-100. This interpretation has often been referred 
to as the ‘Taylor-Warrender thesis’ (or ‘Warrender-Taylor thesis’). 
94 For a partial exception, see A.P. Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Religion 
and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University, Press, 1992), ch. 4, who argues that divine command 
is necessary but not sufficient for Hobbes’s doctrine of the laws of nature. 
95 Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association, pp. 25-28. 
96 Richard Peters, Hobbes (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1956); Spragens, The Politics of Motion; 
J.W.N. Watkins, Hobbes’s System of Ideas: A Study in the Political Significance of Philosophical Ide-
as (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1965). 
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Hobbes’s scepticism led him consider will and artifice, rather than natural reason, as the 
sources of political order.97 Spragens emphasises that Hobbes does no longer conceive 
of political community as part of the universe’s natural order since he substituted a the-
ory of inertial motion for Aristotle’s theory of finite, goal-directed motion.98 
 
Following the above-mentioned contributions, interpreters have largely lost interest in 
the question of the unity of Hobbes’s system of thought.99 Thus, it has been noted that 
Hobbesian scholarship became increasingly fragmented in the second half of the twenti-
eth century.100 Instead of advancing grand interpretations of Hobbes’s system, scholars 
turned to his political and moral philosophy in a narrower sense, a trend that has been 
associated with the game-theoretical approach that took off in the 1960s and mainly fo-
cussed on the state of nature and the social contract.101 However, there may have been 
sveral reasons for the increasing fragmentation of studies, including the historical con-
textualist approach with its emphasis on the rhetoric rather than the logic of his writings, 
the feminist study of Hobbes in the 1980s, and Hobbes’s appropriation in International 
Relations.102 In addition to these aspects, Hobbes's theory of law and his ideas on reli-
gion have received considerable scholarly attention in recent years.103 
                                                
97 Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association, pp. 7, 56-58. 
98 Spragens, The Politics of Motion, pp. 97-108. 
99 For a notable exception, see Samantha Frost, Lessons from a Materialist Thinker: Hobbesian Reflec-
tions on Ethics and Politics (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008). Also see the brief treat-
ments in Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes, pp. 146-155; and Sorell, Hobbes, pp. 24-26. 
100 For a discussion of claims about the fragmentation of Hobbes scholarship, see Gabriella Slomp, “In-
troduction”, in Thomas Hobbes (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2008), pp. xi-xxvii. 
101 Seminal game-theoretical interpretations include David P. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan: The 
Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969); Jean Hampton, 
Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Gregory 
S. Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986). 
102 Cf. Slomp, “Introduction“, pp. xvii-xx. None of these approaches necessarily excludes a more holistic 
approach. David Johnston, The Rhetoric of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of Cultural 
Transformation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986) interprets Hobbes’s natural philos-
ophy in view of the persuasive aims of Leviathan. Implications of Hobbes’s idea of motion for his 
theory of international relations are discussed in Slomp, “The Politics of Motion”, pp. 19-41. 
103 Publications that reflect the increasing interest in fragments of Hobbes's thought include Hobbes on 
Law, ed. Claire Finkelstein (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2005); Thomas Hobbes, ed. Gabriella Slomp 
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Hobbes’s distinctive natural law doctrine also continues to be an important concern of 
scholarship. In contrast to the earlier debate on the ‘Warrender-Taylor thesis’ however, 
this issue is no longer the site of a clash between grand interpretations. Many commen-
tators now take the more pragmatic view that the laws of nature are neither reducible to 
prudential maxims nor entirely independent of Hobbes’s psychological assumptions. 
Rather, it is often argued, Hobbes invokes prudence and self-interest in order to provide 
a foundation for traditional moral values such as peaceableness, equity, fidelity, reci-
procity, and the recognition of others as equals.104 Deborah Baumgold defends this posi-
tion with regard to Hobbesian sovereigns, who are subject to the laws of nature and, 
therefore, have supposedly both “moral and prudential reasons for governing well”.105 
Nonetheless, it needs to be said that the received view, according to which there is no 
sense of morality in Hobbes’s political thought, is still widely held.106 
 
Some interpreters have also argued that Hobbes should be regarded as a virtue ethicist. 
For instance, Tom Sorell points out, in this vein, that Hobbes appears to view “moral 
virtues as dispositions latent in the human make-up, which it takes reasoning about war 
to disclose and activate”.107 Hobbes’s conception of the good, thereby, remains a matter 
of debate, and proponents of this interpretation differ as to whether his endorsement of 
                                                                                                                                          
(Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2008); Hobbes and the Law, eds. David Dyzenhaus and Thomas Poole 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Hobbes Today: Insights for the 21st Century, ed. 
S.A. Lloyd (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Also see Larry May’s Limiting Levia-
than: Hobbes on Law and International Affairs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
104 For interpretations that adhere to this view, see Sorell, Hobbes, pp. 105-108; May, Limiting Leviathan, 
pp. 38-47; and Zagorin, Hobbes and the Law of Nature, pp. 47-49. Studies that develop, or allude to, 
such a position with regard to particular laws of nature include Baumgold, “’Trust’ in Hobbes’s Politi-
cal Thought”, pp. 1-18; Hoekstra, “Hobbesian Equality”, pp. 99-103; and Larry May, “Hobbes on Fi-
delity to Law”, Hobbes Studies 5 (1992), pp. 77-89.  
105 Baumgold, Hobbes’s Political Theory, p. 104. 
106 For a recent defence of this position, see Gary B. Herbert, “The Non-normative Nature of Hobbesian 
Natural Law”, Hobbes Studies 22 (2009), pp. 3–28. 
107 Sorell, Hobbes, p. 108. Also see David Boonin-Vail, Thomas Hobbes and the Science of Moral Virtue 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Richard E. Flathman, Thomas Hobbes: Skepticism, 
Individuality, and Chastened Politics, new edition (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), p. 82; 
and Bernard Gert, Hobbes: Prince of Peace (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), pp. 68-76. 
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moral virtues is merely instrumental for securing peace, or the subject matter of a strict-
ly separate moral philosophy. However, this insistence on a sharp distinction between 
the domains of ethics and politics may tell us less about Hobbes’s views than about the 
departmentalisation of academic studies today. After all, a number of statements in 
Hobbes’s works indicate that he considers the study of rights and duties to be part of 
‘civil philosophy’, as opposed to ethics (or moral philosophy).108 
 
The subject of this thesis may be regarded as yet another fragment of Hobbes’s thought. 
However, as has been suggested above, enmity is certainly a central category of his po-
litical philosophy that is intimately connected to a plethora of other aspects. As part of 
his account of the natural condition, Hobbes addresses the role of the passions, the in-
strumental rationality of violence, and the evil of violent death. The concept of enmity 
also invokes ethical questions, as exemplified by the ‘Love your enemies’ precept, and 
possibly relates to religious conceptions of evil. What is more, hostility is often assumed 
to imply a certain legal status and the applicability of the right of war, which could be of 
relevance for Hobbes’s views on rebellion and international relations. 
 
In view of these possible connections between enmity and other aspects of Hobbes’s 
thought, it seems fruitful to adopt a more holistic approach to his political philosophy. 
While this thesis does not aim at a systematic exposition of Hobbes’s system, a focus on 
the enemy concept could provide an opportunity to reconnect some of the fragments of 
his thought that are increasingly being treated as disparate subjects. 
 
                                                
108 For instance, Hobbes points out in De Corp., I.9, p. 11, that “civil philosophy is […] commonly divid-
ed into two parts, whereof one, which treats men’s dispositions and manners, is called ethics; and the 
other, which takes cognizance of their civil duties, is called politics, or simply civil philosophy”. Cf. 
Richard Tuck, “Hobbes’s Moral Philosophy”, in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes, ed. Tom So-
rell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 175-207, 179f. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
Although philosophers have long considered aspects of enmity, Hobbes seems to be 
among the first to make the latter a central subject of political philosophy. It has been 
suggested in this chapter that this is due to his departure from traditional natural law 
theory. Instead of adopting the position that people are naturally sociable, Hobbes posits 
a state of nature in which everyone is at war with everybody else. On this basis, he ar-
gues for the need of an absolute and undivided sovereign power to deliver people from 
their natural predicament. Hence, enmity clearly plays an important role in Hobbes’s 
reflection on the nature and proper organisation of political community. 
 
It has been suggested that previous theorists do not yet make enmity a central subject of 
political philosophy. Ancient Greek and Roman thinkers, for instance, often understand 
enmity in terms of the seemingly natural distinction between civilisation and barbarians. 
Augustine clearly discerns the function of the fear of enemies as a source of moral ener-
gy and political cohesion, yet he does not conceive of hostility as something that could 
be politically transformed or transcended. Closer to Hobbes’s time, late scholastic theo-
logians such as Vitoria and early modern jurists like Gentili consider enmity as entirely 
the result of human agency, and begin to theorise it in more political categories such as 
(dis)trust and (in)hospitality. However, these thinkers are primarily concerned with rela-
tions towards particular opponents, including pirates and native inhabitants of the New 
World, and still retain the traditional notion of natural sociability. 
 
Undoubtedly, this chapter’s treatment of different conceptions of enmity has been cur-
sory and selective. Yet it seems that the themes and intellectual developments that have 
been discussed help to bring out the significance of Hobbes’s views on this subject. 
 48 
Moreover, it has become apparent that enmity is a fundamental category that relates to 
many other aspects of Hobbes’s thought. Based on these preliminary suggestions re-
garding different conceptions of enmity, the next chapter will further examine Hobbes’s 
views on hostility in the natural condition. It will be argued that he substitutes a concept 
of natural enmity for the traditional notion of natural sociability. 
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3. The concept of natural enmity 
This chapter examines Hobbes’s views on enmity among human beings in the natural 
condition. The first section analyses how hostility relates to human competitiveness. It 
is shown that Hobbes regards people neither as ‘asocial’, nor as naturally fit for society, 
but as competitive creatures that need one another in order to satisfy many of their de-
sires. In addition, he holds that competitiveness provokes hostility in the state of nature. 
The second section looks at the relationship between enmity and Hobbes’s conception 
of the right of nature. It is shown that the latter permits the pre-emptive use of force 
against those who are considered enemies, i.e. anyone who is believed to pose a threat 
to one’s own self-preservation, regardless of whether or not they have already revealed 
their hostility. On this basis, the third section seeks to further clarify the nexus of enmity 
and violent death. It is suggested that Hobbes does not hold the unrealistic view that 
death is under all circumstances regarded as the greatest natural evil. Rather, he posits 
death-aversion insofar as all people would, under certain conditions, inflict death upon 
others in order to avoid it for themselves. According to Hobbes, the willingness to use 
force for this and other purposes also defines the state of hostility. 
 
3.1 Enmity and human competitiveness 
Prior to examining Hobbes’s views on natural enmity and human competitiveness, it 
may be fruitful to briefly consider the conventional distinction between public and 
private enemies. The eighteenth-century jurist and philosopher Emer de Vattel provides 
a paradigmatic statement of this distinction: 
The enemy is he with whom a nation is at open war. The Latins had a particular term 
(Hostis) to denote a public enemy, and distinguished him from a private enemy (Inimi-
cus). Our language affords but one word for these two classes of persons, who ought 
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nevertheless to be carefully distinguished. A private enemy is one who seeks to hurt us, 
and takes pleasure in the evil that befalls us. A public enemy forms claims against us, or 
rejects ours, and maintains his real or pretended rights by force of arms. The former is 
never innocent; he fosters rancour and hatred in his heart. It is possible that the public 
enemy may be free from such odious sentiments, that he does not wish us ill, and only 
seeks to maintain his rights.1 
Endorsing this view, Carl Schmitt insists in The Concept of the Political that “[t]he en-
emy is solely the public enemy”.2 Like Vattel, Schmitt strictly distinguishes the public 
contest between organised collectives, which does not necessarily require personal ha-
tred, from enmity as “a psychological expression of private emotions”.3 
 
In accordance with this distinction, Schmitt rejects a literal reading of Hobbes’s claim 
that the state of nature is a war of all against all. Rather, he suggests that the notion bel-
lum omnium contra omnes (the war of all against all) has a similar status as the phrase 
homo homini lupus (man is a wolf to man),4 i.e. it merely testifies to the dangerous and 
‘asocial’ nature of human beings.5 Yet other commentators reject this view and argue 
that Hobbesian individuals actually seek the company of others. Michael Oakeshott, 
who was among the first to emphasise this theme, aptly captures this idea when he 
states that people “are enemies but they also need one another”.6 As he further points 
out, the felicity of Hobbesian individuals consists of comparative goods, such as hon-
our, that depend on others’ recognition, therefore people are competitive.7 
 
                                                
1 Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and 
Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, with Three Early Essays on the Origin and Nature of Natural Law 
and on Luxury [1758], eds. Béla Kapossy and Richard Whatmore (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 
2008), p. 509. 
2 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 28. 
3 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 28. 
4 This is implied in the brief discussion of the state of nature in Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State 
Theory of Hobbes, p. 31. 
5 Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes, p. 36. 
6 Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association, p. 36. 
7 Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association, pp. 35f. 
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Hobbes puts particular emphasis on glory, which he defines in The Elements of Law as 
“that passion which proceedeth from the imagination or conception of our own power, 
above the power of him that contendeth with us”.8 In his well-known analogy between 
life and a race, he likens glory to considering others behind, and describes felicity as 
continually outdoing other people.9 Similarly, Hobbes states in De Cive that glorying 
“consists in comparison and preeminence”.10 In addition, he claims that “all the heart's 
joy and pleasure lies in being able to compare oneself favourably with others and form a 
high opinion of oneself”.11 In the Anti-White, he also expresses that “the mind's delight, 
is nothing but a kind of triumph of the mind, or an internal pride, or boasting about its 
own potential and excellence in comparison with another”.12 All of these passages sug-
gest that glory is the main driver of human competitiveness. 
 
In Leviathan, Hobbes defines glory as a joy arising from the imagination of one’s own 
power, and therefore leaves open the possibility that people may have feelings of tri-
umph solely based on contemplation of their own actions.13 In general, Leviathan puts 
greater emphasis on the desire for power, which Hobbes defines as present means to 
obtain future goods.14 Thus, power does not relate to any specific passion. However, 
even if Hobbes no longer refers to glory as the source of all desire,15 he continues to at-
tribute an important role to this passion in Leviathan. At least, this is suggested by a 
                                                
8 EL, IX.1, p. 50. 
9 EL, IX.21, pp. 59f. 
10 De Cive, I.2, p. 24. 
11 De Cive, I.5, p. 26. 
12 Anti-White, XXXVIII.7, p. 466. 
13 Lev., VI.39, p. 31. McNeilly suggests that Hobbes's view on glory in Leviathan differs from the earlier 
works, and specifically that glory is no longer relational concept. See F.S. McNeilly, The Anatomy of 
Leviathan (London: Macmillan, 1968), ch. 6. For a convincing argument against this view, see Slomp, 
Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory, pp. 5, 34. 
14 Lev., X.1, p. 50. Hobbes also states in Lev., XI.2, that there is in all people “a perpetual and restless 
desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death”. 
15 Slomp, Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory, p. 91, finds that, in Leviathan, “glory is no 
longer the genus, or ultimate source of all passions and desires, but becomes a species, or an 
instance of human passions”. 
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number of statements that recall passages from earlier writings. For instance, Hobbes 
states in the bees-and-ants argument in this work that “man, whose joy consisteth in 
comparing himself with other men, can relish nothing but what is eminent”.16 
 
Despite this, however, many commentators largely ignore, or play down, the importance 
of glory. It has often been suggested that Hobbesian people primarily seek power and 
recognition in economic terms. According to C.B. Macpherson, the evolving ‘market 
society’ of seventeenth century England shaped Hobbes’s views on human nature.17 
David Gauthier expresses the widely held position that “Hobbes offers the most unified 
and compelling psychological portrayal of economic man”.18 In accordance with this 
view, Gauthier also holds that competition in the state of nature arises because material 
resources are scarce in this condition.19 Moreover, he argues that people only seek the 
glory of conquest since this is conducive to their rational self-interest.20  
 
However, these claims appear to be mistaken. As Gabriella Slomp points out, conflict 
among human beings could never be transcended if resources were really insufficient 
for the survival of an entire population.21 In other words, the commonwealth would be 
unable to bring about civil peace if this was the case. What is more, Hobbesian people 
seem to desire glory and honour for its own sake, rather than because it is conducive to 
                                                
16 Lev., XVII.8, p. 108. 
17 C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1962), pp. 104-106. 
18 David P. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 319. 
19 Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan, p. 18. Other interpreters who highlight the role of scarcity in the state 
of nature include Bobbio, Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition, p. 39; Hampton, Hobbes and the 
Social Contract Tradition, pp. 59f; Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, p. 33; McNeilly, 
The Anatomy of Leviathan, p. 143; Sorell, Hobbes, pp. 32, 36. 
20 Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan, p. 19. 
21 Slomp, Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory, pp. 70f. Also see Tuck, “Hobbes’s Moral 
Philosophy”, p. 185. Indeed, Hobbes states in Lev., XXX.19, p. 229, that “when all the world is 
overcharged with inhabitants, then the last remedy of all is war”. 
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their benefit or security.22 Much to the contrary, some statements suggest that the accu-
mulation of riches is subordinate to the desire for honour.23 In The Elements of Law, 
Hobbes argues that “riches are honourable; as signs of the power that acquired them”.24 
Similarly, he expresses in De Cive that somebody’s enjoyment of being honoured “lies 
in his contemplation of his own virtue, force, knowledge, beauty, friends, wealth or any 
other power which he has or regards as his own”.25 In Leviathan, Hobbes also points out 
that people who are “displeased with one another’s attaining of [wealth]” condemn the 
desire for the latter as covetousness.26 This seems to imply that people seek goods be-
cause they envy others, rather than merely out of self-interest.27 
 
Hobbes’s historical illustrations of the state of nature help to further clarify the relation-
ship between honour and gain. Klosko and Rice show that Leviathan’s account of the 
natural condition resembles the description of the life of the earliest inhabitants of 
Greece in the History of the Grecian War.28 The passage in Leviathan on which they 
base their claim, thereby, indicates a constant threat of pillaging: 
In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, 
and consequently, no culture of the earth, no navigation, nor use of the commodities that 
may be imported by sea, no commodious building, no instruments of moving and re-
moving such things as require much force, no knowledge of the face of the earth, no ac-
count of time, no arts, no letters, no society […].29 
In the same chapter, Hobbes also argues that “others may probably be expected to come 
prepared with forces united, to dispossess and deprive [somebody], not only of the fruit 
                                                
22 Shaver, “Leviathan, King of the Proud”, p. 55. 
23 Slomp, Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory, pp. 54f. 
24 EL, VIII.5, p. 49. 
25 De Cive, XV.13, p. 177. 
26 Lev., VI.23, p. 30. 
27 Elsewhere in Leviathan, Hobbes clearly associates envy with a desire for pre-eminence over one’s 
rivals, and contrasts envy with self-interest. See sec. 6.3. 
28 George Klosko and Daryl Rice, “Thucydides and Hobbes’s State of Nature”, History of Political 
Thought 6 (1985), pp. 405-409. 
29 Lev., XIII.9, p. 76. For the parallel passage in Thucydides, cf. EW 8, p. 2. 
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of his labour, but also of his life or liberty”.30 Similarly, he reasons in De Cive that, out-
side the commonwealth, “anyone may be killed and robbed by anyone”.31 
 
Yet Hobbes does not simply hold that people in the past used force to deprive others of 
their possessions, but also states that pillaging was regarded as a source of honour. 
Thus, he points out in De Cive that ancient nations who lived in a state of nature prac-
ticed piracy or raiding as a gainful activity, which was “considered just and honoura-
ble”.32 In Leviathan, Hobbes states that “till there were constituted great common-
wealths, it was thought no dishonour to be a pirate or a highway thief, but rather a law-
ful trade”.33 As for the time of the old Germanic people, he even suggests that “nothing 
[was then] in honour but virtue military”.34 This, again, recalls passages from Thucydi-
des’ History of the Grecian War. For instance, we read in Hobbes’s translation of this 
work that the earliest inhabitants of Greece “[fell] upon towns unfortified and scatter-
ingly inhabited, rifled them, and made this the best means of their living”.35 Instead of 
being merely a source of gain however, such pillaging was “a matter at that time no-
where in disgrace, but rather carrying with it something of glory”.36 
 
It is true that Hobbes suggests in a number of passages that wealth and honour are sepa-
rate desires that are related to different passions. Thus, he argues in The Elements of 
Law that “men aim at dominion, superiority, and private wealth”.37 In Leviathan’s ac-
count of the natural condition, Hobbes states that “in the nature of man we find three 
                                                
30 Lev., XIII.3, p. 75. 
31 De Cive, X.1, p. 116. 
32 De Cive, XIII.14, p. 150. In this context, Hobbes also considers the possibility that the desire for 
honour limits hostility, and inspires some restraint. See sec. 8.3 
33 Lev., X.49, p. 54. 
34 Lev., X.51, p. 56. In EL, XIV.12, p. 80, Hobbes refers to the old Germanic people as evidence of a state 
of nature. For a more extensive discussion, also see Dialogue, pp. 139f. 
35 EW 8, pp. 5f. 
36 EW 8, pp. 5f. 
37 EL, XIX.5, p. 105. 
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principal causes of quarrel: first, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory”.38 As 
he further specifies, “[t]he first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and 
the third, for reputation.”39 This seems to suggest that the three causes relate to separate 
passions, and that ‘glory’ is distinct from ‘competition’ for wealth. 
 
Yet, elsewhere in Leviathan, Hobbes uses the term ‘competition’ in a more encompass-
ing sense. In the chapter on the passions, he states that people may be “competitor[s] in 
wealth, honour, or other good[s]”.40 Similarly, he expresses in another passage that 
“[c]ompetition of riches, honour, command, or other power, inclineth to contention, 
enmity, and war”.41  In the bees-and-ants argument in Leviathan, he also points out that 
“men are continually in competition for honour and dignity”.42 The picture emerging 
from these statements is that Hobbes does not seek to reduce competition to a matter of 
economic gain. Rather, his principal concern is to establish the fact of human competi-
tiveness, and he appears to be relatively indifferent towards the specific passions that 
fuel rivalry and the distinction of kinds of goods for which people compete. 
 
According to this reading, competitiveness is part of the human makeup, rather than be-
ing due to external circumstances. The goods that people primarily compete for, i.e. glo-
ry and honour, are not only scarce in the state of nature, but are intrinsically scarce, be-
cause the superiority of some presupposes the inferiority of others.43 Therefore, it also 
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seems that human beings will compete with one another at all times, even though rivalry 
no longer necessarily provokes hostility in the civil state.44 
 
Understood thus, competitiveness is a fundamental aspect of the concept of natural en-
mity, which Hobbes appears to substitute for the traditional notion of natural sociability. 
Hobbes’s statements on the idea of natural sociability in The Elements of Law are still 
somewhat ambiguous.45 A more developed account of his critique of this notion, which 
was probably occasioned by objections to the first version of his political philosophy, 
can be found in De Cive. Before Hobbes even introduces his concept of the state of na-
ture in the first chapter of this work, he seeks to establish that people do not gather out 
of love of society, but in pursuit of their own benefit or glory: 
Men’s purpose in seeking each other’s company may be inferred from what they do 
once they meet. If they meet to do business, everyone is looking for profit not for friend-
ship. If the reason is public affairs, a kind of political relationship develops, which holds 
more mutual fear than love; it is sometimes the occasion of faction, but never of good-
will. If they meet for entertainment and fun, everyone usually takes most pleasure in the 
kind of amusing incident from which […] he may come away with a better idea of him-
self in comparison with someone else's embarrassment or weakness. [Therefore it is] ev-
ident that what they primarily enjoy is their own glory and not society.46 
While Hobbes does not deny that human beings seek each other’s company,47 he finds 
that they, thereby, only pursue their own glory or advantage. On this basis, he concludes 
that, instead of providing mutual help and protection, people would naturally endeavour 
to dominate one another.48 Thus, competitiveness is crucial for Hobbes’s critique of the 
notion of natural sociability, for it offers an explanation for why people come together 
even though they are supposed to be naturally unfit for society. What makes this expla-
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nation attractive is that it could be applied to all spheres of public life. Indeed, Hobbes 
suggests that even philosophers “not only […] fail, like ordinary men, to love their col-
leagues, [but] actively pursue their resentments against them”.49 
 
To conclude, this section has shown that Hobbesian people are not ‘asocial’, as it is of-
ten supposed, but competitive creatures that need one another to satisfy many of their 
desires. While the desire for pre-eminence appears to be a permanent feature of human 
nature however, competitiveness only necessarily develops into hostility in the state of 
nature. The next section will further show how this relates to the concept of natural 
right, which permits the use of force against anyone who poses a threat. 
 
3.2 Enmity and the natural right to all things 
As mentioned in the last section, Hobbes’s account of the state of nature as a war of all 
against all has sometimes been interpreted figuratively. Carl Schmitt, for example, reads 
it merely as a statement about human psychology.50 This appears to reflect the conven-
tional view that public enmity, which is a matter of right, is absolutely distinct from pri-
vate enmity, which is a matter of emotions. However, there are reasons to believe that 
Hobbes himself takes the possibility of war between individuals more seriously, at least 
for the purpose of spelling out the absurdity of the state of nature.51  
 
Critics of Schmitt have argued that Hobbes does not simply portray human beings as 
dangerous and wolflike, but attributes to them a right to use force against one another. 
As Leo Strauss points out, “the fundamental political fact [for Hobbes] was natural right 
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50 Cf. sec. 3.1. 
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as the justified claim of the individual, and Hobbes conceived of obligation as a 
subsequent restriction upon that claim”.52 This finds support in Hobbes’s statement in 
Leviathan that “desires and other passions of man are in themselves no sin. No more are 
the actions that proceed from those passions, till [people] know a law that forbids 
them”.53 Thus, we cannot be blamed for trying to preserve ourselves. 
 
The importance of Hobbes’s concept of natural right, which permits actions contrary to 
the prescriptions of the natural law, is widely acknowledged today. Hobbes maintains 
that the laws of nature still bind in conscience.54 However, it seems that these precepts 
cannot effectively regulate human behaviour in the state of nature. After all, the first 
natural law that Hobbes posits prescribes that everyone should renounce his or her right 
of nature in order to constitute an absolute sovereign power.55 What is more, Hobbes 
suggests in Leviathan that, before the constitution of the commonwealth, “the notions of 
right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there [in the state of nature] no place”.56 
This may be understood in the sense that the laws of nature cannot be applied to human 
interaction as long as everyone retains a natural right to all things. 
 
Hobbes’s concept of natural right has also been subject to revisionist interpretations. 
Richard Tuck argues that, like Hugo Grotius, Hobbes intended to develop a moral 
science based on the commonly agreeable right of self-preservation. In advancing this 
view, Tuck effectively conceives of the state of nature as a moral condition in which 
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conflicts arise due to disagreement on the application of right. Thus, he also suggests 
that Hobbes attributes ‘minimal sociability’ to people in this condition.57 As critics of 
this interpretation have pointed out, however, Tuck seems to misconstrue Hobbes’s 
characteristic departure from traditional natural law theory with its emphasis on natural 
sociability.58 What is more, it is important to note that, according to Hobbes, the right of 
nature does not have to be recognised by others. Thus, Hobbes also points out in The 
Elements of Law that people in the state of nature are permitted to kill animals on the 
same grounds as they can use force against fellow human beings.59 
 
Hobbes describes the natural right both as a right to all things and, more specifically, as 
a right to kill.60 Thus, he expresses in The Elements of Law and De Cive that people in 
the state of nature have a right to attack and resist one another.61 In the latter work, 
Hobbes, moreover, identifies the right to all things (jus in omnia) with the right of war 
(jus belli).62 Elsewhere in De Cive, he argues that inflicting death is the ‘greatest thing’ 
that people can do to each other,63 which may explain why he describes the natural right 
both as a right to kill and a right to all things. Indeed, Hobbes also states in Leviathan 
that everyone in the state of nature “has a right to everything, even to one another's 
body”.64 In view of these passages, it seems plausible that Hobbes conceives of the 
natural right as a right to all things in the sense of each and every thing, up to and 
including the taking away of another’s life, which is the ‘greatest thing’. 
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In order to further bring out how Hobbes’s concept of natural right relates to his views 
on enmity, it may be fruitful to distinguish between offensive and defensive uses of 
force. In The Elements of Law, for instance, Hobbes describes the state of nature as a 
situation where “one man invadeth with right, and another with right resisteth”.65 The 
parallel passage in De Cive likewise refers to some individuals who invade, and others 
who resist the attackers.66 However, such defensive uses of force are not restricted to the 
natural condition. In Leviathan, Hobbes also argues that “[a] man is assaulted, fears pre-
sent death, from which he sees not how to escape but by wounding him that assaulteth 
him”.67 Yet this statement refers to assaults by others in the civil state, i.e. to people 
who no longer face each other as enemies. This shows that a mere act of self-defence 
does not require prior beliefs about the other’s hostile disposition. 
 
By contrast, the anticipation of attacks seems to presuppose that others come to be re-
garded as enemies. Hobbes holds that the natural right does not only permit resistance 
against an attacker, but also the pre-emptive use of force.68 This seems to reflect his 
more general contention that people in the state of nature are free to deploy all available 
means according to their own judgement. As Hobbes, for instance, states in The Ele-
ments of Law, everyone “is judge himself of the necessity of the means, and of the 
greatness of the danger”.69 Although he only mentions that everyone is allowed to judge 
the greatness of danger and the necessity of means, this statement seems to imply a right 
to identify other people as the source of danger. In this vein, Hobbes also points out in 
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Leviathan that the sovereign’s natural right permits judgement “both of the means of 
peace and defence, and also of the hindrances and disturbances of the same”.70 
 
Tom Sorell suggests, but does not further elaborate, that the natural right permits indi-
viduals in the state of nature ”to treat everybody as an enemy”.71 This seems to be cor-
rect in view of the aforementioned passages. Treating somebody as an enemy, thereby, 
implies using force against them on the ground that they pose a threat to one’s self-
preservation. Yet Hobbes also argues in his earlier works that people in the state of na-
ture have a right to harm or subdue others that do not yet pose threat, as such individu-
als might otherwise “gather strength and be our enemy”.72 This clearly shows that 
Hobbes’s concept of natural right permits pre-emptive attacks solely on the grounds of 
subjective means-ends calculations, regardless of whether or not those who are treated 
as enemies currently pose a threat by any inter-subjective standard. 
 
Therefore, Hobbes’s argument does not seem to depend on epistemological assumptions 
about our ability to detect others’ true dispositions. This issue is raised by Marshall 
Missner, who claims that Hobbes adopts a more sceptical position regarding our ability 
to know others’ intentions in order to resolve a problem in his initial account of the nat-
ural condition in The Elements of Law.73 Considering Hobbes’s argument in the earlier 
work that a number of vain-glorious people seek to subdue everybody else, while others 
are content with natural equality, Missner asks: “why could not these ‘moderates’ band 
together and form a community in which they could protect themselves against the ‘hos-
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tiles’?”.74 In order to resolve this problem, Hobbes supposedly argues from De Cive 
onwards that it is very difficult to tell good and evil people apart.75 
 
However, it rather seems that, according to Hobbes, the war of all against all materialis-
es because everybody is entitled to act upon the supposition that others pose a threat to 
their self-preservation. As Sorell puts it, as long as there is no authority that could estab-
lish inter-subjective standards of right and wrong, people may even engage in mass-
slaughter if they think that this is conducive to their self-preservation. Therefore, vain-
glorious individuals cannot be blamed for acting according to their disposition, while 
the 'moderate' people have good reason to act out of character.76 Hobbes clearly states in 
De Cive that people do not sin as long as they believe that their actions are conducive to 
self-preservation.77 As was demonstrated above, this does not require that others have 
previously revealed their hostility. Rather, everyone is free to harm or subdue every-
body else on the ground that they might become enemies in the future. 
 
Consequently, the epistemic ground on which people in the state of nature may treat 
others as enemies is not knowledge about their dispositions, but mere suspicion. In this 
regard, it is important to consider Hobbes’s peculiar conception of distrust as the oppo-
site of assurance. In The Elements of Law, he defines trust as “a passion proceeding 
from belief of him from whom we expect or hope for good, so free from doubt that upon 
the same we pursue no other way”.78 In accordance with this view, Hobbes also reasons 
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that contracts of mutual trust are ineffectual in the state of nature, for “he that doubteth, 
shall be judge himself”.79 Similarly, he states in De Cive that 
in the purely natural state, if you wish to kill, you have the right to do so on the basis of 
the natural state itself; so that there is no need to trust first and kill later when he lets you 
down. But in the civil state, where the right of life and death and of all corporal punish-
ment are [sic] the responsibility of the commonwealth, this right of killing cannot be al-
lowed to any private person.80 
This shows that people do not have to take any risks to find out whether or not the other 
is truly hostile. Hence, Hobbes also points out in De Cive that “hostility is adequately 
shown by distrust”.81 Similarly, he maintains in Leviathan that war persists in the natu-
ral condition as long as there is “no assurance to the contrary”.82 On Hobbes’s account, 
this, of course, requires the constitution of an absolute sovereign. 
 
To conclude, Hobbes’s concept of natural right signifies that individuals are naturally 
free to do everything they consider conducive to self-preservation. In particular, this 
right permits treating everybody as an enemy solely on the grounds of means-ends cal-
culations, i.e. without consideration of whether or not others have revealed their hostile 
dispositions in any way. Based on these findings, the next section will further examine 
how enmity relates to Hobbes’s assumptions about death-aversion. 
 
3.3 Enmity, death-aversion, and the will to fight 
Given that enemies are those who pose a threat to self-preservation, there appears to be 
a connection between enmity and the evil of violent death. According to the received 
view, Hobbes regards death as the greatest natural evil. While some interpreters have 
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defended this position, others have also expressed objections and advanced alternative 
interpretations of the role of death in Hobbes’s political thought. As the following dis-
cussion will show however, none of the existing accounts sufficiently considers the rela-
tionship between violent death and Hobbes’s views on enmity. 
 
There are different explanations for why Hobbes apparently regards death as the great-
est natural evil. John Watkins, for example, seeks to defend this view on the basis of 
Hobbes's physiological theory of pleasure and pain.83 According to Watkins’ recon-
struction of this theory, desires reflect whether something enhances or impedes the 
body’s vital motion. In this light, it appears that there is, on the one hand, no natural 
limit to pleasure. On the other hand, Watkins maintains, death is the greatest possible 
impediment to motion, and therefore also the greatest anticipated pain.84 
 
Watkins’ interpretation, according to which death is the greatest evil due to Hobbes’s 
physiological theory of pleasure and pain, has not found many followers. However, oth-
er scholars defend the received view on different grounds. For instance, Jean Hampton 
suggests that the desire for self-preservation requires the capability “healthy delibera-
tion” about real and apparent goods.85 Thus, some individuals may consider other ap-
parent evils worse than death because a disease, such as madness, impedes their delib-
eration. Yet, Hampton suggests, all those people who are able to deliberate healthily 
would recognise that death is really the greatest evil. This reading provides an explana-
tion for why Hobbes refers to death as the greatest evil, while also considering some 
cases where some people regard other things as worse than death. 
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Some commentators have also emphasised the role of education in this context, which 
points to a normative reinterpretation of the standard view on death.86 On this view, 
Hobbes does not posit that all human beings do regard death as the greatest evil, but ra-
ther seeks to persuade his audience that they should do so. Leo Strauss, for instance, 
thus argues that the consistency of Hobbes’s political philosophy does not depend on 
psychological assumptions, but on the prospect of popular enlightenment. The latter 
supposedly makes subjects of the commonwealth realise that life is the condition sine 
qua non (an essential condition) for the satisfaction of any desire.87 If people were to 
realise that being alive is indispensable, they would follow the prescriptions of 
Hobbes’s political philosophy in order to secure their self-preservation. 
 
In the light of exceptions mentioned by Hobbes, some Hobbesian scholars reject the re-
ceived view on death. Gregory Kavka, for example, finds that Hobbes’s statements on 
this matter are simply unclear and inconsistent.88 Edwin Curley suggests that Hobbes's 
apparently unrealistic assessment of the fear of death is an exaggeration for stylistic 
purposes.89 A more substantial objection is put forward by S.A. Lloyd, who holds that 
Hobbes regards passionately held opinions about our duties to God as the main cause of 
rebellion.90 Lloyd finds that Hobbes was particularly concerned with some people’s 
willingness to risk their lives for the purpose of salvation, which would rule out the 
standard view of death as the supreme evil. Rather than developing a political philoso-
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phy on the basis of the principle of death-aversion, Hobbes supposedly tried to reconcile 
competing transcendent interests by way of a careful scriptural exegesis.91 
 
It is usually assumed that Hobbes's principal concern is with violent death, as opposed 
to death caused by old age or disease. Yet most interpreters do not make much of this 
qualification. One exception is Michael Oakeshott, who argues that violent death is a 
shameful death that signifies the greatest possible defeat.92 People in the civil state are 
relieved from the fear of such a death, because there is no longer an unconditional com-
petition for precedence in this condition. However, Oakeshott suggests that subjects 
could still risk their lives for the defence of the state, which is honourable.93 This read-
ing helpfully points to the role of the other who inflicts violent death. Nevertheless, 
Oakeshott’s claim that death is part of the competition for honour does not stand up 
against a close reading of Hobbes’s works. For instance, Hobbes states in The Elements 
of Law that “[t]o kill is the aim of them that hate, to rid themselves of fear; [whereas] 
revenge aimeth at triumph, which over the dead is not”.94 
 
To begin with, it needs to be said that Hobbes does, indeed, suggest that death is the 
greatest natural evil. What is more, he clearly expresses the assumption that human be-
ings necessarily avoid death. Yet, as can already be seen in his first discussion of natural 
right in The Elements of Law, his concern seems to be with death-aversion insofar as it 
motivates resistance against other individuals. Thus, Hobbes argues that 
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forasmuch as necessity of nature maketh men to will and desire bonum sibi, that which 
is good for themselves, and to avoid that which is hurtful; but most of all that terrible 
enemy of nature, death, from whom we expect both the loss of all power, and also the 
greatest of bodily pains in the losing; it is not against reason that a man doth all he can 
to preserve his own body and limbs, both from death and pain.95 
Although Hobbes refers to death as an enemy of nature, he seems to be particularly con-
cerned with death that is inflicted by others and therefore avoidable through resistance 
or anticipation. As he reiterates later in the same chapter, natural right proceeds from 
danger, and danger from human equality.96 This already indicates that Hobbes may in-
voke death-avoidance in a narrower sense than is often supposed. 
 
In De Cive, Hobbes states that people avoid death “by a real necessity of nature as pow-
erful as that by which a stone falls downward”.97 In addition, he introduces the tendency 
to avoid violent death as one of two “postulates of human nature” in the epistle dedica-
tory.98 Yet De Cive also contains a more detailed discussion of death-aversion. Con-
cerning agreements that people are not bound to keep, Hobbes points out that  
there is in every man a kind of supreme stage of fearfulness, by which he sees the harm 
threatening him as the worst possible, and by natural necessity does his best to avoid it; 
and is understood not to be able to do otherwise. When one has reached this level of 
fear, he must be expected to look out for himself either by flight or by fighting. Since no 
one is bound to do the impossible, no one is obliged to accept the death with which he is 
threatened (the greatest harm of nature) […].99 
This passage lends further credence to the view that Hobbes only posits death-aversion 
in a narrow sense as a matter of natural necessity, as statements in The Elements of Law 
already suggested. His position in De Cive seems to be that nobody could be expected 
not to take action in response to the threat of violent death. Having said that, the alterna-
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tive courses of action mentioned by Hobbes, i.e. flight and fighting, raise the question 
why people would necessarily risk their lives for self-preservation. 
 
This issue is further addressed by passages in Leviathan. In particular, Hobbes suggests 
that an act of self-defence presupposes that individuals do not see any other option as to 
how they could escape from violent death.100 He also argues in Leviathan that “man by 
nature chooseth the lesser evil, which is danger of death in resisting, rather than the 
greater, which is certain and present death in not resisting”.101 This indicates that 
Hobbes posits death-aversion insofar as it lets people inflict death on others in order to 
avoid it for themselves. Understood thus, death-aversion may either take the form of 
resistance against an attacker, or manifest itself in the pre-emptive use of violence. The 
latter is certainly not a matter of necessity in the civil state, where people “have time 
and means to demand protection from the sovereign power”.102 In the natural condition 
however, people are constantly threatened by violent death and do not possess any al-
ternative means to protect themselves from their enemies. Thus, Hobbes points out that 
“there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation”.103 
 
This reading of Hobbes’s views on death-aversion can account for apparent exceptions, 
which have led some interpreters doubt the standard view that death is the greatest natu-
ral evil. For instance, Hobbes states in De Cive that “most men prefer to lose […] their 
lives rather than suffer insult”, and that “a son may prefer to die rather than live in in-
famy and loathing”.104 In De Homine, he also notes that “the pains of life can be so 
                                                
100 Lev., XXVII.20, p. 196. 
101 Lev., XIV.29, p. 87. 
102 Lev., XXVII.20, p. 196. The question to what extent subjects may still use force to protect themselves 
in the civil state will be further addressed in sec. 5.3 
103 Lev., XIII.4, p. 75. 
104 De Cive, III.12, p. 49; De Cive, VI.13, p. 83. 
 69 
great that, unless their quick end is foreseen, they may lead men to number death among 
the good”.105 If Hobbes’s ‘postulate’ of death-aversion only concerns natural responses 
to the threat of violent death, as has been suggested above, it would not conflict with the 
fact that some people, under certain circumstances, choose to lose their lives. In particu-
lar, it does not exclude the possibility that people find the actual pain of infamy or a se-
vere medical condition greater than the anticipated pain of violent death. 
 
Furthermore, the previously stated interpretation helps to clarify the nexus of enmity 
and violent death. As was shown in sec. 3.1, enmity implies, according to Hobbes, that 
the other is believed to pose a threat to self-preservation. However, this is not how 
Hobbes generally defines the state of war (or the state of hostility).106 In The Elements 
of Law, for example, he points out that war is “that time wherein the will and intention 
of contending by force is either by words or actions sufficiently declared”.107 Thus, 
Hobbes distinguishes the condition of war (or hostility) from battle, which he defines in 
The Elements of Law as “reciprocally resistances […] upon the persons of one anoth-
er”.108 De Cive contains a virtually identical definition of the state of war.109 
 
Similarly, Hobbes states in Leviathan that “WAR consisteth not in battle only, or the act 
of fighting, but in a tract of time wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently 
known”.110 Thus, throughout Hobbes’s main political works, the state of war (or hostili-
ty) is defined by the will to contend in battle. The latter implies, as has been suggested 
above, that human beings are willing to risk their lives, and ultimately to kill another, in 
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order to preserve themselves. Yet some individuals may, of course, also be willing to 
fight for other purposes. This comes out in another passage in Leviathan, according to 
which people in the natural condition “become enemies; and in the way to their end, 
which is principally their own conversation, and sometimes their delectation only, en-
deavour to destroy or subdue one another”.111 Delectation may, thereby, be understood 
as the satisfaction of desires that are unrelated to self-preservation.112 
 
However that may be, the will to contend in battle presupposes that others come to be 
regarded as a hindrance to satisfying a desire. Based on his determinism,113 Hobbes 
generally defines the will as the last appetite preceding the act.114 Nonetheless, he does 
not simply hold that human actions are caused by external events, but also seeks to ac-
count for mental events through his concept of deliberation:115 
When in the mind of man appetites and aversions, hopes and fears, concerning one and 
the same thing arise alternately, and diverse good and evil consequences of the doing or 
omitting the thing propounded come successively into our thoughts, so that sometimes 
we have an appetite to it, sometimes an aversion from it, sometimes hope to be able to 
do it, sometimes despair or fear to attempt it, the whole sum of desires, aversions, hopes 
and fears, continued till the thing be either done or thought impossible, is that we call 
DELIBERATION.116 
Thus, human beings are said to constantly deliberate whether or not they can satisfy a 
desire through some action. While Hobbes does not describe this succession of hopes 
                                                
111 Lev., XIII.3, p. 75. 
112 Hobbes may be referring to desires related to the natural competitiveness of human beings, such as 
glory and honour, which have been discussed in sec. 3.1. 
113 While this thesis does not seek to make any general claims about the importance of Hobbes’s 
mechanistic ideas for his political thought, it seems fruitful to briefly consider his views on the will 
and deliberation on this point in this context. On Hobbes’s determinism, see esp. Frost, Lessons from 
a Materialist Thinker, pp. 82-105; Cees Leijenhorst, The Mechanisation of Aristotelianism: The Late 
Aristotelian Setting of Thomas Hobbes' Natural Philosophy (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2003), 
pp. 203-217; and Yves Charles Zarka, “Liberty, Necessity and Chance: Hobbes's General Theory of 
Events”, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 9 (2001), pp. 425-437. 
114 Lev., VI.53, p. 33. Cf. EL, XII.2, p. 71; De Corp., XXV.13, pp. 408-410; De Hom., XI.2, pp. 45f. 
115 Zarka, “Liberty, Necessity and Chance”, pp. 431f, suggests that the controversy with Bishop Bramhall 
on free will made Hobbes realise the problems inherent in the application of his general theory of 
causality to human conduct. Hobbes’s use of the concept of deliberation may accordingly be 
understood as an attempt to resolve these problems. 
116 Lev., VI.49, p. 33 (capitalisation in the original). 
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and fears as an active process, and generally denies freedom of the will, he seems to al-
low for the possibility of manipulating deliberation through reasoning.117 As was shown 
in sec. 3.2, Hobbes specifically maintains that enemies could be identified based on 
means-ends calculations, rather than through sense-perception alone. 
 
Moreover, it seems to follow from Hobbes’s views on deliberation that the will to con-
tend in battle presupposes hope to satisfy some desire in this way. This is what Hobbes 
generally describes as the passion of courage. In The Elements of Law, he associates the 
latter with the absence of fear, and defines it more specifically as “contempt for wounds 
and death, when they oppose a man in the way to his end”.118 In addition, he argues that 
anger is sudden courage, i.e. “the appetite or desire of overcoming present opposi-
tion”.119 Similarly, Hobbes suggests in the Anti-White that anger presupposes “hope of 
victory”.120 In Leviathan, he defines fear as “Aversion with opinion of hurt from the ob-
ject”,121 and refers to courage as “[fear] with hope of avoiding that hurt by re-
sistance”.122 Furthermore, Hobbes suggests in Leviathan (as part of his speculative theo-
ry of dreams) that anger corresponds with an “imagination of an enemy” in the mind.123 
De Homine provides a very similar account of these passions.124 
 
While Hobbes’s definitions may be idiosyncratic, his statements on hope, fear, courage, 
and anger provide an explanation for––and thus lend further credence to––his ‘postu-
late’ of death-aversion, as reconstructed above, i.e. the notion that people would neces-
                                                
117 Adrian Blau, “Reason, Deliberation, and the Passions”, in The Oxford Handbook on Hobbes, eds. A.P. 
Martinich and Kinch Hoekstra (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
118 EL, IX.4, pp. 51f. 
119 EL, IX.5, p. 52. 
120 AW, XXXVIII.14, p. 473. 
121 Lev., VI.16, p. 30 (emphasis in the original). 
122 Lev., VI.16-17, p. 30. As in The Elements of Law, Hobbes subsequently introduces anger as a sudden 
occurrence of courage. See Lev., VI.18, p. 30. 
123 Lev., II.6, p. 10. 
124 De Hom., XII.4, p. 56f. 
 72 
sarily risk their lives in battle, and ultimately kill others, for the purpose of self-
preservation. At least, this would be the case if human beings had no alternative means 
at their disposal. Given that using force would then be their only hope to overcome the 
threat of death, they would have to risk their life in order to preserve it. 
 
However, it seems that this explanation requires a further assumption that Hobbes pro-
vides in all of his main political works. It is commonly agreed that, although Hobbes 
considers natural inequalities between human beings, he also regards all grown-ups as 
roughly equal in strength and vulnerability.125 As he puts it in Leviathan, “the weakest 
has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confedera-
cy with others that are in the same danger with himself”.126 If this assumption is grant-
ed, it follows that people who are faced with the threat of violent death have generally 
reason to hope that fighting is conducive to self-preservation. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that Hobbes regards human beings as natural enemies insofar as 
they would, under certain circumstances, use force against one another and, ultimately, 
inflict death in order to avoid it for themselves. Some individuals may also be willing to 
fight for other desires, such as honour, and thus provoke hostility. Furthermore, this 
chapter has suggested how Hobbes’s views on natural enmity relate to his conception of 
the natural right, which everybody retains in the state of nature. It has been shown that, 
according to Hobbes, people in this condition cannot be expected to take risks in order 
                                                
125 See, for instance, Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, pp. 24f; Gary B. Herbert, 
“Thomas Hobbes's Counterfeit Equality”, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 14 (1976), pp. 269-
282, 275; Kinch Hoekstra, “Hobbesian Equality”, in Hobbes Today: Insights for the 21st Century, ed. 
S.A. Lloyd (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 76-112, 85; Kavka, Hobbesian Moral 
and Political Theory, p. 34; Slomp, Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory, pp. 22-26. 
126 Lev., XIII.1, p. 74. 
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to find out about others’ dispositions. Rather, they possess a right to treat others as ene-
mies upon the mere suspicion that they might pose a threat to self-preservation, even if 
these people have not revealed their hostility in any way. 
 
Furthermore, this chapter has shown that Hobbes’s concept of natural enmity is marked-
ly different from the conventional distinction between public and private enmity. The 
latter differentiates between the public struggles among organised collectives, which are 
a matter of right, and enmity among individuals, which is a matter of emotions. By con-
trast, Hobbes describes enmity in the natural condition both in terms of the passions and 
the natural right to all things, which permits killing another person. 
 
Hobbes’s concept of natural enmity may be regarded as a substitute for the notion of 
natural sociability. The claim that competitiveness is intrinsic to human nature, rather 
than due to external circumstances (such as scarcity of resources), is thereby of particu-
lar importance. This provides an alternative explanation for why people seek each oth-
er’s company. In the natural condition, where everybody retains a right to all things, ri-
valry would develop into hostility. Yet even individuals in the civil state, who are kept 
in bounds by the sovereign power, may be described as natural enemies insofar as they 
remain competitors and could return to the state of nature. 
 
However, the latter consideration also suggests that, even though Hobbes regards hu-
man beings as natural enemies, they can also be reconciled. For this purpose, his ac-
count of the natural laws prescribes the constitution of an absolute and undivided sover-
eign power. The following chapter will further examine Hobbes’s views on reason and 
the good of peace, which inform his account of the laws of nature. 
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4. Natural reason and the good of peace 
This chapter examines Hobbes’s views on reason and peace. The first section demon-
strates that peace is not only conducive to self-preservation, but also encompasses other 
goods that are unavailable in the state of nature. It is suggested that the hope to benefit 
from lasting peace lets people submit themselves (or remain obedient) to an absolute 
sovereign. The second section looks at Hobbes’s conceptions of language and reason, 
which underlie his account of the laws of nature. It is suggested that he does not merely 
envision a syllogistic science but also invokes the idea of natural reason, understood as 
an inherent human potential which can be realised through both science and experience. 
As a consequence, even untaught people are supposed to be able to seek peace. The 
third section examines different interpretations of Hobbes’s scepticism. It is argued that 
instead of entertaining fundamental doubts about the foundations of knowledge, 
Hobbes’s scepticism serves the more limited purpose of disarming seditious ecclesiasti-
cal doctrines. The fourth section analyses religious analogies that Hobbes employs to 
describe the good of peace. It is shown that he likens peace to salvation on earth and 
identifies rebellion with the original sin in the biblical story of the Fall. 
 
4.1 Enmity and the natural law to endeavour peace 
References to natural enmity are sometimes supposed to preclude reconciliation. For 
instance, Plato writes in his Republic that Greeks are natural friends who ought to re-
establish peace after their conflicts. By contrast, Greeks and barbarians are enemies by 
nature and can, therefore, not be reconciled.1 Unlike Plato, Hobbes does not refer to par-
ticular peoples as natural enemies. Rather, as has been shown in the last chapter, he in-
                                                
1 Plato, Republic, 470c, p. 163. This distinction appears to have been conventional at the time, and is also 
invoked by other ancient Greek writers. See sec. 2.1  
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vokes universal human characteristics, including competitiveness, distrust, and death-
aversion, to show that the natural condition is a war of all against all. 
 
Understood thus, Hobbes’s concept of natural enmity does not preclude reconciliation,2 
but––to the contrary––makes it mandatory to transcend hostility within the rationally 
constructed, artificial political order of the commonwealth. Hobbes also does not seem 
to regard enmity between groups as irrevocable. His views on sovereignty acquired by 
conquest indicate that states may be decomposed and reassembled in order to establish 
peace between their members, implying that group identities are ultimately less im-
portant than the preservation of individuals.3 In order to clarify on what ground Hobbes 
holds that natural enemies can generally be reconciled, this section will examine his 
views on the fundamental natural law that prescribes to endeavour peace. Furthermore, 
the analysis will consider what exactly the good of peace consists of. 
 
All of Hobbes’s main political works put forward the fundamental prescription to seek 
peace. In The Elements of Law and De Cive, Hobbes introduces this tenet as a conclu-
sion of his accounts of the state of nature, and uses it as the starting point of the follow-
ing discussions of the natural laws.4 Thereby, he refers to seeking peace as a precept of 
reason. In Leviathan, Hobbes instead concludes the account of the natural condition 
with a discussion of “the passions that incline men to peace”.5 However, in the subse-
quent chapter on the first and second natural laws, he also states that 
it is a precept, or general rule, of reason that every man ought to endeavor peace, as far 
as he has hope of obtaining it, and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use 
                                                
2 Hobbes himself uses the term ‘reconciliation’ to refer to the event when peace is established through the 
subjection to a sovereign power. See sec. 5.1. 
3 Hobbes’s views on sovereignty acquired by conquest will be further examined in sec. 5.1 and 8.1. 
4 EL, XIV.14, p. 81; De Cive, I.15, p. 31, II.3, p. 34. 
5 Lev., XIII.14, p. 78. 
 76 
all helps and advantages of war. The first branch of which rule containeth the first and 
fundamental law of nature, which is to seek peace and follow it. The second, the sum of 
the right of nature, which is by all means we can, to defend ourselves.6 
Although human beings retain the liberty to defend themselves by all means as long as 
they remain in the state of nature, Hobbes holds that it is a precept of reason to avoid 
this condition in the first place. For this purpose, people ought to renounce their natural 
right to all things and constitute an absolute sovereign power. 
 
Thus, peace appears to be the raison d'être of the Hobbesian state, which comes into 
existence with the constitution of an absolute sovereign. Hobbes characterises the peace 
provided by the commonwealth in terms of security and protection from injuries that 
people might otherwise inflict upon one another.7 Yet while peace may be instrumental 
for the self-preservation of individuals, it also implies the pacification of society as a 
whole. Thus, Hobbes expresses in Leviathan that peace is a means for “the conservation 
of men in multitudes”.8 Furthermore, he refers to peace in terms of the subjects’ con-
cord and mutual aid.9 This can be understood in view of the fact that peace inside the 
commonwealth needs to be accompanied by defence against external enemies. Indeed, 
Hobbes often writes as if peace and defence were inseparable goods.10 
 
The kind of peace that Hobbes envisions is a lasting peace, and must therefore be dis-
tinguished from peace agreements in the state of nature. Hobbes acknowledges that 
                                                
6 Lev., XIV.4, p. 80 (emphasis in the original). 
7 EL, XVII.10, p. 97, XIX.1-6, pp. 103-106, XX.2, p. 109, XX.5, pp. 111f, XXI.14, p. 125; De Cive, 
V.12, p. 74, VI.3-4, pp. 77f, VII.6, p. 95, XIII.6, p. 144; Lev., XIV.8, p. 82, XVII.1-4, pp. 106f, 
XVIII.8, p. 113, XIX.4, p. 120, XIX.15, p. 124, XXVII.3, p. 191, XXVII.20, p. 196. 
8 Lev., XV.34, p. 99. 
9 EL, XIX.1, p. 103, XIX.4, p. 105; De Cive, V.3, p. 70, V.9, p. 73. Lev., XV.16, p. 95, XVII.13, p. 109, 
XVIII.9, p. 113, XXX.7, p. 222. 
10 EL, XXI.2, p. 119, XXIV.2, p. 137; De Cive, V.6, p. 72, V.9, p. 73, VI.3, p. 77, VI.10, p. 80, X.2, p. 
116, X.5, p. 119; Lev., XV.5, p. 92, XVIII.13, p. 109, XVIII.8, p. 113, XVIII.13, p. 115, XXII.5, p. 
146, XXIV.8, p. 162, XXIX.3, p. 211, XXX.25, p. 231. 
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people in the latter condition can form alliances for common defence, or to make boo-
ty,11 yet this does not terminate the state of war between them. Likewise, international 
peace treaties are fragile because sovereigns retain a right to break them if they consider 
it necessary for security reasons.12 By contrast, as Hobbes clearly expresses in Levia-
than, individuals are supposed to constitute the commonwealth “for their perpetual (and 
not temporary) security”.13 In effect, he advances the view that (only) the submission to 
an absolute sovereign power could provide permanent societal peace. 
 
While Hobbes thus considers subjection necessary for self-preservation, scholars have 
noted that this kind of peace also contains (or provides the foundation for) many other 
goods that are unavailable in the state of nature.14 This comes out particularly in Levia-
than. In this work’s account of the natural condition, Hobbes states:  
In such a condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, 
and consequently, no culture of the earth, no navigation, for use of commodities that 
may be imported by sea, no commodious building, no instruments for moving and re-
moving such things as require much force, no knowledge of the face of the earth, no ac-
count of time, no arts, no letters, no society […].15 
Thus, the continual fear of enemy attacks implies that people would be unable to devel-
op or access many economic and cultural goods that are available in the civil state. In 
accordance with this view, Hobbes further points out at the end of this chapter that hu-
man beings do not only seek peace to avoid violent death. Rather, they are also motivat-
ed by a “desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living, and a hope by 
                                                
11 EL, XIX.4, p. 105; De Cive, V.4, p. 70; Lev., XVII.4-5, pp. 107f. 
12 Hobbes likens international relations to the state of nature. For a discussion of this analogy, and of 
international peace agreements, see sec. 8.1. 
13 Lev., XIX.15, p. 124. In Lev., XIX.14, p. 124, Hobbes also refers to the state’s ‘artificial eternity’ that is 
necessary for preventing a return of the state of war.   
14 See, for instance, Gert, Hobbes, p. 171; Slomp, Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory, p. 67; 
Tom Sorell, “Hobbes on Trade, Consumption and International Order”, The Monist 89 (2006), pp. 
245-258, 246f; Sorell, Hobbes, p. 108; Peter J. Steinberger, “Hobbesian Resistance”, American 
Political Science Review 46 (2002), pp. 856-865, 857. 
15 Lev., XIII.9, p. 76. 
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their industry to obtain them”.16 In a similar vein, Hobbes states elsewhere in Leviathan 
that the ‘safety of the people’ does not merely consist of their “bare preservation”, but 
also implies that they have access to other “contentments of life”.17 
 
What is more, it seems that the peace provided by the commonwealth makes it safe for 
people to comply with the natural laws that prescribe justice, gratitude, modesty, equity, 
mercy, and other moral qualities.18 As was shown in sec. 3.2, Hobbes holds that the lat-
ter only bind in conscience as long as people lack sufficient security. Yet this no longer 
applies to individuals in the civil state, who renounced their natural right to all things 
and are generally secure enough to act in accordance with the natural laws. Although 
not everyone will develop a virtuous character,19 Hobbes holds that all subjects ought to 
show justice, gratitude, mercy, etc. Thus, he argues in Leviathan that 
he that having sufficient security that others shall observe the same laws towards him, 
observes them not himself, seeketh not peace, but war, and consequently the destruction 
of his nature by violence.20 
This suggests that the moral qualities prescribed by the natural laws are inseparable 
from the good of peace. On the one hand, justice, gratitude, etc., can only develop (or be 
displayed) because subjects of the commonwealth have sufficient security to do so. On 
the other hand, the laws of nature are conducive to sustaining civil peace. 
 
Having said that, some commentators attribute a far greater role to the natural laws in 
the Hobbesian state of nature. For instance, Larry May has recently suggested that it is 
                                                
16 Lev., XIII.14, p. 78. Cf. Lev., XVII.1, p. 106. 
17 Lev., XXX.1, p. 219. Cf. De Cive, XIII.6, p. 144. 
18 This presumes that justice, gratitude, etc., are (in some sense) moral, rather than merely prudential 
maxims. For an overview of different views on this question, see sec. 2.4. 
19 Hobbes states in Lev., XV.10, p. 193, that, unlike the justice of actions, the justice of manners is “a 
certain nobleness or gallantness of courage (rarely found)”. 
20 Lev., XV.36, p. 99. 
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reasonable for people in this condition to develop ‘pacifist attitudes’, by which he 
means the disposition to trust others and only use violence as the last resort.21 May re-
gards such attitudes as crucial for the transition from the state of nature to the civil state. 
In particular, pacifist attitudes are supposed to “[open] the door to the kind of limited 
trust upon which the social contract seems to be based”.22 Yet such a quasi-historical 
reading is difficult to square with remarks suggesting that the state of nature is merely a 
thought experiment intended to show how life would be without the fear of a common 
power.23 François Tricaud also notes that Hobbes uses both the past tense and a seem-
ingly atemporal present tense when describing the natural condition.24 
 
This points to Hobbes’s own understating of time, which casts further doubt on the view 
that his political philosophy seeks to reveal the actual origins of the state. As Hobbes 
points out in Leviathan, “[t]he present only has a being in nature; things past have a be-
ing in the memory only; but things to come have no being at all, the future being but a 
fiction of the mind”.25 Thus, he considers history solely in terms of memory, which is 
the basis of historiography.26 Hobbes does seem to conceive of history as a series of 
events that encompasses the past, present, and future of human existence.27 Further-
more, his accounts of the state of nature suggest that everyone in this condition would 
                                                
21 May, Limiting Leviathan, pp. 224-239. Forsyth, “Hobbes and the External Relations of States”, pp. 
196-209, provides a somewhat similar account that also emphasises the role of the natural laws in the 
transition from the state of nature to the civil state. 
22 May, Limiting Leviathan, p. 237. 
23 Hobbes asks his readers in De Cive, VIII.1, p. 102, “to look at men as if they had just emerged from the 
earth like mushrooms and grown up without any obligation to each other”. 
24 François Tricaud, “Hobbes's Conception of the State of Nature from 1640 to 1651: Evolution and 
Ambiguities”, in Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes, eds. G.A.J. Rogers and Alan Ryan (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 107-123, 111f. 
25 Lev., III.7, p. 14 (emphasis in the original). 
26 Hobbes generally distinguishes between science (or philosophy), i.e. knowledge of consequences (or 
causes and effects), and history, defined as knowledge of fact. Moreover, he points out that historical 
knowledge “is nothing else but sense and memory”. See Lev., IX.1-2, p. 47. 
27 Cf. Karl Schuhmann, “Hobbes’s Concept of History”, in Hobbes and History, eds. G.A.J. Rogers and 
Tom Sorell (Oxford: Routledge, 2000), pp. 3-24, 6. Yet J.G.A. Pocock suggests that Hobbes’s views 
on religion, and specifically the transmission of prophecies, add a historical dimension to his thought. 
See Pocock, Politics, Language and Time (London: Methuen, 1972), pp. 148-201. 
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be concerned with present survival or the satisfaction of other short-term desires.28 In 
Leviathan, Hobbes even points out that there is “no account of time” in the natural con-
dition.29 If human beings are thus immersed in the present, it is hard to imagine how 
their attitudes or actions could be, as Larry May implies, oriented towards long-term 
goods. Rather, as has been suggested above, such a concern seems to be specific to the 
civil state. Given that subjects of the commonwealth do no longer face a constant threat 
of violent death, and can also be certain that the state will protect the fruit of their la-
bour, they could, for instance, produce goods to satisfy their desires. This indicates that 
Hobbes does not envision a historical peace process, but instead holds that the time ori-
entation of human conduct only unfolds under the condition of peace. 
 
The latter claim is consistent with a view that is now widely held among Hobbesian in-
terpreters, i.e. that the state of nature is a thought experiment intended to persuade an 
audience that already live in the civil state that they ought to obey their sovereign in or-
der to make an already existing peace lasting and secure.30 For current subjects, lasting 
peace entails the prospect that they could continue to enjoy the goods they already pos-
sess, and satisfy other desires through their own industry. Yet even those who have re-
vealed their hostility to the state, or were previously subjects of another state, could re-
pent and submit themselves to the sovereign in view of the good of peace.31 
                                                
28 Game-theoretic interpreters also suggest that it would be impossible for agents in a Hobbesian state of 
nature to agree to the social contract. See, for instance, Jean Hampton, “Hobbes's State of War”, Topoi 
4 (1985), pp. 47-60; and Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, pp. 109-123. 
29 Lev., XIII.9, p. 76. 
30 For example, Russell Hardin, “Hobbesian Political Order”, Political Theory 19 (1991), pp. 156-180, 
158f; Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, pp. 123f; Slomp, Hobbes and the Political 
Philosophy of Glory, pp. 148-152; Sorell, Hobbes, pp. 136f. In support of this reading, scholars often 
refer to a passage from De Cive, VIII.1, p. 102, which was cited in footnote 23. Oakeshott seems to 
advance a somewhat similar view as the aforementioned interpreters when he states in Hobbes on 
Civil Association, p. 14, that “Leviathan is a myth, the transposition of an abstract argument into the 
world of the imagination”. Cf. Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association, pp. 159-163. 
31 The remainder of this thesis will shed further light on these cases. Sec. 5.1 examines Hobbes’s views on 
sovereignty acquired by conquest. Sec. 7.3 shows that Hobbes emphasises the need to pardon (some) 
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To conclude, peace is, according to Hobbes, not only instrumental for self-preservation, 
but also provides the foundation for the attainment of many other goods that are only 
available in the civil state. Unlike temporary peace agreements in the state of nature, the 
lasting peace provided by the commonwealth, thereby, requires subjection to an abso-
lute sovereign power. Hobbes describes seeking peace as a precept of reason and law of 
nature, which raises the question how reason guides human beings to submit themselves 
(or remain obedient to) the sovereign. In order to answer this question, the next section 
will further look at Hobbes’s conceptions of reason and language. 
 
4.2 Natural reason and the power of language 
This section examines Hobbes’s conception of reason and how it relates to his philoso-
phy of language. Rejecting the position that he regards reasoning merely as an acquired 
art, this section will argue for, and further develop, the alternative view that Hobbes has 
a concept of natural reason. The latter also points to a different reading of Hobbes’s 
views on the foundations and conditional nature of scientific knowledge. 
 
Michael Oakeshott first expressed the view that Hobbes’s conception of reasoning de-
parts from the notion of Reason in the classical tradition,32 i.e. the idea that reason is a 
divinely ordained faculty of the mind that provides people with innate knowledge of the 
cosmic order. For Oakeshott, all branches of Hobbes’s philosophy instead rely on syllo-
gistic reasoning in order to establish conditional knowledge of causes and effects.33 
                                                                                                                                          
participants of a rebellion in order to restore them as obedient subjects. 
32 Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association, p. ix. Cf. John Deigh, “Reason and Ethics in Hobbes's 
Leviathan”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 34 (1996), pp. 33-60, 49f; Philip Pettit, Made with 
Words: Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 
44; Sorell, Hobbes, p. 27; Zagorin, Hobbes and the Law of Nature, pp. 10f. 
33 Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association, pp. 15-28. As mentioned in sec. 2.4, Oakeshott also claims 
that this method of rational enquiry gives unity to Hobbes’s system of thought. 
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Hence, he also claims that, even though Hobbes identifies ‘natural reason’ with the laws 
of nature, the latter are nothing but “theorems about human preservation”.34 Bernard 
Gert adopts a very different position, according to which Hobbes invokes a concept of 
natural reason similar to that of Aristotle.35 Gert argues that, despite rejecting the notion 
that reason is a guide towards the good, Hobbes still holds that reason has its own end, 
i.e. self-preservation. Moreover, Gert finds that natural reason is a broader concept than 
syllogistic reasoning, also containing knowledge from experience.36 
 
To begin with, Oakeshott is right that Hobbes aimed to develop a syllogistic science ca-
pable of establishing universal truths.37 In particular, Hobbes defines science (or philos-
ophy) as knowledge of consequences (or of causes and effects) and generally contrasts 
the latter with knowledge of sensible facts.38 His conception of science as a language-
based way of thinking is inspired by Euclidean geometry. In addition, Hobbes draws a 
comparison with arithmetic, arguing that in the same way as we can reckon with num-
ber words to establish universal truths, it is possible to apply syllogistic reasoning to 
other phenomena.39 His favourite example is the syllogism every man is a living crea-
ture, every living creature is a body, therefore every man is a body.40 
 
Although such syllogistic reasoning is primarily a theoretical exercise, Hobbes also 
thinks of philosophy as having important practical implications. He specifically praises 
geometry for providing the theoretical foundation of the mechanical arts, including 
                                                
34 Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association, p. 117. 
35 Gert, Hobbes, pp. 72f. This position is also defended by Kinch Hoekstra, “Hobbes on Law, Nature, and 
Reason”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 41 (2003), pp. 111-120, 116-119. 
36 Gert, Hobbes, p. 73. 
37 EL, VI.6, p. 42; Lev., VII.4, p. 36. 
38 EL, VI.1, p. 40; Lev., IX.2, p. 47; De Corp., I.8, pp. 10f. Note that Hobbes generally uses the terms 
‘science’ and ‘philosophy’ interchangeably. 
39 Lev., IV.9-10, p. 18. 
40 De Corp., IV.7, p. 49. 
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chronometry, navigation, and architecture.41 Regarding the utility of moral and political 
philosophy, Hobbes points out in De Corpore that it is 
to be estimated, not so much by the commodities we have by knowing these sciences, as 
by the calamities we receive from not knowing them. Now, all such calamities as may 
be avoided by human industry, arise from war, but chiefly from civil war; for from this 
proceed slaughter, solitude, and the want of all things.42 
This recalls the depictions of the state of nature in Hobbes’s main political works. Par-
ticularly in Leviathan, Hobbes refers to a wide range of goods that are available in the 
civil state, but cannot be accessed (or developed) in the natural condition.43 
 
Nonetheless, a number of statements in Hobbes’s works cast doubt on the view that he 
conceives of reason solely in terms of the kind of syllogistic ratiocination that inspires 
his philosophy of science. In The Elements of Law, for instance, Hobbes defines reason 
as a natural faculty, and also states that “God Almighty hath given reason to a man to be 
a light unto him”.44 Similarly, we read in De Cive that the natural law “is the law which 
God has revealed to all men through his eternal word which is innate in them, namely 
by natural reason”.45 One of the explanatory notes that Hobbes later added to De Cive 
provides the clearest statement on this matter. According to this clarification, the notion 
of natural reason does not mean that something is known by everyone, only that it can 
be known if people acquire the necessary skills.46 Elsewhere in De Cive, Hobbes also 
contrasts natural reason with matters of faith, which are “beyond human understand-
                                                
41 De Corp., I.7, p. 7. Cf. De Hom., X.3, p. 39. 
42 De Corp., I.7, p. 8. 
43 Cf. sec. 4.1. 
44 EL, I.4, p. 21, XVIII.12, p. 103. 
45 De Cive, ch. XIV.4, p. 156 (emphasis in the original). Cf. De Cive, epistle, 10, p. 6. However, after 
Hobbes describes the natural laws as dictates of right reason, he also insists that “[b]y right reason 
[…] I mean not, as many do, an infallible Faculty”. See De Cive, II.1, n., p. 33. In this context, 
Hobbes apparently identifies ‘right reason’ with ‘natural reason’. Cf. footnote 76 below. 
46 De Cive, XIV.10, n., p. 164. 
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ing”.47 Together, these passages suggest that his concept of natural reason denotes the 
full potential and inherent limitations of human understanding. 
 
Statements in Leviathan lend further credence to the view that Hobbes invokes the con-
cept of natural reason in this sense. As in De Cive, Hobbes suggests in Leviathan that 
the Word of God is revealed through natural reason.48 In the Latin Leviathan, he argues 
that the schoolmen take natural reason away from young men,49 which seems to imply 
that ecclesiastical doctrines prevent students from realising an inherent potential. More-
over, he explains in which sense human beings are rational creatures: 
Children […] are not endured with reason at all till they have attained the use of speech, 
but are called reasonable creatures for the possibility apparent of having the use of rea-
son in time to come. And the most part of men, though they have the use of reasoning a 
little way, as in numbering to some degree, yet it serves them to little use in common 
life, in which they govern themselves, some better, some worse, according to the differ-
ences of experience, quickness of memory, and inclinations to several ends, but special-
ly according to good or evil fortune, and the errors of one another.50 
Thus, human beings may be called rational insofar as they have the potential to find out 
truth with the help of language, and despite the fact that most people fail to acquire 
much scientific knowledge. Yet Hobbes also states in this context that  
they that have no science are in better and nobler condition with their natural prudence 
than men that by mis-reasoning [sic], or by trusting them that reason wrong, fall upon 
false and absurd general rules.51 
In other words, knowledge from experience is generally preferable to deception through 
false reasoning or mistaken doctrines. These passages are echoed in the first chapter of 
De Corpore, where Hobbes states that “every man brought Philosophy, that is, Natural 
                                                
47 De Cive, XVIII.4, p. 238. 
48 Lev., XXXI.3, p. 235. 
49 Lev., XLVII.20 (OL), p. 487. 
50 Lev., V.18, p. 26 (emphasis added). Cf. Lev., XLVI.6, pp. 454f. 
51 Lev., V.1p, p. 26 (emphasis in the original). 
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Reason, into the world with him”.52 What is more, Hobbes argues in this regard that 
most people fail to realise this potential due to a want of the right method, and that those 
who rely on knowledge from experience are generally of sounder judgment than others 
who merely trust received doctrines or their teachers’ authority.53 
 
This suggests that the potential of natural reason may be realised to different degrees, 
with those using the right method being able to establish universal truths. People who 
make inferences based on their experience may still find out some truths,54 while others 
are being led astray by false reasoning or mistaken doctrines. This reading finds further 
support in Hobbes’s reflections on language. Hobbes generally attributes great power to 
speech, which sets humans apart from other animals.55 Thus, he states in Leviathan that, 
without language, “there had been amongst men, neither commonwealth, nor society, 
nor contract, nor peace, no more than amongst lions, bears, and wolves”.56 Yet language 
does not merely account for the greatest human achievements, but also causes extreme 
misery, particularly civil war.57 The latter seems to be connected to abuses of speech, as 
a consequence of which people end up deceiving themselves or others.58 
 
What distinguishes constructive from deceptive uses of language, according to Hobbes, 
is not the use of syllogism. Rather, this distinction appears to be due to whether or not 
people use words as verbal marks and signs for images or conceptions of the mind, 
                                                
52 De Corp., I.1, p. 1 (capitalisation in the original). 
53 De Corp., I.1, pp. 1f. 
54 Experience could also be aided by history. As Hobbes states in his preface to History 1, p. vii: “[T]he 
principal and proper work of history being to instruct and enable men, by the knowledge of actions 
past, to bear themselves prudently in the present and providently towards the future”. That being said, 
Hobbes still insists that experience-based knowledge falls short of science. For instance, he states in 
EL, IV.10, p. 33: “Experience concludeth nothing universally”. 
55 EL, V.1, p. 2; Lev., IV.1, p. 16; De Hom., X.1, pp. 37f. 
56 Lev., IV.1, p. 16. 
57 This comes out particularly in the bees-and-ants argument in EL, XIX.5, p. 105; De Cive, V.5, pp. 71f; 
and Lev., XVII.10, p. 108. Also see Lev., IV.3-4, p. 17; De Hom., X.3, pp. 39f. 
58 In Lev., IV.3-4, p. 17, Hobbes distinguishe between a number of uses and abused of language. 
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which he regards as the general purpose of language.59 As he puts it in Leviathan, estab-
lishing universal truths requires first of all to settle the meaning of words: 
So that in the right definition of names lies the first use of speech, which is the acquisi-
tion of science; and in wrong or no definitions lies the first abuse, from which proceed 
all false and senseless tenets, which make those men that take their instruction from the 
authority of books, and not from their own meditation, to be as much below the condi-
tion of ignorant men as men endued with true science are above it. For between true sci-
ence and erroneous doctrines, ignorance is the middle.60 
Thus, people may reckon with words whose meaning they have not clearly defined, and 
consequently end up with false conclusions. This would be worse than ‘natural igno-
rance’, i.e. the understanding of those who are untaught. 
 
Hobbes has sometimes been considered a radical nominalist who regards meaning as 
entirely arbitrary and conventional, and truth as a function of language.61 Yet, more re-
cently, some Hobbesian interpreters have argued for a more nuanced view. For instance, 
Cees Leijenhorst highlights that, according to Hobbes, external objects cause images or 
conceptions in the mind. Therefore, only the signifier (i.e. the labels that we attach to 
these conceptions) is supposed to be conventional, yet not the significant (i.e. mental 
images, which supposedly arise naturally in the mind).62 This would suggest that scien-
tific knowledge and knowledge from experience are not mutually exclusive. As Tom 
Sorell puts it: “Instead of taking the place of experience, reason is supposed to trans-
form, partly by introducing new ways of organising, experience”.63 
                                                
59 EL, V.1, pp. 34f; Lev., IV.3, pp. 16f; De Corp., II.1-2, pp. 13-15. 
60 Lev., IV.13, p. 19. 
61 See, for instance, Dorothea Krook, “Hobbes's Doctrine of Meaning and Truth”, Philosophy 31 (1956), 
pp. 3-22. Cf. Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association, p. 23. 
62 Leijenhorst, The Mechanisation of Aristotelianism, pp. 44, 156-157. Also see Malcolm, Aspects of 
Hobbes, p. 152; Sorell, Hobbes, p. 31. 
63 Sorell, Hobbes, p. 31. For a illuminating discussion of Hobbes’s views on scientific and historical 
knowledge and how they changed over time, see Gigliola Rossini, “The Criticism of Rhetorical 
Historiography and the Ideal of Scientific Method: History, Nature and Science in the Political 
Language of Thomas Hobbes”, in The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe, ed. 
Anthony Pagden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 303-324. 
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This view finds support in many passages throughout Hobbes’s works. In The Elements 
of Law, for example, he argues that the truth of a proposition is not evident “until we 
conceive the meaning of the words or terms whereof it consisteth, which are always 
conceptions of the mind”.64 In the Third Objections, he points out that “reasoning de-
pends on names, names on the imagination, and the imagination perhaps (as I myself 
hold) on the motion of bodily organs”.65 In Leviathan, we read that reason is not “gotten 
by experience only”,66 which seems to suggest that it is not meant to replace, but rather 
to perfect, experience. Furthermore, Hobbes criticises the terms used by scholastic phi-
losophers, which do not correspond with anything conceivable and must therefore lead 
to absurd doctrines.67 In De Homine, he also claims that “no sense can be had from [the 
words of the schoolmen]”, and in De Corpore he argues that the “first beginnings [of 
scientific] knowledge are the phantasms of sense and imagination”.68 
 
If reasoning depends on conceptions of the mind that we naturally acquire by experi-
ence, then the conditional nature of scientific knowledge needs to be reconsidered. In 
Leviathan, Hobbes distinguishes the absolute knowledge of fact, i.e. sense and memory, 
from conditional knowledge of consequences.69 In addition, he points out: 
No man can know by discourse [i.e. syllogistic reasoning] that this or that is, has been, 
or will be, which is to know absolutely, but only that if this be, that is, if this has been, 
that has been, if his shall be, that shall be, which is to know conditionally […].70 
However, it seems that reasoning meets this condition for the truth of its conclusions 
insofar as it uses propositions about things that are known by experience. In other 
                                                
64 EL, VI.4, p. 41. 
65 Third Objs., p. 112. 
66 Lev., V.17, p. 25 (emphasis added). 
67 Lev., V.5-15, pp. 23-25. 
68 De Hom., X.3, p. 40; De Corp., VI.1, p. 66. 
69 Lev., VII.3, p. 35. 
70 Lev., VII.3, p. 35. 
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words, reasoning does not, as is sometimes argued, merely establish conditional 
knowledge. This is also suggested by Hobbes’s discussion of syllogism in De Corpore: 
[W]hen this syllogism is made, every man is a living creature, every living creature is a 
body, therefore every man is a body, the mind conceives first an image of a man speak-
ing or discoursing, and remembers that that, which so appears, is called man; then it has 
the image of the same man moving, and remembers that that, which appears so, is called 
living creature; thirdly, it conceives an image of the same man, as filling some place or 
space, and remembers that what appears so is called body; and lastly, when it remem-
bers that that thing, which was extended and moved and spake [sic], was one and the 
same thing, it concludes that the three names, man, living creature, and body, are the 
names of the same thing, and that therefore [it] is a true proposition.71 
As this passage clearly shows, syllogistic reasoning is supposed to raise a succession of 
images in the mind, and is therefore not simply a reckoning with words intended to es-
tablish merely conditional knowledge. Rather, reasoning uses propositions that are con-
firmed by experience, such as ‘human beings are living creatures’. 
 
The same may be true for the laws of nature, which Hobbes describes as precepts of 
reason. As was previously mentioned, Oakeshott regards them as mere “theorems about 
human preservation”.72 Gert, on the other hand, maintains that Hobbesian reason has its 
own end, i.e. self-preservation.73 Expanding on the latter view, Kinch Hoekstra suggests 
that the laws of nature “are conditional, but we already by our very nature fulfil the 
conditions”.74 This seems to be warranted in view of the analysis of Hobbes’s concept 
of natural reason in this section. In particular, the laws of nature are conditional upon 
Hobbes’s proposition that people avoid violent death, which cannot be confirmed 
through syllogistic reasoning. Rather, death-aversion is known by experience.75 Thus, 
                                                
71 De Corp., IV.7, p. 49 (emphasis in the original). 
72 Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association, p. 117. 
73 Gert, Hobbes, p. 73. 
74 Hoekstra, “Hobbes on Law, Nature, and Reason“, p. 116. Hoekstra also draws on Watkins’ claim that 
the laws of nature are best understood as ‘assertoric hypothetical imperatives’ in a Kantian sense, i.e. 
as imperatives with a fixed end. See Watkins, Hobbes’s System of Ideas, pp. 82-84. 
75 As has been suggested in sec. 3.3, Hobbes posits death-aversion in the sense that all people would, 
under certain conditions, inflict death on others in order to avoid it for themselves. 
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Hobbesian natural reason may be understood to encompass both empirical assumptions 
and knowledge of consequences. Thus, it dictates, for example, endeavouring peace in-
sofar as this is conducive to avoiding death at the hands of another.76 
 
To conclude, this section has shown that Hobbes adopts a concept of natural reason, 
which denotes the full potential and inherent limitations of human understanding. Alt-
hough he holds that this potential can only be fully realised with the help of syllogistic 
reasoning, people can, according to Hobbes, also find out some truths by experience 
alone. His principal concern seems to be with those who act contrary to natural reason 
because they were deceived by false reasoning or mistaken doctrines. 
 
4.3 Scepticism as a weapon against seditious doctrines 
This section considers claims about Hobbes’s scepticism, which relate to issues such as 
the relationship between philosophy and religion, the foundations of knowledge, and the 
nexus of reason and rhetoric. It will be suggested that Hobbes’s scepticism is grounded 
in his aforementioned concept of natural reason. In particular, it appears that Hobbes 
draws out the latter’s sceptical implications for the purpose of disarming seditious ec-
clesiastical doctrines that could otherwise endanger the civil peace. 
 
While it is often argued that Hobbes was a sceptic of some sort, commentators advance 
different interpretations of his scepticism. Emphasising similarities between Hobbes and 
late-medieval sceptics, Michael Oakeshott, for example, suggests that Hobbes was “not 
                                                
76 This raises a further question, namely how ‘natural reason’ relates to ‘right reason’. Gregory Kavka, 
“Right Reason and Natural Law”, p. 121, notes that Hobbes sometimes uses the latter term as a 
synonym for ‘reason’ or ‘natural reason’. At other times, he apparently identifies ‘right reason’ with 
the process of reasoning, or with the conclusions reached by reasoning. This seems to be consistent 
with the above stated view that Hobbes adopts a concept of natural reason, defined as the full potential 
of human understanding, which can be realised with the right method. 
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less persuaded of [the] fallibility and limitations [of reasoning] than Montaigne him-
self”.77 This assertion appears to be justified insofar as Hobbes, indeed, assumes that 
there are limits to human understanding. In particular, Hobbes holds that philosophy 
cannot reveal the truth about matters of faith.78 He also invokes St Paul’s warning to-
wards a corruption of faith “through philosophy and vain deceit”,79 which is echoed in 
his own condemnation of ‘vain philosophy’ in Book 4 of Leviathan. In addition, Hobbes 
clearly states in De Corpore that philosophy “excludes Theology”.80 
 
However, Oakeshott appears to be mistaken when he claims that Hobbes’s conception 
of philosophy as conditional knowledge of causes and effects entirely excludes matters 
of religion.81 After all, Hobbes indicates his acceptance of a causal proof of God in Le-
viathan.82 While he denies that we can have an image or conception of God in the same 
way as we conceive sensible objects, he holds that we can infer the fact of His existence 
like a blind man can confirm the presence of a fire after experiencing its effects. If we 
suppose the actuality of conceptions of the mind, their necessary external causes, and a 
succession of prior causes, we may infer the existence of a “first and eternal cause of all 
things, which is that which men mean by the name of God”.83 This casts doubt on the 
                                                
77 Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association, pp. 25f. Cf. ibid., pp. 10f. In these passages Oakeshott also 
associates Hobbes’s scepticism with his conception of reason. Cf. sec. 4.2. 
78 It has often been suggested that Hobbes was an atheist, a claim that can be traced back to his own time 
when the charge of atheism conveyed a wider meaning than today. See Samuel I. Mintz, The Hunting 
of Leviathan: Seventeenth-Century Reactions to the Materialism and Moral Philosophy of Thomas 
Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 67. More recently, a number of 
Hobbesian interpreters have argued that Hobbes was not opposed to religion as such, but rather to a 
particular kind of theology that applied philosophy to matters of faith. See, for example, Alan 
Cromartie, “The God of Thomas Hobbes”, The Historical Journal 51 (2008), pp. 857-879; Arrigo 
Pacchi, “Some Guidelines Into Hobbes's Theology”, Hobbes Studies 2 (1989), pp. 87-103; Patricia 
Springborg, “Hobbes on Religion”, in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes, ed. Tom Sorell 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 346-380. 
79 Lev., XLVI.30, p. 463. Cf. Col 2:8. 
80 De Corp., I.8, p. 10 (emphasis and capitalisation in the original). 
81 Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association, p. 17. 
82 See Lev., XII.6, p. 64. 
83 Lev., XII.6, p. 64. At least, this would follow if we assume that our imaginings must have external 
causes, and that an infinite regress of causes is inconceivable. 
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idea that reasoning merely joins together propositions,84 and points to Hobbes’s concept 
of natural reason, which also incorporates knowledge of fact.85 
 
The idea that human beings have an inherent potential to understand the natural world, 
moreover, indicates that reason and religion are not mutually exclusive. As Kinch 
Hoekstra aptly observes, Hobbes rather “identifies natural reason with the word of God, 
who rules as God of nature via natural reason”.86 This connection has received surpris-
ingly little attention in the literature on Hobbes.87 A 1634 letter by Hobbes, which men-
tions Galileo’s Dialogue, is most revealing in this regard: 
My first businesse in London, was to seek for Galileo’s dialogues; […] I heare say it is 
called in, in Italy, as a booke that will do more hurt to their religion then all the bookes 
haue done of Luther and Calvin, such opposition they thinke is between their Religion, 
and naturall reason.88 
Hobbes seems to suggest that ecclesiastics in Italy consider Galileo’s Dialogue a threat 
because they fear that their religion is opposed to natural reason. In contrast to this al-
leged position of the Roman Church, Hobbes himself points out in the introduction of 
Leviathan that nature is “the art whereby God hath made and governs the world”.89 Un-
derstood thus, the fact of divine Creation enables the acquisition of knowledge about the 
natural world, rather than being opposed to science and philosophy. 
                                                
84 Cf. Cromarite, “The God of Thomas Hobbes”, p., 868. Yet this does, of course, not provide an answer 
to the question whether or not Hobbes truly believed in God. Alan Cromartie, “The God of Thomas 
Hobbes”, p., 877, for instance, finds it “hard to believe that Hobbes had ‘faith’”. However, it seems 
very difficult to make an assertion based on Hobbes’s writings about this issue. 
85 See sec. 4.2. 
86 Hoekstra, “Hobbes on Law, Nature, and Reason“, p. 119. 
87 Douglass Jesseph highlights the debts of Hobbes’s natural philosophy to Galileo, and argues that both 
thinkers sought to unlock the principles underlying the Book of Nature. See Douglas M. Jesseph, 
“Galileo, Hobbes, and the Book of Nature”, Perspectives on Science 12 (2004), pp. 191-211. Richard 
Popkin suggests that, with few exceptions, seventeenth-century philosophers conceived of knowledge 
as being revealed through the Book of Nature or the Word of God, i.e. natural science or Scripture. 
See Richard H. Popkin, “The Religious Background of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy”, Journal of 
the History of Philosophy 25 (1987), pp. 35-50, 43. However, Popkin does not explicitly mention 
Hobbes in this context. 
88 Corr. 1, Letter 10 (1634), pp. 19f. 
89 Lev., intr. 1, p. 3. 
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In general, the role of the Word of God appears to have been an important concern in 
the early-modern period. In their search for truth, many thinkers at the time turned away 
from Scripture as a source of divine revelation towards the ‘text’ of Creation––often 
conceived as the Book of Nature.90 In doing so, they adopted a distinctive position on 
the relationship between the Word of God and human languages, i.e. they held that the 
latter were disconnected from the divine Word due to the corruption of language at the 
Tower of Babel.91 Therefore, scholars also abandoned the search for traces of the Word 
of God with the methods of Renaissance humanism, i.e. philology, textual criticism, and 
historiography.92 The authority of the Scripture was, of course, still recognised. Howev-
er, Protestant theologians and early-modern philosophers advanced naturalistic readings 
of passages about issues such as miracles and transubstantiation.93  
 
Hobbes seems to adopt a similar position on the Word of God and the Book of Nature. 
In De Cive and Leviathan, he distinguishes between three ways in which the Word 
could be revealed: first, through natural reason; secondly, supernaturally by God Him-
self; thirdly, through prophets who speak on God’s behalf.94 In effect, nature and Scrip-
ture are the two sources of knowledge about the Word that available to ordinary human 
beings. While Hobbes does not use the phrase ‘Book of Nature’, passages in his works 
show that he does conceive of reason as a means to unlock the natural order of Creation. 
In De Cive, for instance, he refers to the “government of the world, in which God the 
first mover of all things, produces natural effects through the order of secondary caus-
                                                
90 James J. Bono, The Word of God and the Languages of Man: Interpreting Nature in Early Modern 
Science and Medicine, Vol 1: Ficino to Descartes (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1995), pp. 64-84. 
91 Bono, The Word of God and the Languages of Man, pp. 70f. 
92 Bono, The Word of God and the Languages of Man, p. 49-60.  
93 Nicholas Jolley, “The Relation Between Theology and Philosophy”, in The Cambridge History of 
Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, Vol. 1, eds. Daniel Garber and Michael Ayres (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 363-392, 377-388. 
94 De Cive, XV.3, pp. 172f; Lev., XXXI.3, p. 235. 
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es”.95 In addition, in the introduction of Leviathan, he seems to directly allude to Gali-
leo’s notion of the Book of Nature when he states his intention to acquire knowledge 
about human nature “not by reading of books, but of men”.96 
 
Like other Protestant thinkers at the time, Hobbes doubted that miracles were still being 
performed after the time of the prophets.97 Moreover, he argues in Leviathan that “in all 
miracles the work done is not the effect of any virtue in the prophet, because it is the 
effect of the immediate hand of God”.98 On this basis, Hobbes cautions against pretence 
to miracle, such as in the case of transubstantiation.99 Before something be declared a 
miracle, Hobbes insists, it is necessary to establish “whether it be such as no man can do 
the like by his natural power, but that it requires the immediate hand of God”.100 This 
shows that Hobbes attributes an important role to natural reason in the interpretation of 
the Scripture.101 The explanations that he provides for supposedly supernatural phenom-
ena, such as miracles, thereby seem to reveal the sceptical implications of his concept of 
natural reason. Yet, given that Hobbes also identifies natural reason with the Word of 
God, his scepticism seems to be less radical than Oakeshott suggests. 
 
In particular, Hobbes’s views on nature as a source of knowledge about the Word of 
God seem incompatible with a fundamental scepticism regarding the foundations of 
knowledge. Richard Tuck has considered this possibility. He argues that Hobbes’s phi-
losophy attempted to overcome what was then perceived as a crisis of knowledge after 
                                                
95 De Cive, XIII.1, p. 142. Cf. De Corp., epistle, p. xiii. 
96 Lev., intr. 3, p. 4 (emphasis in the original). Similarly, Hobbes points out in Hist. Eccl., p. 349, that 
philosophers “read the world not books”. 
97 Lev., XXVI.41, n. 15, p. 187. 
98 Lev., XXXVII.8, p. 297. 
99 Lev., XXXVII.13, p. 299. According to the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation, a priest turns bread 
and wine into the body and blood of Christ when performing the mass. 
100 Lev., XXXVII.13, p. 299. Cf. Lev., XXXVII.3-4, p. 294. 
101 On Hobbes’s approach to scriptural exegesis, cf. Johnston, The Rhetoric of Leviathan, pp. 134-163; 
and Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes, pp. 383-431. 
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the rediscovery of ancient scepticism.102 Hobbes’s reading of Descartes’s Discourse on 
the Method supposedly stimulated his interest in these questions.103 Yet other Hobbesi-
an interpreters have put forward severe objections to Tuck’s thesis. Their criticisms 
concern, among other things, problematic historical conjectures, a selective reading of 
Hobbes, and a misrepresentation of Descartes’ hyperbolical doubt.104 While it is true 
that Hobbes discusses the fallibility of sense-perception in The Elements of Law,105 Tom 
Sorell convincingly argues that he does not address himself to the Cartesian doubt, i.e. 
the idea that all beliefs might be caused by the operation of a demon.106 
 
According to Sorell, Hobbes’s Third Objections to Descartes’s Meditations show that 
he simply did not grasp the hyperbolical doubt.107 Yet Hobbes’s response to Descartes 
does not necessarily testify to a lack of ingenuity, but may also be explained in view of 
his concept of natural reason. The latter seems to preclude the idea of a malicious de-
mon, as purported by Descartes in his formulation of the hyperbolical doubt. In The El-
ements of Law, for instance, Hobbes argues that the heathen belief in spirits is due to a 
lack of knowledge about the causes of phantasms in the mind.108 Likewise, he suggests 
in Leviathan that people mistake their own imaginings for demons, and traces this mis-
understanding back to heathen origins.109 He also provides figurative readings of bibli-
cal passages about spirits, including, for example, the entering of Satan into Judas, 
                                                
102 Tuck, Hobbes, p. 7. Also see Tuck, “Optics and Sceptics: The Philosophical Foundations of Hobbes's 
Political Thought”, in: Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modern Europe, ed. Edmund Leiters 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 236-63. 
103 Tuck, Hobbes, pp. 17-19. In addition, Tuck argues that Hobbes shared Grotius’ concern to develop a 
post-sceptical natural law doctrine. This issue was briefly addressed in sec. 3.2.  
104 For these objections to Tuck’s claims, see. Tom Sorell, “Hobbes's Objections and Hobbes's System”, 
in Descartes and his Contemporaries: Mediations, Objections, and Replies, eds. Roger Ariew and 
Marjorie Grene (Chicao: The Chicago University Press, pp. 83-96; Sorell, “Hobbes Without Doubt”, 
pp. 121-135; and Perez Zagorin, “Hobbes's Early Philosophical Development”, Journal of the History 
of Ideas 54 (1993), 505-518. 
105 See EL, II.10, p. 26. 
106 Sorell, “Hobbes Without Doubt”, 126f. 
107 Sorell, “Hobbes's Objections and Hobbes's System”, pp. 88-90. 
108 EL, XI.6, pp. 66f. 
109 Lev., XLV.2-4, pp. 436f. Cf. Lev., II.8, pp. 10f. 
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which he interprets as the development of a treacherous intention.110 What is more, 
Hobbes seems to regard the very idea of demons inspiring or infusing thoughts as evi-
dence of deception, yet of a strikingly different kind of deception than the one consid-
ered by Descartes. In Leviathan, he thus refers to “this superstitious fear of spirits […] 
by which crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple people”.111 
 
In view of such statements, it seems plausible that Hobbes did not address himself to the 
Cartesian doubt (i.e. the idea that all beliefs might be caused by the operation of a mali-
cious demon) because this notion is contrary to his concept of natural reason. As was 
mentioned above, the latter implies scepticism towards supernatural appearances that 
may also be accounted for in terms of natural causes and effects. Deception may, for 
instance, be explained with regard to the teaching of seditious doctrines. Indeed, as was 
shown in sec. 4.2, Hobbes identities false teachings as one of the main reasons for why 
human beings fail to realise their inherent potential of natural reason.  
 
Hobbes pays great attention to this kind of deception in Book 4 of Leviathan, titled ‘Of 
the Kingdom of Darkness’. Thereby, he does not merely blame the schoolmen for their 
‘vain philosophy’, but also suggests that their doctrines, and the teachings of the 
Church, have caused a more fundamental deception of all beliefs: 
The enemy has been here in the night of our natural ignorance and sown the tares of 
spiritual errors. And that, first, by abusing and putting out the light of the Scriptures; for 
we err, not knowing the [OL: the meaning of] the Scriptures. Secondly, by introducing 
the demonology of the heathen poets, that is to say, their fabulous doctrine concerning 
demons, which are but idols or phantasms of the brain, without any real nature of their 
own distinct from human fancy […]. Thirdly, by mixing with the Scripture diverse relics 
of the religion and much of the vain and erroneous philosophy of the Greeks (especially 
                                                
110 Lev., XXXIV.1-14, pp. 261-270, XLV.4-9 pp. 437-441. 
111 Lev., II.8, p. 11. 
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of Aristotle). Fourthly, by mingling with both these, false and uncertain traditions, and 
feigned and uncertain history.112 
Instead of cultivating the seeds of natural reason with the help of the right method, the 
Church and the schoolmen have thus abused the people’s natural ignorance. Among 
other things, they cause ‘darkness’ by interpreting Scripture contrary to the light (of rea-
son?), and by falsely applying Aristotelian philosophy to matters of faith. In addition, 
Hobbes argues that, as a consequence of this deception, Christendom has been haunted 
by foreign and civil war “almost from the time of the Apostles”.113 
  
Hobbes’s account of the ‘Kingdom of Darkness’ has been interpreted in terms of the 
more rhetorical nature of Leviathan, compared to the two earlier versions of his political 
philosophy in De Cive and The Elements of Law. Quentin Skinner, for instance, main-
tains that the use of eloquence in Leviathan, and specifically of the master tropes of 
simile and metaphor, shows Hobbes’s increasing scepticism concerning the power of 
reason to persuade an audience, as a consequence of which he supposedly returned to 
his earlier humanist interests.114 According to Skinner’s interpretation, Hobbes’s scepti-
cism thus primarily concerns the relationship between reason and rhetoric. 
 
Specifically, Skinner claims that Hobbes invokes the image of the ‘Kingdom of Dark-
ness’ in order to demonise his ecclesiastical opponents.115 Yet surely Hobbes does not 
simply employ particular figures of speech, but seeks to engage the popular imagina-
tion, which was then largely based on biblical themes and motifs. As part of this strate-
gy, he advances a figurative interpretation of conventional religious doctrines, including 
                                                
112 Lev., XLIV.2, p. 412. Cf. Matt 13:25. 
113 Lev., XLIV.2, p. 412. 
114 Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, pp. 343-375. 
115 Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, pp. 389f. 
 97 
the one of the ‘Kingdom of Darkness’. While Hobbes rejects the idea of a literal domin-
ion of Satan, he seems to suggest in Book 4 of Leviathan that the cause of ‘darkness’ 
are the very people who deceive everyone with their doctrine of evil spirits.116 
 
In seventeenth-century century England, the papacy was commonly regarded as the an-
tichrist and enemy of the true church.117 Given Hobbes’s apparent exploitation of this 
view, commentators have noted with some astonishment that he denies that the pope is 
actually the antichrist.118 Yet it comes as no surprise that Hobbes rejects the idea of a 
cosmological struggle between good and evil. Interpreting biblical passages about Satan 
metaphorically, he reduces the idea of an antichrist to a matter of false pretence.119 At 
the same time, Hobbes points out that “for all metaphors there is some real ground that 
may be expressed in proper words”.120 In this spirit, he argues that  
the kingdom of darkness, as it is set forth in […] the Scripture, is nothing else but a con-
federacy of deceivers that, to obtain dominion over men in this present world, endeavor 
by dark and erroneous doctrines to extinguish in them the light, both of nature and of 
the gospel, and so to disprepare them for the kingdom of God to come.121 
The truth behind the image of the papal antichrist thus lies in the fact that the Church is 
part of a league that aims to acquire dominion over all Christians.122 Far from condemn-
ing the ecclesiastics as literally demoniacal––which would commit him to a doctrine of 
evil spirits––, Hobbes provides a natural explanation of deception. Book 4 of Leviathan 
reaches it finale with a simile between the ‘Kingdom of Darkness’ and a kingdom of 
                                                
116 By adopting such an interpretation of biblical passages about Satan, Hobbes may seek to subvert the 
threat of damnation. In Behemoth, pp. 4-8, Hobbes identifies the threat of excommunication and 
damnation as one of the means by which ecclesiastics challenged the sovereign authority, and 
consequently as one of the causes of the English Civil War. 
117 Christopher Hill, Antichrist in Seventeenth-Century England (London: Verso, 1990), p. 4. 
118 Edwin Curley, footnote 63, in Lev., p. 377; Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan, pp. 320f; 
Springborg, “Hobbes on Religion”, p. 367. 
119 Lev., XXVIII.12-13, p. 308, XLII.87-88, pp. 376-378. 
120 Lev., XXVIII.12-13, p. 308. 
121 Lev., XLIV.1, p. 411 (emphasis in the original). 
122 That Hobbes generally seeks to substitute a metaphorical for a literal understanding of the ‘Kingdom 
of Darkness’ is affirmed in Answer, pp. 356f; and QLNC, pp. 210f. 
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fairies, which exists only “in the fancies of ignorant people”.123 This image suggests that 
deception can be overcome by natural reason, the sceptical implications of which 
Hobbes deploys against the application of philosophy to matters of faith, orthodox bib-
lical interpretations, demonology, and other ecclesiastical doctrines. If this reading is 
granted, it casts doubt on Skinner’s claim that Book 4 in Leviathan reveals Hobbes’s 
increasing scepticism concerning the persuasive power of reason. 
 
To conclude, this section has suggested that Hobbes neither entertains any fundamental 
doubts about the foundations of knowledge, nor draws a sharp distinction between rea-
son and religion. Rather, he conceives of natural reason as a source of knowledge about 
the Word of God and the Book of Nature. Hobbes’s scepticism appears to be grounded 
in this concept of natural reason, and it has been argued that he mainly uses this notion 
for the purpose of disarming seditious ecclesiastical doctrines.  
 
4.4 Religious analogies for peace and rebellion 
Hobbes does not only advance figurative and naturalistic readings of the bible in order 
to counter the latter’s potential seditious implications, as has been suggested in the last 
section. He also invokes different religious parallels and analogies to put across his own 
views on the good of peace. In particular, this section will discuss Hobbes’s claim that 
the commonwealth offers some sort of salvation on earth, and the related idea that the 
sin of rebellion is naturally punished with civil war and violent death. 
 
Some Hobbesian interpreters have compared his political philosophy to Augustine's 
doctrine of the Fall, although not without some caveats. Michael Oakeshott argues that 
                                                
123 Lev., XLVII.33, p. 484. 
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while he resembles Augustine in that he envisions a predicament arising from pride, 
Hobbes regards the latter as a consequence of human nature, rather than of a depravity 
of the same.124 Similarly, Sheldon Wolin finds that Hobbes’s political philosophy does 
not appropriate the idea of an original sin. Nonetheless, he finds that the state of nature 
may be understood as “a fall […] from the highest level of human achievement, life in a 
civilised society”.125 According to Tom Sorell’s reading, Hobbes’s account of the natu-
ral condition assumes that human beings have inherited the original sin from Adam, 
therefore being vulnerable to death and unable to lead an innocent life.126 
 
To begin with, it is true that some of Hobbes’s statements appear to suggest that he ac-
cepts the notion of an inherited sin, i.e. the idea that human nature has been corrupted 
after the Fall. In De Cive’s preface to the readers, Hobbes considers the objection that 
he portrays people as evil by nature, and responds that this “perhaps, though harsh, 
should be conceded, since it is clearly said in holy Scripture”.127 However, in the re-
mainder of this passage Hobbes clearly rejects the view that human nature is inherently 
sinful. To the contrary, “evil is simply want of reason at an age when it normally ac-
crues to men by nature governed by discipline and experience of harm”.128 This sug-
gests that evil results from a lack of understanding, particularly of the consequences of 
human actions, which recalls Hobbes’s concept of natural reason.129 The latter seems to 
imply that evils such as civil war are neither due to human nature nor an inherited de-
fect, but rather a result from the failure to realise the potential of reason. 
                                                
124 Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association, pp. 58-60. 
125 Wolin, Politics and Vision, p. 237. 
126 Sorell, Hobbes, pp. 33-35. A similar interpretation is proposed by M.M. Goldsmith, Hobbes’s Science 
of Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 177. 
127 De Cive, pref. 12, p. 11. 
128 De Cive, pref. 13, p. 11. In a similar vein, Hobbes states in De Hom., XIII.4, p. 65, that “dispositions 
are corrected by adverse events”. 
129 As has been suggested in sec. 4.2, Hobbes’s concept of natural reason denotes the full potential and 
inherent limitations of human understanding. 
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Hobbes does, of course, accept the most obvious implication of the doctrine of the Fall, 
i.e. that human beings became mortal through the original sin. In Leviathan, he states 
that, after Adam committed the sin of eating from the forbidden tree of knowledge of 
good and evil, “mortality entered upon himself and his posterity”.130 However, it seems 
that Hobbes also seeks to reduce the practical implications of Adam’s sin, for he rejects 
the view that individuals need to pay a ransom in order to be redeemed by God. Rather, 
the entire work of redemption was supposedly accomplished by Jesus’ death.131 Thus, 
Hobbes points out that “Jesus Christ hath satisfied for the sins of all that believe in him; 
and therefore recovered to all believers that ETERNAL LIFE which was lost by the sin of 
Adam”.132 While those who believe that Jesus is the Christ are already redeemed how-
ever, they will not come to enjoy eternal life until after the resurrection.133 
 
Yet Hobbes also suggests in Leviathan that mortal human beings are eligible to some 
sort of secular salvation, i.e. peace in the commonwealth. He argues that “to be saved 
from sin is to be saved from all the evil and calamities that sin hath brought upon us”.134 
Thereby, Hobbes distinguishes between salvation from all evils, including human mor-
tality, and salvation from particular evils. Specifically, he cites biblical passages that 
suggest that God––in His capacity as the king of the Israelites––saved them “from their 
temporal enemies”135 In addition, Hobbes goes at some length to establish the heterodox 
view that the Kingdom of Heaven (i.e. divine salvation after the resurrection) will be on 
earth.136 This suggests an essential similarity between salvation and the peace provided 
by the state, which only differ insofar as the former fully restores immortality, while the 
                                                
130 Lev., XXXVIII.2, p. 301. 
131 Cf. Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan, pp. 267-271. 
132 Lev., XXXVIII.2, p. 302 (capitalisation in the original). Cf. Lev., XXXVIII.25, pp. 313f. 
133 Lev., XXXVIII.3, p. 303. 
134 Lev., XXXVIII.15, p. 310. 
135 Lev., XXXVIII.16, p. 310. 
136 Lev., XXXVIII.17-23, pp. 310-313. Cf. Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan, pp. 261f. 
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latter merely takes away the fear of violent death. Conversely, if people return to the 
state of nature in the event of civil war,137 this may, as Wolin suggests, be understood as 
a fall from the highest level of human achievement. 
 
However, Wolin seems to be mistaken when he claims that this is a fall without sin.138 It 
is true that, according to Hobbes, human beings cannot be blamed for evils they commit 
in order to preserve themselves in the state of nature.139 However, people are liable for 
reverting to this condition in the first place. This comes out in De Cive, where Hobbes 
alludes to the Genesis when he discusses the doctrine that subjects may judge good and 
evil for themselves.140 Thereby, he likens rebellion to the original sin:  
[A]nyone whom [authors of sedition] want killed as a Tyrant, rules either by right or 
without right. If without right, he is a public enemy [hostis] and is rightly killed, though 
this should not be called Tyrannicide but hosticide. If he holds power rightly, the divine 
question applies: Who told you that he was a Tyrant, unless you have eaten of the tree of 
which I told you not to eat? For why do you call him a Tyrant whom God made a King, 
unless you, a private person, are claiming for yourself a knowledge of good and evil?141 
Thus, the notion of lawful tyrannicide presupposes that subjects pretend knowledge of 
good and evil, which Hobbes regards as most dangerous for civil peace.142 
 
In his controversy with Bishop Bramhall, Hobbes likewise identifies private knowledge 
of good and evil with Adam’s forbidden judgement of God’s command.143 In Leviathan, 
                                                
137 In Lev, XIII.11, p. 77, Hobbes states that “it may be perceived that what manner of life there would be 
where there were no common power to fear, by the manner of life which men that have formerly lived 
under a peaceful government use to degenerate into, in a civil war”. 
138 Wolin, Politics and Vision, p. 237. 
139 Hobbes holds that, insofar as human beings in the natural condition possess a natural right to all 
things, they do not sin if they act contrary to the laws of nature. See sec. 3.2. 
140 De Cive, XII.1, pp. 131f. Cf. Gen. 2.17; Gen. 3.5. 
141 De Cive, XII.3, p. 133 (emphasis and capitalisation in the original). Pat Moloney also notes that 
Hobbes is referring to Adam’s sin, but apparently shares Sorell’s view that Hobbes accepts the notion 
of inherited sin, rather than, as suggested here, merely invoking the idea of the original sin as an 
analogy. See Pat Moloney, “Leaving the Garden of Eden: Linguistic and Political Authority in 
Thomas Hobbes”, History of Political Thought 18 (1997), pp. 242-266, 263f. 
142 De Cive, XII.3, p. 133 (emphasis in the original). 
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he refers to the forbidden tree of knowledge as a “trial of Adam’s obedience”.144 Fur-
thermore, Hobbes discusses the doctrine “That every private man is judge of good and 
evil actions” in the chapter on things that weaken the commonwealth.145 Even though he 
does not draw an explicit analogy to Adam’s sin in this context, his description of this 
seditious doctrine may well be an allusion to the Scripture.  
 
These statements seem to be related to Hobbes’s account of the ‘Kingdom of God by 
Nature’ in Leviathan. In consideration of God as the author of nature, he posits that 
breaches of natural laws necessarily provoke some evil consequences:  
There is no action of man in this life that is not the beginning of so long a chain of con-
sequences as no human providence is high enough to give man a prospect to the end. 
And in this chain are linked together both pleasing and unpleasing events, in such man-
ner as he that will do anything for his pleasure must engage himself to suffer all the 
pains annexed to it; and these pains are the natural punishments for those actions, which 
are the beginning of more harm than good.146 
Among other things, Hobbes finds that injustice is necessarily followed by the violence 
of enemies, negligent government by rebellion, and rebellion by slaughter.147 This re-
flects his view that “natural punishments must be naturally consequent to the breach of 
the laws of nature”.148 Alluding to the English Civil War, he also points out in the Latin 
edition of Leviathan that those who had advocated seditious doctrines “have been pun-
ished by a civil war”.149 These statements indicate that he regards the state of nature as a 
fall from peace and a consequence of the ‘original sin’ of rebellion. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
143 QLNC, p. 269. 
144 Lev., XX.17, p. 134 (emphasis in the original). Cf. Lev., XXXV.3, p. 272. 
145 Lev., XXIX.6, p. 212. 
146 Lev., XXXI.40, p. 352. Cf. Lev., XXVIII.8, pp. 204f. 
147 Lev., XXXI.40, p. 352. 
148 Lev., XXXI.40, p. 352. 
149 Lev., XXXI.41 (OL), n. 15, p. 244. 
 103 
In accordance with his statements on ‘natural punishments’, Hobbes also advances a 
figurative interpretation of biblical passages about the devil. As he points out in Levia-
than, “the names of the Enemy (or Satan), the Accuser (or Diabolus), the Destroyer (or 
Abaddon) […] set not forth to us any individual person […] but only an office or quali-
ty”.150 In particular, Hobbes identifies the devil with temporal enemies, which recalls 
his account of the ‘Kingdom of Darkness’, as discussed in sec. 4.3. In response to Bish-
op Bramhall, Hobbes also points out that “Satan is evil to us, because he seeketh our 
destruction, but good to God, because he executeth his commandments.”151 This seems 
to suggest that evil fulfils a purpose in the greater scheme of things. In the same way as 
punishments are generally ordained “to the end that the will of men may thereby be bet-
ter disposed to obedience”,152 metaphorical devils may act as enforcers for the laws of 
nature (which prescribe what is necessary for peace and self-preservation). 
 
Hobbes’s controversy with Bramhall on free will and predestination seems to confirm 
this perspective on evil. Bramhall took issue with Hobbes’s determinism, which “makes 
the first cause, that is, God Almighty, to be the introducer of all evil and sin into the 
world”.153 To counter the Bishop’s accusation, Hobbes stresses that “God is the cause, 
not the author, of all actions and motions”.154 Although God is the original cause of sin 
insofar as He is the first mover of the universe, this does not, as argued by Bramhall, 
imply His responsibility.155 Rather, Hobbes regards God as the author of nature, which 
is intelligible to us in terms of necessary causes and effects.156 In this capacity, He may 
also be understood to provide guidance for human conduct: “Why may not God make 
                                                
150 Lev. XXVIII.12, p. 308 (emphasis and capitalisation in the original). Cf. Answer, p. 356. 
151 QLNC, p. 192. 
152 Lev., XXVIII.1, p. 203. 
153 QLNC, p. 111. 
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the affliction […] the necessary causes of those he hath elected; their own affliction 
serving therein as chastisements, and the afflictions of the rest as examples?”157 
 
Hobbes’s reading of the Book of Job points to a similar conception of evil. This book 
was at the time often interpreted as counselling forbearance of suffering.158 Similarly, 
Hobbes expresses that he regards it as a parable about human suffering, rather than as an 
account of biblical history.159 However, Hobbes’s political philosophy does not merely 
advocate forbearance of suffering, but spells out how great suffering (such as civil war) 
can be avoided by following the laws of nature. Like the Leviathan who, on God’s be-
half, caused Job to repent, the Hobbesian sovereign is meant to be the greatest power on 
earth and king of the children of pride.160 In Leviathan, Hobbes, in fact, acknowledges 
that such an absolute power may not be without disadvantages.161 Yet, as he points out 
in the same breath, the greatest evil “proceeds from the subjects’ disobedience and 
breach of those covenants from which the Commonwealth hath its being”.162 
 
Hence, Hobbes invokes different religious analogies to put across the conclusions of his 
political philosophy. In particular, it has been shown in this section that he likens the 
peace provided by the state to salvation on earth. Moreover, he proposes a reinterpreta-
tion of the biblical story of the Fall as a warning against rebellion, which likens the lat-
ter to Adam’s forbidden judgement of good and evil. These parallels indicate that great 
suffering can be avoided if people follow the precepts of natural reason. 
                                                
157 QLNC, p. 214. 
158 Gordon Hull, “Against This Empusa: Hobbes's Leviathan and the Book of Job”, British Journal for the 
History of Philosophy 10 (2002), pp. 3-29, 6-10. 
159 Lev., XXXIII.12, p. 254 (emphasis in the original). 
160 Lev., XXVIII.27, p. 210. For an interesting discussion of the Leviathan symbol, see Noel Malcolm, 
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4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that Hobbes’s concept of natural enmity does not preclude rec-
onciliation. To the contrary, Hobbes holds that peace is necessary for self-preservation, 
and therefore considers seeking it a fundamental natural law. Yet lasting peace does not 
simply imply the absence of the continual fear of violent death, but also encompasses 
many other goods that are unavailable in the state of nature. Thus, Hobbes also suggests 
that the hope to attain peace lets individuals submit themselves to an absolute sovereign 
power. Similarly, people who already live in the civil state should remain obedient in 
order to make an already existing peace lasting and secure. 
 
Given that Hobbes describes the laws of nature as rational precepts, this chapter has fur-
ther examined his views on reason. It has become apparent that Hobbes does not, as is 
sometimes claimed, reduce reason to syllogistic reasoning. Rather, he adopts a concept 
of natural reason that denotes the full potential and inherent limitations of human under-
standing. While this potential can only be completely realised with the help of language, 
the latter may also deceive people. More specifically, it has been argued that Hobbes 
draws out the sceptical implications of his concept of natural reason in order to counter 
the threat of seditious ecclesiastical doctrines. Nevertheless, Hobbes does not seem to 
entertain fundamental doubts concerning the human capacity to find out truth, and 
seems to hold that––provided they have not been deceived––even untaught people, 
whose judgement relies on experience alone, could follow the laws of nature. 
 
Hobbes’s views on reason indicate that he does not only regard enmity, but also recon-
ciliation, as natural in some sense. After all, he suggests that human beings are rational 
creatures that are in principal able to realise the good of peace. Yet Hobbes is also 
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aware that he does not address people in the natural condition, but an audience that has 
already been conditioned by what he regards as seditious doctrines. 
 
Following this discussion of Hobbes’s views on reason and the good of peace, the next 
chapter will further consider what is necessary for reconciliation, i.e. trust and subjec-
tion to a sovereign. These aspects of Hobbes’s political thought explain what distin-
guishes subjects of the commonwealth from enemies in the state of nature.  
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5. Enmity, trust, and subjection to the sovereign 
This chapter examines how Hobbes’s concept of natural enmity relates to his views on 
subjection to the sovereign, which he considers necessary for realising the promise of 
civil peace. The first section analyses the distinction between enemies and subjects. It is 
argued that, for Hobbes, subjection supposes reciprocal trust between sovereign and 
subjects. The second section reconsiders the distinction between public and private en-
emies. Analysis of Hobbes’s Latin terminology shows that, while he describes all an-
tagonists outside the civil state as hostes (public enemies), opponents within the bound-
aries of the law are merely inimici (private enemies). This suggests a dynamic distinc-
tion between public and private enemies, which is further examined in the third section 
with regard to the rights of sovereigns and subjects. It is argued that the right of war and 
subjection to the sovereign are mutually exclusive. Although people in the civil state 
may still resist punishment or assaults, Hobbes holds that they are no longer permitted 
to take pre-emptive action against anyone whom they consider a threat. 
 
5.1 Trust as a condition of subjection to the sovereign 
Considering that Hobbes argues for the need of an absolute sovereign power to deliver 
people from the war of all against all, he seems to attribute great importance to fear. 
Undoubdtedly, this passion plays an important role in law enforcement, and may also 
motivate submission to the sovereign.1 Yet the distinction that Hobbes draws between 
enemies and subjects, which will be examined in this section, shows that his political 
philosophy is not all about fear, but also attributes great importance to trust. 
                                                
1 Hobbes maintains that the fear of violent death motivates people to seek peace. Yet, as was shown in 
sec. 4.1, he also holds that people could be driven by the hope for a better life. 
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Hobbes has often been associated with a politics of fear. Leo Strauss, for instance, ar-
gues that Hobbes’s concern with this passion distinguishes his characteristically modern 
political philosophy from pre-modern thought, which rather focused on virtue and the 
good life.2 However, it seems that previous writers already considered the importance of 
fear to some extent. For example, as was shown in sec. 2.2, Augustine clearly discerns 
the political function of fear of enemies with regard to the fall of Rome. Neal Wood 
puts forward a different view of the characteristic differences between modern and pre-
modern perspectives. He suggests that thinkers such as Machiavelli, Jean Bodin, and 
Hobbes envisioned a ‘domestication’ of political fear, i.e. they sought to substitute the 
fear of an absolute sovereign power for the fear of external enemies.3 
 
Other commentators also consider similarities between the fear of enemies and the fear 
of an absolute sovereign. For example, Stephen Holmes points out that, for Hobbes, “a 
foreign enemy and a sovereign ruler are functional equivalents”, given that both could 
provide internal cohesion and prevent faction.4 This claim finds some support in 
Hobbes’s writings. In The Elements of Law, for instance, we read that alliances in the 
state of nature come about “by the fear of a present invader, or by the hope of a present 
conquest, or booty”.5 Yet Hobbes also states in this work that 
even at that time when men are in tumult, though they agree a number of them to one 
mischief, and a number of them to another; yet, in the whole, they are amongst them-
                                                
2 Thereby, Strauss draws out apparent similarities between Hobbes and Machiavelli. See Leo Strauss, 
“Niccolo Machiavelli“, in History of Political Philosophy, eds. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chi-
cago: Rand McNally, 1972), pp. 271-292. For similar views, see Ioannis D. Evrigenis, Fear of Ene-
mies and Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 128-130; Corey Rob-
in, Fear: The History of a Political Idea (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), esp. pp. 3-30; 
and Wolin, Politics and Vision, p. 218. 
3 Wood, “Sallust’s Theorem“, pp. 183-189. 
4 Holmes, „Does Hobbes Have a Concept of the Enemy?“, p. 374. 
5 EL, XIX.4, p. 105. 
 109 
selves in the state of hostility, and not of peace; like the seditious Jews besieged in Jeru-
salem, that could join against their enemies, and yet fight amongst themselves […].6 
This suggests that fear of common enemies is insufficient for establishing lasting peace. 
In De Cive, Hobbes argues with regard to concord outside the civil state that human be-
ings “will refuse to help each other or to keep peace among themselves, unless com-
pelled to do so by a common fear”.7 Likewise, he expresses in Leviathan that people 
keep peace among themselves if they have a common enemy.8 However, they would 
revert to war among themselves “when either they have no common enemy, or he that 
by one part is held for an enemy is by another part held for a friend”.9 
 
Hobbes’s statements clearly show that cohesion due to the fear of enemies falls short of 
the lasting peace provided by the commonwealth. In addition, it has been noted that the 
fear of the sovereign power could not be exactly like fear of enemies, for in this case 
individuals would have no reason to submit themselves to the sovereign. Peter Stein-
berger thus distinguishes the immediate fear of others in the state of nature from fear in 
the civil state, which is “merely hypothetical”. Provided that subjects remain obedient, 
they have reason to hope that their fear does not materialise.10 By contrast, people in the 
state of nature are likely to suffer regardless of how they themselves behave. 
 
Furthermore, it seems that the role of fear cannot be understood in isolation. Some in-
terpreters have recently stressed the role of trust in Hobbes’s political philosophy, which 
may act as a counterweight to fear. Larry May argues that it is reasonable for people in 
the state of nature to develop ‘pacifist attitudes’, by which he means the disposition to 
                                                
6 EL, XX.2, p. 110. 
7 De Cive, V.4, p. 70. 
8 Lev., XVII.4-5, p. 107. 
9 Lev., XVII.5, pp. 107f. 
10 Steinberger, “Hobbesian Resistance“, p. 863. 
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trust others and only use violence as the last resort.11 May finds that this could explain 
the transition to the civil state. However, as was suggested in sec. 4.1, such a quasi-
historical reading is at odds with statements suggesting that people in the natural condi-
tion are absorbed by the pursuit of survival and other short-term desires. 
 
Deborah Baumgold provides an alternative account of the importance of trust. Rather 
than considering its role in the state of nature, she argues that the social contract insti-
tutes a relationship of reciprocal trust between sovereign and subjects.12 While the sov-
ereign guarantees the life and liberty of subjects, the latter promise obedience in ex-
change. Baumgold particularly emphasises the distinction between servants and slaves 
that Hobbes introduces based on an adaption of Roman ideas on this subject. Unlike 
slaves, who cannot be trusted to obey their master, servants are supposed to enjoy con-
siderable liberty as part of their exchange relationship with the sovereign.13 
 
Although Baumgold concentrates on comparing servants with slaves, her reading also 
points to an important distinction between subjection and hostility. This comes out par-
ticularly in Hobbes’s reflections on sovereignty acquired by conquest. In The Elements 
of Law, he advances the view that subjects are released from their obligation to obey the 
sovereign when “the power of a commonwealth is overthrown”, implying that they can 
make a new covenant with the conqueror.14 Hobbes clearly states that such a covenant 
supposes that the conqueror has sufficient trust into the one who is to become his serv-
ant.15 De Cive contains a similar account of sovereignty acquired by conquest.16 Unlike 
                                                
11 May, Limiting Leviathan, pp. 224-239. 
12 Baumgold, “’Trust’ in Hobbes’s Political Thought”, pp. 1-18. 
13 Baumgold, “’Trust’ in Hobbes’s Political Thought”, pp. 11-13. 
14 EL, XXI.15, pp. 125f, XXII.2, pp. 126f, XXII.7, p. 128 
15 EL, XXII.3, p. 127. 
16 De Cive, VIII.1, pp. 102f 
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in The Elements of Law, however, Hobbes does not only point out that those who be-
come servants will enjoy liberty, but also highlights that their lives will be spared.17 
Hobbes also seems to suggest that enslaved prisoners of war remain in a state of hostili-
ty and, therefore, retain their natural right to all things, for he points out that if slaves 
“kill their Master, they are not acting against the natural laws”.18 
 
The account of sovereignty acquired by conquest in Leviathan makes the distinction be-
tween subjects and enemies even more clear. In this work, Hobbes carefully distin-
guishes between victory and voluntary submission to a conqueror: 
It is not […] the victory that giveth the right of dominion over the vanquished, but [the 
latter’s] own consent. Nor is he obliged because he is conquered (that is to say, beaten, 
and taken or put to flight), but because he cometh in, and submitteth to the victor; nor is 
the victor obliged by an enemy’s rendering himself (without promise of life) to spare 
him for this his yielding to discretion […].19 
This suggests that people remain enemies until the victor and the vanquished have made 
a covenant. Indeed, Hobbes also states concerning somebody who submits himself to a 
conqueror that “then only is his life in security, and his service due, when the victor 
hath trusted him with his corporal liberty”.20 Furthermore, Leviathan provides a more 
developed account of how the commonwealth is dissolved: 
[W]hen in a war […] the enemies get a final victory, so as (the forces of the common-
wealth keeping the field no longer), there is no farther protection in their loyalty, then is 
the commonwealth DISSOLVED, and every man at liberty to protect himself by such 
courses as his own discretion shall suggest to him.21 
Thus, Hobbes holds that subjects retain the right to submit themselves to an invading 
power when the old sovereign can no longer protect them. While the criterion of ‘final 
                                                
17 De Cive, VIII.1, pp. 102f 
18 De Cive, VIII.4, pp. 103f (emphasis in the original). 
19 Lev., XX.11, p. 131. 
20 Lev., XX.12, p. 131. 
21 Lev., XXIX.23, pp. 218f (capitalisation in the original). 
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victory’ is certainly ambiguous, it shows that Hobbes regards the trust relationship that 
characterises subjection as reciprocal. Once people have no more hope for protection 
from the sovereign, they cease to be subjects and retain their natural right. 
 
A number of statements throughout Hobbes’s works lend further credence to the view 
that he envisions a relationship of reciprocal trust between sovereign and subjects. In 
both De Cive and Leviathan, for example, Hobbes expresses that sovereigns would vio-
late the subjects’ trust if they fail to cater for the people’s safety.22 He also mentions on 
some occasions that a sovereign must have great confidence in the fidelity of ministers, 
counsellors, and other powerful subjects.23 In the Dialogue, Hobbes draws a distinction 
between crimes committed “by one that has been trusted” and the acts of an “open En-
emy”,24 which shows that people in the civil state are meant to have different expecta-
tions about each other’s behaviour than those in the state of nature. 
 
Yet, as Hobbes’s distinction between subjects and enemies reveals, trust is not merely a 
contingent feature of life in the civil state, but a condition of subjection. This can be fur-
ther clarified in view of the natural law that prescribes pardon. In all of his main politi-
cal works, Hobbes reasons that people ought to forgive those who repent and promise 
not to offend in the future.25 For instance, he states in Leviathan that 
upon caution of the future time, a man ought to pardon the offences past of them that, 
repenting, desire it. For PARDON is nothing but the granting of peace, which (though 
granted to them that preserve in their hostility be not peace but fear, yet) not granted to 
them that give caution of the future time is sign of an aversion to peace […].26 
                                                
22 De Cive, XIII.4, pp. 143f; Lev., XXIV.7, p. 162. 
23 Behemoth, p. 83; Lev., XXV.15, p. 171, XXIX.20, p. 218, XXX.28, n. 13, p. 232. 
24 Dialogue, p 71. In Leviathan, Hobbes also draws a distinction between legal punishment and ‘acts of 
hostility’ which will be further considered in sec. 7.2. 
25 EL, XVI.9, p. 91; De Cive, III.10, p. 48; Lev., XV.18, p. 96. 
26 Lev., XV.18, p. 96 (emphasis and capitalisation in the original). 
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This precept of reason seems applicable to the acquisition of sovereignty by conquest, 
in which case the victor saves the life and liberty of former enemies in exchange for 
their promise of obedience. Although Hobbes does not explicitly mention trust, he states 
in the above passage that pardon should not be granted––out of fear alone––to those 
who remain in a hostile state of mind.27 This shows that, especially in the case of sover-
eignty acquired by conquest, subjection supposes trust. 
 
However, Hobbes apparently does not consider trust a pre-condition of life in the civil 
state, but rather suggests that trust is created in the event of submission. More specifi-
cally, it seems that repentance is supposed to allow for the possibility of establishing a 
relationship of trust. In the chapter on the passions in The Elements of Law, Hobbes 
points out that revenge “aimeth not at the death, but at the captivity and subjection of an 
enemy”.28 In addition, he refers in this chapter to the “tears of reconciliation”, which are 
supposedly shed when somebody’s quest for revenge “is suddenly stopped or frustrated 
by the repentance of the adversary”.29 In Leviathan, Hobbes also mentions “the sudden 
stop made to their thoughts of revenge, by reconciliation” as one of the causes of weep-
ing.30 This suggests that he conceives of repentance and reconciliation in terms of a 
sudden change of mind, much in the same way as, for Hobbes, repentance of sins and 
faith in Jesus Christ are all that is required for divine salvation.31 
 
Hobbes further elaborates his ideas on reconciliation in the context of the natural law 
that dictates gratitude. In The Elements of Law, he already argues that nobody ought to 
                                                
27 The same caveat is expressed in EL, XVI.9, p. 91; and De Cive, III.10, p. 48. 
28 EL, IX.6, p. 52. 
29 EL, IX.14, p. 55. 
30 Lev., VI.43, p. 32. 
31 Cf. Lev., XLIII.19, pp. 407f. For parallels and analogies between the good of peace and salvation, see 
the discussion in sec. 4.4. 
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suffer for trusting in others’ charity or good affection, for if this was the case “men will 
not dare to confer mutually to each other’s defence, nor put themselves into each other’s 
mercy upon any terms whatsoever; but rather abide by utmost and worst event of hostil-
ity”.32 Similarly, Hobbes points out in De Cive that without gratitude, “all kindness and 
trust between men will […] be lost, and all benevolence too”.33 In Leviathan, he posits 
the precept of natural law to show gratitude on the following grounds: 
[N]o man giveth but with intention of good to himself, because gift is voluntary, and of 
all voluntary acts the object is to every man his own good; of which, if men see they 
shall be frustrated, there will be no beginning of benevolence or trust; nor, consequently, 
of mutual help, nor of reconciliation of one man to another; and therefore they are to 
remain still in the condition of war […].34 
Thereby, Hobbes seems to refer back to the second law of nature, according to which 
people ought to relinquish their natural right to all things. As he suggests in this context, 
the sovereign, who is not a covenanting party, is supposed to receive the subjects’ natu-
ral right as a free gift.35 This would explain why there could be no beginning of trust 
and reconciliation without gratitude. If the sovereign disappoints the hope of those who 
submitted themselves to him, hostility and war are likely to prevail. 
 
To conclude, Hobbes’s statements suggest that the social contract requires trust, albeit 
not among the covenanting parties.36 Rather, trust merely signifies that, on the one hand, 
individuals repent and promise obedience to the sovereign, and on the other hand, the 
sovereign accepts them as his subjects. Both of these actions imply a certain amount of 
trust. As a consequence of subjection to the sovereign, there may also be “reconciliation 
                                                
32 EL, XVI.6, p. 90. 
33 De Cive, III.8, p. 47. 
34 Lev., XV.16, p. 95 (emphasis added). 
35 Lev., XIV.5-12, pp. 80-82. 
36 Hobbes’s theory does not envision a social contract between sovereign and subjects, but between the 
subjects themselves. Cf. sec. 5.3. 
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of one man to another”,37 i.e. peace among all members of society. Understood thus, 
trust does not replace, but complement and reinforce, the importance of fear in 
Hobbes’s political philosophy. In particular, it seems that sovereignty supposes trust 
between ruler and subjects, as the former would otherwise have no reason to spare the 
vanquished and allow considerable liberty to potential enemies.38 
 
5.2 The distinction between public and private enemies 
As has been demonstrated in sec. 3.1 and 3.2, Hobbes’s concept of natural enmity is 
markedly different from the conventional distinction between public and private enmity. 
Neither does he conceive of antagonism solely in terms of a public struggle between 
organised collectives, nor does he regard it as merely a matter of private emotions. Ra-
ther, his concept of natural enmity signifies that hostility arises outside the common-
wealth because human beings are competitive creatures that, in this condition, also re-
tain a natural right to harm or subdue others in order to satisfy their desires. 
 
Hobbes’s own views on the distinction between public and private enemies will be fur-
ther examined in this section. Thereby, the focus is on the question of how natural enmi-
ty is transformed through subjection to a sovereign. Although human beings are sup-
posed to be at peace with each other in the civil state, Hobbes also considers the possi-
bility that subjects relate to one another as personal rivals. Focussing on his terminology 
of enmity, this analysis seeks to bring out the differences between antagonisms without 
                                                
37 Lev., XV.16, p. 95. 
38 It has been noted before that Hobbesian sovereigns have to fear that their subjects turn into enemies, 
and that they are therefore, in some basic sense, accountable. See Baumgold, “’Trust’ in Hobbes’s Po-
litical Thought”, pp. 13f; and Tom Sorell, “The Burdensome Freedom of Sovereigns”, in Leviathan 
After 350 Years, eds. Tom Sorell and Luc Foisneau (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), pp. 183-196, 
184. In focussing on the accountability of sovereigns, however, these accounts do not bring out the 
role of trust in Hobbes’s distinction between subjects and enemies. 
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and within the civil state. While there is little variation in Hobbes’s English works, the 
Latin writings and translations reveal his use of the different terms inimicus (private en-
emy), hostis (public enemy), and adversarius (adversary). 
 
To begin with, it needs to be said that Hobbes’s terminology of enmity in The Elements 
of Law is not particularly revealing. In this work, Hobbes uses the word ‘enemy’ indis-
criminately for both private opponents and antagonists in the state of nature, and regard-
less of whether he is referring to groups or individuals.39 He also employs the word ‘ad-
versary’ as a synonym for ‘enemy’, signifying private rivals, opposed factions, and en-
emies in the state of nature.40 Sometimes Hobbes specifically refers to ‘common ene-
mies’.41 Yet this phrase does not seem to signify a different kind of antagonist, but 
merely denotes the fact that the other is an enemy of more than one person. 
 
De Cive is more illuminating as it reveals Hobbes’s use of the different Latin terms for 
enemies. Hobbes employs the word hostis (public enemy) when he is referring to for-
eign enemies or individuals in the state of nature.42 Sometimes he adds signifiers for 
clarification, such as when he argues that private individuals cannot decide who is 
hostis publicus (a public enemy).43 In a similar vein, Hobbes uses the term hostis exter-
nus (external enemy) when discussing matters of defence.44 The word inimicus (private 
enemy) appears on a few occasions, including a reference to an opponent in a democrat-
ic assembly, a remark about killing a private adversary, and a biblical quotation that 
                                                
39 EL, IX.2, p. 51, IX.6, p. 52, X.9, p. 63, XIV.13, p. 81, XV.13, p. 86, XVI.9, p. 91, XIX.3, p. 104. 
40 EL, IX.6, p. 52, IX.14, p. 55, XIV.13, pp. 80f, XXV.8, p. 140. 
41 EL, XIX.6, p. 106, XX.2, p. 109. 
42 De Cive OL, I.12, p. 96, I.14, p. 97, VI.7, p. 139, VII.18, p. 159, IX.3, p. 165, XII.9, p. 191, XIII.8, p. 
198, XIII.13, p. 201, XIV.20, p. 216, XVII.27, pp. 277f. 
43 De Cive OL, XVII.11, p. 260. 
44 De Cive OL, VI.17, p. 147, XIII.6, p. 197. 
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adopts inimicus as the Vulgate term.45 Hobbes occasionally also uses the word adver-
sarius (adversary) as a synonym for both inimicus and hostis.46 
 
Hobbes seems to be relatively indifferent towards terminology in purely theoretical con-
siderations, where he also uses verb conjugations to refer to the other, or employs 
phrases such as altera pars (the other side).47 However, it appears that Hobbes consist-
ently uses the word hostis when he seeks to establish the legal status of particular oppo-
nents. For example, he states that the Roman Church is in a status hostilis (state of hos-
tility) towards the state in order to show that the Church must not be allowed to govern 
the subjects’ consciences.48 In a similar vein, Hobbes argues that declaring the sover-
eign a tyrant would amount to declaring him hostis (a public enemy).49 
 
One of the notes that Hobbes added later to De Cive provides a helpful clarification of 
the different meanings of inimicus and hostis. In this annotation, he seeks to defend his 
previously stated view that atheists are God’s enemies: 
Ego vero ita atheis inimicus sum, ut legem aliquam, juxta quam condemnare eos injust-
itæ possem, et diligentissime quæsiverim et vehementer cupiverim; sed cum nullam in-
venerim quæsivi proxime, quo nomine tantopere Deo exosi homines, ab ipso appellaren-
tur. Deus autem de atheo sic loquitur; dixit insipiens in corde suo, non est Deus. Itaque 
peccatum eorum in eo genere collocavi, in quod genus ab ipso Deo relatum fuerat. De-
inde Atheos hostes Dei esse ostendo; nomen autem hostis quam a summis imperantibus 
eo nomine puniri posse confirmo.50 
                                                
45 De Cive OL, IV.7, p. 124, X.14, p. 179, XV.11, p. 224. 
46 De Cive OL, XIII.7, p. 197, XIV.19, n., p. 215. 
47 De Cive OL, I.14, p. 97, V.3, p. 131. 
48 De Cive OL, XVII.27, p. 277. 
49 De Cive OL, VII.3, p. 151, XII.3, p. 187. Silverthorne translates hostis in this context as 'public enemy' 
(De Cive, pp. 93, p. 133), yet it seems more plausible that a tyrant would only be an enemy of those 
individuals who declare him a tyrant, given that Hobbes states in De Cive OL, XVII.11, p. 260, that 
hostis publicus can only be declared by the sovereign. 
50 De Cive OL, XIV.19, n., p. 215 (emphasis added). Silverthrone’s English translation: “As a matter of 
fact I am such an enemy to Atheists that I have strongly desired and diligently sought some law by 
which I could condemn them for injustice. But since I have not found such a law, I have gone on to 
ask what name God would give to men who are so exceedingly hostile to him. This is what God says 
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In this passage, Hobbes uses the word inimicus to describe his own sentiments towards 
atheists that led him probe their criminal liability. He argues that, in the absence of a 
civil law against atheism, atheists should be punished on the basis of the natural law, 
which supposedly allows treating them as hostes. Elsewhere in De Cive, Hobbes in-
vokes the same reasoning to establish that the sovereign can apply his right of war 
against rebels and traitors, who are hostes of the commonwealth.51 
 
The analysis of Hobbes’s Latin terminology so far suggests that inimicus puts emphasis 
on adverse sentiments, while hostis implies the application of the right of war. Contrary 
to the conventional distinction between public and private enemies, however, these 
terms do not necessarily refer to different kinds of antagonists in his works. Rather, 
Hobbes uses the word hostis to describe all enemies outside the civil state.52 
 
These findings are further confirmed by Hobbes’s Latin translation of Leviathan, in 
which he explicitly likens hostility amongst individuals to the international state of war. 
The pattern of translation is revealing. Whereas Hobbes translates phrases such as 
‘common enemy’ or ‘declared enemy’ literally into Latin, he considers hostis without a 
signifier an adequate rendering of ‘foreign enemy’.53 Usually he employs the singular of 
hostis in reference to individuals, and uses the plural of this word for the English phrase 
‘the enemy’.54 This indicates that Hobbes was aware of whether he was referring to 
                                                                                                                                          
of the atheist: 'The fool hath said in his heart: there is no God.' And thus I have placed their sin in the 
same class as it was placed by God himself. And then I show that atheists are enemies of God; and the 
name, enemy, I think, is sometimes stronger than 'unjust man'. Finally, I insist that he may be justly 
punished on this account both by God and by sovereigns.” De Cive, p. 164. 
51 De Cive OL, VI.2, p. 137, XIV.22, p. 217. 
52 In which sense rebels and traitors may be considered as being outside the commonwealth will be fur-
ther examined in sec. 7.1 and 7.2. 
53 Lev OL, XVII.4, p. 128, XVII.5, p. 129, XXVIII.13, p. 225, XXVIII.21, p. 228, XXIX.10, p. 234, 
XLII.68, p. 396. 
54 Lev OL, IV.4, p. 24, XIV.17, p. 108, XV.5, p. 113, XXI.22, p. 169, XXIV.9, p. 188, XXVIII.21, p. 228, 
XXXVIII.13, p. 329, XXXVIII.17, p. 331, XL.10, p. 345. However, it appears that phrases such as 
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groups or individuals, but deliberately chose the word hostis to refer to, and perhaps 
highlight similarities between, all kinds of opponents in a state of nature. 
 
The word inimicus appears in the Latin Leviathan only where Hobbes refers to private 
rivals who wish each other ill, or alludes to the bible.55 In accordance with the etymolo-
gy of this word, he uses inimicus as the antonym of amicus (friend).56 However, it 
seems that private enemies, that are solely defined in terms of their sentiments, can only 
exist in the civil state, for otherwise Hobbes consistently refers to hostile individuals as 
hostes. He even employs the latter word when he argues that the passion of anger corre-
sponds with the image of an enemy in the mind.57 This confirms that Hobbes’s thought 
differs from the conventional static distinction between private enmity, which is defined 
by adverse sentiments, and public enmity, understood as a matter of right.  
 
Yet the word amicus does not only signify a personal friend, but could also refer to an 
ally. Hobbes contrasts the status of hostis with that of civis (citizen or subject) in order 
to establish that the sovereign can apply his right of war against rebels, who are suppos-
edly public enemies.58 However, he also holds that people in the state of nature are ei-
ther hostes (enemies) or amici (allies).59 Likewise, Hobbes points out that common-
wealths become amici if they form an alliance.60 This suggests that hostility outside the 
civil state can be described as natural, as it is not only defined in terms of public right 
                                                                                                                                          
communis hostis (common enemy) are generally in the singular. 
55 Lev OL, XIX.8, p. 144, XXVI.24, p. 203, XLIV.3, p. 450, XLV.7, p. 456. 
56 Lev OL, XIX.8, p. 144. 
57 Lev OL, II.6, p. 11. 
58 Lev OL, XXVIII.13, p. 225, XXVIII.23, p. 228. 
59 Lev OL, XVII.5, p. 129. 
60 Lev OL, XXIV.14, p. 190, XXVIII.23, p. 228. Note that the latter passage differs considerably from the 
English Leviathan, a variance that is not marked in the Curley edition (Lev., p. 208). 
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but also implies adverse sentiments towards the other. Understood thus, natural enmity 
can be contrasted with the status of civis and the disposition of amici.61 
 
In addition to Hobbes’s published works, his surviving Latin correspondence gives 
some further clues to his distinction between public and private enemies. On some oc-
casions Hobbes employs the word inimicus to refer to his private opponents.62 Further-
more, he contrasts the term amicus with inimicus. In a 1669 letter, he writes that the 
congratulations of his friends (amici) and the envy of his enemies (inimici) are the 
sweetest consolations of his old age.63 In another letter, Hobbes expresses, in a similar 
vein, that he values testimonies of his friends (amici), but attributes little importance to 
the rebukes of his enemies (imimici).64 Thus, he appears to employ the word inimicus in 
the conventional sense to refer to private enemies within the civil state. 
 
To conclude, Hobbes’s Latin terminology confirms that his thought is markedly differ-
ent from the conventional distinction between public and private enmity. He uses the 
term hostis, which usually denotes a public struggle between organised totalities, to re-
fer to all kinds of natural enemies, i.e. to both groups and individuals in a state of na-
ture. In addition, his terminology shows that inimici, i.e. private enemies that are soeley 
defined in terms of their adverse sentiments, could only exist in the civil state. This sug-
gests that, according to Hobbes, outright hostility can be transformed into private rivalry 
if people submit themselves to a sovereign power. The next section will further examine 
this dynamic distinction in view of the rights of sovereigns and subjects. 
                                                
61 As has been shown in sec. 3.1 and 3.2, Hobbes holds that hostility in the natural condition is both a 
matter of right (the natural right of war) and of the passions. 
62 Corr. 1, Letter 52 (1647), p. 156, Letter 112 (1658), p. 428. 
63 Corr. 2, Letter 187 (1669), p. 710. 
64 Corr. 2, Letter 197 (1674), p. 745. 
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5.3 The sovereign’s exclusive right of war and peace 
What is peculiar about Hobbes’s social contract theory is that it does not envision a 
covenant between ruler and subjects, but amongst the subjects themselves. This allows 
him to use the idea of a contract, which was commonly employed to advocate limita-
tions of power, as the basis of his argument for absolute and undivided sovereignty.65 
Hobbes’s notion of the social contract has implications for the rights that sovereigns and 
subjects retain in the civil state, which will be analysed in this section. 
 
It is well known that Hobbes’s social contract theory conceives of the state’s constitu-
tion in terms of a transfer of right.66 In all of his main political works, he insists that 
rights cannot be literally transferred. Rather, the transfer of natural right supposedly 
takes away the subjects’ liberty to hinder the sovereign in the exercise of his natural 
right, which he retains from the natural condition.67 All people who agree to the social 
contract are meant to lay down their right of nature in this way in order to constitute a 
common power, which also brings into existence the commonwealth. As Hobbes rea-
sons in The Elements of Law and De Cive, this implies a submission of everybody’s 
strength to the sovereign’s will.68 In Leviathan, he emphasises that individuals, moreo-
ver, need to submit their judgement in order to constitute the state: 
                                                
65 As Hobbes spells out in Lev., XVIII.3-7, pp. 110-113, not being a contracting party, the sovereign is 
neither legally restricted in the exercise of his authority nor directly accountable to the people. Cf. 
Zagorin, Hobbes and the Law of Nature, p. 64. However, there seems to be some tension between the 
two different models considered by Hobbes, i.e. sovereignty by institution and sovereignty acquired 
by conquest. As has been shown in sec. 5.1, the latter comes into existence through a covenant be-
tween the victor and the vanquished. Hence, the sovereign appears to be a covenanting party in this 
model, yet not in the case of sovereignty instituted through a social contract. 
66 In The Elements of Law, Hobbes first develops this argument in three steps: first, he spells out how the 
natural right can be transferred through a covenant (Ch. XV); secondly, he argues that the keeping of 
covenants is the most fundamental law of nature (Ch. XVI); thirdly, he spells out how people can es-
cape from the natural condition by establishing a sovereign power (Ch. XIX). In De Cive (Ch. III), 
Hobbes integrates the first two steps in his discussion of the fundamental natural law. In Leviathan 
(Ch. XVI), he further introduces a new intermediate step by elaborating issues of authorisation and 
representation with regard to the artificial personality of the state. 
67 EL, XV.3, p. 82; De Cive, II.4, p. 34; Lev., XIV.6, p. 81. 
68 EL, XIX.7, pp. 106f; De Cive, V.7-8, pp. 72f. 
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The only way to erect such a common power as may be able to defend them from the 
invasion of foreigners and the injuries of one another […] is to confer all their power 
and strength upon one man, or upon an assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, 
by plurality of voices, unto one will, which is as much as to say, to appoint one man or 
assembly of men to bear their person, and every one to own and acknowledge himself to 
be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person shall act, or cause to be acted, in 
those things which concern the common peace and safety, and therein to submit their 
wills, every one to his will, and their judgments, to his judgment.69 
Although The Elements of Law and De Cive do not mention submission of judgement as 
a condition for the constitution of a common power, other statements in these writings 
suggest that Hobbes always regarded this as a requirement of civil peace. For instance, 
he points out in the two earlier works that subjects must submit their opinions in reli-
gious controversies to the sovereign’s judgement.70 In De Cive, Hobbes also pays great 
attention to the doctrine that subjects can judge good and evil for themselves, which he 
describes as one of the main causes of the dissolution of the state.71 
 
Hobbes’s argument seems to imply that the sovereign retains his natural right to all 
things. In particular, Hobbes argues that the sovereign must have a right to everything 
required for securing the civil peace and defending the state against foreign enemies. In 
The Elements of Law and De Cive, he subsumes these rights under the notions of the 
‘sword of justice’ and the ‘sword of war’, from which he further derives a right to 
judgement in matters of controversy.72 In Leviathan, Hobbes states that 
because the end of this institution is the peace and defence of them all, and whosoever 
has the right to whatsoever to the end has right to the means, it belongeth of right to 
whatsoever man or assembly that hath the sovereignty, to be judge both of the means of 
peace and defence, and also of the hindrances and disturbances of the same, and to 
whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both beforehand (for the preserving of 
                                                
69 Lev., XVII.13, p. 109 (emphasis added). 
70 EL, XXV.13, p. 153; De Cive, XVII.12, p. 215. 
71 De Cive, XII.1, pp. 131f. For Hobbes’s views on the forbidden judgement of good and evil and other 
seditious doctrines, see the discussions in sec. 4.4 and 7.1. 
72 EL., XX.8-10, pp. 112f; De Cive, VI.5-9, pp. 78f. 
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peace and security, by prevention of discord at home and hostility from abroad) and, 
when peace and security are lost, for the recovery of the same.73 
This passage recalls Hobbes’s conception of the natural right, which specifically con-
tains a right to take pre-emptive action against anyone who is considered a threat.74 
Similarly, the sovereign has a right to judge “hindrances and disturbances” of peace and 
security. In addition, Hobbes argues that he is permitted to restore peace and security 
after a foreign or domestic conflict. This suggests that sovereign authority encompasses 
a right to decide who the enemy is, and who has ceased being so. 
 
Other statements seem to confirm this view. In Leviathan, Hobbes also points out that 
“against enemies, whom the commonwealth judgeth capable to do them hurt, it is lawful 
by the [sovereign’s] original right of nature to make war”.75 Furthermore, he maintains 
that enemies could become subjects upon their promise of obedience to a conqueror.76 
These passages suggest that the Hobbesian sovereign possesses a right of war and peace 
that contains a right to discern between subjects and public enemies. This is also how 
Hobbes describes the sovereign’s right of war and peace in De Cive: 
[N]o citizen may privately determine who is an ally [amicus] or public enemy [hostis 
publicus] of the commonwealth, nor when to make war or alliance, peace or truce; nor 
may he decide what is for or against the interest of the commonwealth in the matter of 
who are to be citizens [cives], and who should have what authority, nor what doctrines, 
morals, and public pronouncements are useful, and what unions of which men.77 
Thus, Hobbes holds that subjects must submit themselves to the sovereign’s judgement 
of the enemy. Moreover, the sovereign decides who should be admitted as a member of 
                                                
73 Lev., XVIII.8, p. 113 (emphasis added). 
74 See sec. 3.2. 
75 Lev., XXVIII.23, p. 208. 
76 Lev., XX.10, pp. 130f, R&C VII, p. 491. As was shown in sec. 5.1, this is how people are supposed to 
become subjects in the case of sovereignty acquired by conquest. 
77 De Cive, XVII.11, p. 214. 
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the commonwealth, which seems to suggest that subjects could ultimately jeopardise 
their own status if they refuse to accept the sovereign’s commands. 
 
Hobbes generally conceives the status of subjects in relation to the opposite status of an 
enemy. In De Cive, he introduces this dichotomy as a corollary of his social contract 
argument: “[W]e derived the origin of a commonwealth […] from an agreement by a 
number of men, in such terms that it is apparent that all must consent or be regarded as 
enemies [hostes]”.78 Hobbes also specifies this dichotomy in other passages. In a dis-
cussion of a child's obligation to obey the mother in the state of nature, he states that 
“everyone is an enemy [hostis] to everyone whom he neither obeys nor commands”.79 
Similarly, when he argues that atheists should be treated as God’s enemies, he points 
out that “men are enemies [hostis] to each other when they are not subject [subjiciuntur] 
one to another or to any common ruler”.80 While this statement contains the additional 
possibility of subjection to a common ruler, it confirms that people either relate to each 
other as enemies or as members of a commonwealth. 
 
In Leviathan, Hobbes likewise argues that “all men that are not subjects [cives] are ei-
ther enemies [hostes] or else they have ceased from being so by some precedent cove-
nants”.81 As the corresponding passage in the Latin Leviathan shows, the option of be-
ing neither subject nor enemy is only available for commonwealths, which become al-
lies [amici] when they form an alliance.82 Yet it seems that, unlike states, private indi-
viduals must relate to each other as either subjects or enemies [hostes]. 
 
                                                
78 De Cive, XI.1, p. 127. 
79 De Cive, IX.3, p. 108. 
80 De Cive, XIV.19, p. 164. 
81 Lev., XXVIII.23, p. 208. 
82 Lev OL, XXIV.14, p. 190, XXVIII.23, p. 228. Cf. sec. 5.2. 
 125 
Hobbes’s views on the sovereign’s exclusive right of war helps to explain the scope of 
the right to self-defence that subjects, according to Hobbes, retain.83 Regarding their use 
of force of against one another, he points out in The Elements of Law and De Cive that 
the civil state excludes the right of the ‘private sword’.84 Yet Hobbes also argues in De 
Cive that people have no obligation to abandon their right to resist “death, wounds or 
other bodily harms”.85 For this reason, a subject “is understood to retain the right of de-
fending himself against violence”.86 In his most extensive treatment of this matter in 
Leviathan, Hobbes further spells out his conception of the right to self-defence:  
[N]ot every fear justifies the action it produceth, but the fear only of corporal hurt, 
which we call bodily fear, and from which a man cannot see how to be delivered but by 
the action. A man is assaulted, fears present death, from which he sees not how to es-
cape but by wounding him that assaulteth him; if he wound him to death, this is no 
crime; because no man is supposed at the making of the commonwealth to have aban-
doned the defence of his life and limbs where the law cannot arrive time enough to his 
assistance. But to kill a man because from his actions, or his threatenings, I may argue 
he will kill me when he can (seeing I have time and means to demand protection from 
the sovereign power) is a crime.87 
Thus, although people cannot relinquish their right to resist an assault, Hobbes stresses 
that subjects are not permitted to take pre-emptive action against anyone whom they 
consider a threat. Based on the analysis so far, it seems that doing so would require a 
right of war, which only the sovereign possesses in the civil state.88 
 
In addition to a right to defend themselves against an assault, Hobbes grants subjects a 
right to resist punishment. In The Elements of Law, he first argues that “the law of na-
                                                
83 Discussions of Hobbesian ‘resistance rights’ include Baumgold, Hobbes’s Political Theory, ch. 2; 
Finkelstein, “A Puzzle About Hobbes on Self-Defence”, pp. 332-361; and Sreedhar, Hobbes on Re-
sistance. 
84 EL, XX.14, p. 115, XX.15, p. 116; De Cive, VI.13, xiii, p. 82, VII.4, p. 93. Hobbes also states in De 
Cive, II.18, p. 40, that the “right of killing cannot be allowed to a private person”. 
85 De Cive, II.18, p. 39. 
86 De Cive, V.7, p. 72. 
87 Lev., XXVII.20, p. 196 (emphasis added). Cf. Lev., XXI.15, p. 142, XXVIII.2, p. 203. 
88 As was shown in sec. 3.2, the natural right of war does not only permit the pre-emptive use of force for 
self-preservation, but also implies a right to identify others as an enemy. 
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ture [does not] command any divesting of other rights, than of those only which cannot 
be retained without the loss of peace”.89 Moreover, he expresses in this work that sub-
jects have abandoned their right to resist the sovereign insofar as non-resistance is pos-
sible.90 In De Cive, Hobbes states that the commonwealth does not “require of anyone, 
as a condition of punishment, an agreement not to resist, but only that no one protect 
others”.91 Similarly, he argues in Leviathan that, in the social contract, “every man 
giveth away the right of defending another, but not of defending himself”.92 
 
This suggests that the right to resist punishment explicitly rules out unions for mutual 
protection, to which Hobbes refers elsewhere as factions.93 Given that the latter threaten 
the civil peace, they may be treated as enemies.94 By contrast, mere resistance against 
one’s own punishment leaves somebody’s status as a subject intact. 
 
In Leviathan, Hobbes also advances the view that subjects have a right to refuse dan-
gerous or dishonourable commands as long as this does not frustrate “the end for which 
sovereignty was ordained”.95 Specifically, he argues that 
a man that is commanded as a soldier to fight against the enemy [hostis publicus], 
though his sovereign have right enough to punish his refusal with death, may neverthe-
less in many cases refuse without injustice, as when he substituteth a sufficient soldier in 
his place; for in this case he deserteth not the service of the commonwealth. And there is 
allowance to be made for natural timorousness, not only to women (of whom no such 
dangerous duty is expected), but also to men of feminine courage. When armies fight, 
there is, on one side or both, a running away; yet when they do it not out of treachery, 
but fear, they are not esteemed to do it unjustly, but dishonourably.96 
                                                
89 EL, XVII.2, p. 93. 
90 EL, XX.7, p. 112. 
91 De Cive, II.18, p. 40. 
92 Lev.,XXVIII.2, p. 204. Cf. Lev., XXI.17, p. 143. 
93 De Cive, XIII.13, p. 149; Lev., XX.30-32, pp. 153f. 
94 In De Cive, XIII.13, p. 149, Hobbes compares factions to „an enemy within the walls“. 
95 Lev., XXI.15, p. 142. 
96 Lev., XXI.16, pp. 142f. 
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Only under special circumstances is there an absolute obligation to fight against the en-
emy, such as when a soldier has committed to do so, or when the defence of the com-
monwealth requires the help of all.97 Yet apart from such extreme cases, Hobbes appar-
ently does not regard desertion in war as an act of treason. 
 
This view of Hobbes can be explained if we consider the difference between fleeing 
from either the enemy or the sovereign. Hobbes describes the latter in Leviathan as a 
betrayal of the sovereign’s trust, upon which a person was initially admitted as a sub-
ject. In accordance with his distinction between slaves and servants,98 he stresses that 
those who are accepted as subjects promised “not to run away, nor to do violence to 
[their] master”.99 Elsewhere in this work, he also argues that an exile who escaped pun-
ishment becomes a public enemy.100 These statements suggest that, while individuals 
would reveal their hostility to the commonwealth if they fled from the sovereign, they 
can ‘run away’ from the enemy without jeopardising their status as a subject. 
 
Hence, it appears that subjection to the sovereign requires submission to his exclusive 
right of war and peace. Hobbes argues that people in the civil state retain a right to resist 
assaults, or punishments that the state inflicts upon them. Yet he also maintains that 
people may lose their status as subjects if they challenge the sovereign’s right of war 
and peace, such as when they take pre-emptive action against those whom they consider 
a threat. Ultimately, it is up to the sovereign to discern subjects and enemies, i.e. to de-
cide who should be admitted to, or excluded from, the commonwealth. 
 
                                                
97 Lev., XXI.16, p. 143. 
98 See sec. 5.1. 
99 Lev., XX.10, p. 131. 
100 Lev., XXVIII.21, pp. 207f. 
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However, this presupposes that there is indeed a sovereign. As was shown in sec. 5.1, 
Hobbes allows for the possibility that people are released from their subjection if the 
sovereign power effectively ceases to exist, such as in the event of a successful enemy 
invasion. In this case, they are free to submit themselves to the conqueror. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
It is sometimes suggested that Hobbes’s political philosophy is all about fear. Yet this 
chapter has shown that Hobbes also attributes great importance to trust, which seems to 
complement the role of fear in the civil state. In particular, it has been argued that sub-
jection supposes reciprocal trust between sovereign and subjects. Without hope for good 
from each other, there would be no reason for rulers to spare the lives of subjects, or for 
the latter to submit themselves to an absolute sovereign power. While everyone’s sub-
mission to the sovereign is meant to pacify society as a whole, Hobbes also allows for 
the possibility that subjects continue to relate to each other as enemies. Yet the termi-
nology of his Latin works shows that he regards antagonists in the civil state as inimici 
(private enemies), rather than hostes (public enemies). Thus, Hobbes appears to envi-
sion a political transformation of outright hostility into personal rivalry, which is com-
patible with civil peace and does not affect the legal status of subjects. 
 
By contrast, Hobbes generally uses the term hostis for antagonists in a state of nature, 
regardless of whether he is referring to groups or individuals. His terminology, thereby, 
indicates an essential similarity between all actors that are not subject to the same sov-
ereign. Hobbes’s distinction between subjects and public enemies appears to be related 
to the right of war. More specifically, it has been argued in this chapter that subjects 
need to submit themselves to the sovereign’s exclusive right to discern friends and ene-
 129 
mies. Although people in the civil state may still resist punishment or assaults, they risk 
their status as subjects if they challenge the sovereign’s right of war. This is because the 
right of war and subjection to the sovereign are mutually exclusive. 
 
Based on the above findings, the next chapter will address the question why subjects 
may continue to rival one another in the civil state. This examination will shed further 
light on Hobbes’s dynamic distinction between public and private enmity. 
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6. Human competitiveness in the civil state 
This chapter looks at Hobbes’s views on the role of human competitiveness in the civil 
state. The first section considers the argument that civil peace requires a complete trans-
formation of human nature. It is argued that this claim is unfounded, since Hobbes con-
siders competitiveness a permanent feature of human nature and only condemns particu-
lar manifestations of the passions. The second section further examines how, according 
to Hobbes, the sovereign could limit and direct competitiveness. It is shown that the 
commonwealth does not merely allow human beings to compete with each other with-
out having to risk their lives, but may also encourage socially beneficial competition. 
The third section analyses how Hobbes’s views on socially beneficial competition relate 
to the passions of emulation and envy. It is suggested that these passions, which are 
rarely considered in the literature on Hobbes, help to explain why people continue to 
rival each other in the civil state. However, it seems that competitiveness, fuelled by 
emulation and envy, could also provoke a return of hostility. This possibility is consid-
ered in the fourth section, which spells out under what conditions competitiveness may 
undermine the sovereign authority or provoke rebellion and civil war. 
 
6.1 Competitiveness as a permanent feature of human nature 
Richard Tuck has argued that Hobbes's political project was more utopian than it is usu-
ally supposed.1 Specifically, Tuck finds that acting on the basis of the laws of nature 
presupposes the elimination of most passion;2 and that lasting peace, therefore, requires 
a thoroughgoing transformation of human beings.3 Rejecting these claims, this section 
                                                
1 Richard Tuck, “The Utopianism of Leviathan”, in Leviathan After 350 Years, eds. Tom Sorell and Luc 
Foisneau (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), pp. 125-138. 
2 Tuck, “The Utopianism of Leviathan”, pp. 133-135. 
3 Tuck, “The Utopianism of Leviathan”, pp. 129, 138. 
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will show that Hobbes considers competitiveness a permanent feature of human nature 
and only seeks to supress certain manifestations of the passions. 
 
Many statements by Hobbes indeed suggest that people do not stop being competitive in 
the civil state. For instance, the bees-and-ants-argument clearly refers to competition for 
honours, and the desires for private goods and public offices, as permanent features of 
human nature.4 In De Cive, Hobbes explicitly states that “[a]mbition and longing for 
honour cannot be removed from men’s minds, and sovereigns have no duty to attempt 
to do so”.5 A passage in Leviathan’s chapter on crimes also testifies to the enduring 
presence of passions such as hate, lust, ambition, and covetousness.6 In Leviathan’s 
‘Review & Conclusion’, Hobbes addresses the objection that it is 
impossible to entertain a constant civil amity with all those with whom the business of 
the world constrains us to converse (which business consisteth almost in nothing else 
but a perpetual contention for honour, riches, and authority).7 
The fact that Hobbes acknowledges the difficulty of reconciling the prescriptions of his 
political philosophy with human competitiveness clearly shows that he does not hold 
any hope that the latter can simply be overcome in society. 
 
In addition, there is a systematic reason for the view that human beings will always re-
main competitive creatures, which is aptly captured by Tom Sorell: 
Hobbes cannot make great claims for the power of the state to transform people for the 
better, and hold at the same time that were the state to dissolve, its people would imme-
diately revert to savagery. If competitiveness and the hunger for glory are causes of 
quarrel indelibly engraved in human nature, then there cannot be a state made up of men 
                                                
4 All of Hobbes’s main political works contain versions of this argument, which spells out differences 
between human beings and other animals that are naturally sociable, particularly bees and ants. See 
EL, XIX.5, p. 105; De Cive, V.5, p. 71; Lev., XVII.7-9, p. 108. 
5 De Cive, XIII.12, p. 148. 
6 Lev., XXVII.18, p. 195. 
7 Lev., R&C 3, 489. 
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who are free from the hunger or of the urge to compete. Either the truths about men that 
Hobbes states are scientific, or they are not.8 
In view of Hobbes’s claim that society reverts back to the state of nature if the sover-
eign power is dissolved, it seems that human beings must continue to have competitive 
passions in the civil state. However, this does, of course, not mean that they can still act 
out their passions in the same way as they do in the war of all against all.  
 
Hobbes generally only seems to condemn certain desires arising from the passions that 
fuel human competitiveness, not the passions themselves. For instance, he points out in 
The Elements of Law that glorying can be “just and well grounded” when it proceeds 
from the experience of our own actions, as opposed to ‘false glory’ and ‘vain glory’.9 
Likewise, he distinguishes in Leviathan between well-grounded ‘confidence’ and ‘vain 
glory’ as two different forms of joy over one's own ability.10 In all of his main political 
works, Hobbes also states that ‘pride’, rather than glory, is contrary to the natural law.11 
In addition, he argues that ‘arrogance’ is forbidden by the laws of nature, thereby appar-
ently referring to a kind of vain glory which makes subjects claim exclusive rights for 
themselves, hence disposing them to break the law.12 The same passion seems to be at 
play in a discussion of the pretence to divine revelation in Leviathan. As Hobbes points 
out in this regard, somebody who claims that God has spoken to him may do so because 
of “self-conceit, foolish arrogance, and false opinion of [his] godliness, or other virtue, 
by which he thinks he hath merited the favour of extraordinary revelation”.13 
                                                
8 Sorell, Hobbes, p. 125. 
9 EL, IX.1, pp. 50f. 
10 Lev., VI.39, p. 31. 
11 EL, XVII.1, p. 93; De Cive, III.13, p. 50; Lev., XV.21, xxi, pp. 96f. On the distinction between the val-
ue-loaded term pride and the descriptive term glory, also see EL, IX.1, p. 50. Cf. Slomp, Hobbes and 
the Political Philosophy of Glory, p. 36. 
12 De Cive, III.14, p. 50; Lev., XV.22, p. 97. Note that EL, XVII.2, pp. 93f refers to 'encroaching' rather 
than 'arrogance' in the same context. 
13 Lev., XXXII.6, p. 247. 
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Similarly, Hobbes criticises certain manifestations of the desire for riches. As he points 
out in Leviathan, the latter should “be blamed or allowed, according to the means by 
which the riches are sought”.14 Hobbes seems to be opposed to the desire for riches 
whenever it leads to the encroachment of another’s right, in which case he usually em-
ploys the value-loaded terms ‘covetousness’, ‘avarice’, or ‘greed’. In this vein, he ar-
gues in The Elements of Law that contracts of mutual trust are ineffectual in the natural 
condition, for “he that performeth first, […] doth but betray himself thereby to the cov-
etousness, or other passion of him with whom he contracteth”.15 In De Cive, Hobbes 
also describes greed as the passion which motivates breaches of contracts, misuses of 
authority, and crimes.16 Similarly, he refers in Leviathan to avarice and covetousness as 
passions that let people break their covenants or commit crimes.17 
 
While Hobbes generally only condemns particular desires, it is true, however, that some 
statements in The Elements of Law appear to suggest that competitiveness is generally 
an obstacle to peace.18 Thus, Hobbes argues that charity is contrary to passions by 
which we strive “to leave others as far as we can behind us”.19 In addition, he points out 
that “most passions, as of anger, ambition, covetousness, vainglory, and the like […] 
tend to the excluding of natural equality”.20 Hobbes even claims that “as long as men 
arrogate to themselves more honour than they give to others, it cannot be imagined how 
they can possibly live in peace”.21 However, it seems that his concern is generally with 
                                                
14 Lev., VI.23, p. 30. 
15 EL, XV.10, p. 84. Cf. XX.6, p. 112. 
16 De Cive, II.11, p. 37, VI.16, p. 87, XIII.16, p. 153. 
17 Lev., XIV.31, p. 88, XXVII.18, p. 195. Hobbes does not clearly define covetousness, avarice, and 
greed, yet his statements suggest that he does not condemn the desire of riches per se. 
18 Note that Tuck’s claim that acting in accordance with the natural laws requires the elimination if most 
passion is largely based on passages in The Elements of Law. See Tuck, “The Utopianism of Levia-
than”, pp. 133-135. 
19 EL, XVI.8, p. 91. 
20 EL, XVII.9, p. 96. 
21 EL, XVII.1, p. 93. 
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acknowledging natural equality, showing respect, and treating people as equals before 
the law, rather than with preventing social inequalities and competition amongst sub-
jects.22 He also states in the same paragraph that the question “which is the better man” 
needs to be settled by the sovereign power.23 What is more, he argues in The Elements 
of Law that, despite the precept to acknowledge equality, 
if [another person] shall see cause to renounce the same [equality], and make himself in-
ferior, then, if from thenceforth he consider him as inferior, he breaketh not thereby that 
law of nature that commandeth to allow equality.24 
Thus, although Hobbes’s remarks in this work are somewhat ambiguous, he does not 
seem to hold that inequalities in the civil state are against the natural law. 
 
Some statements in Hobbes’s later works indicate that observance of the laws of nature 
is not only compatible with human competitiveness, but may also be part of the compe-
tition for civil honours. This can be seen, for instance, in his comments on derisive 
laughter, which is supposedly caused by a sudden occurrence of the other-regarding 
passion of glory. As Hobbes points out in Leviathan, such laughter 
is incident most to them that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves, who are 
forced to keep themselves in their own favour by observing the imperfections of other 
men.25 
Yet moral virtue is not simply defined as abstaining from derisive laughter. Rather, 
Hobbes argues that “of great minds one of the proper works is to help and free others 
from scorn, and compare themselves only with the most able”.26 This suggests that 
                                                
22 According to Hobbes’s later, more precise formulation in Leviathan, one merely ought to acknowledge 
another as “his equal by nature”. Lev., XV.21, p. 97 (emphasis added). Natural equality, thereby, 
means roughly equal strength and vulnerability, as a consequence of which people cannot remain in 
the natural condition, but have to submit themselves to a sovereign power. 
23 EL, XVII.1, p. 93. 
24 EL, XVII.11, p. 97. 
25 Lev., VI.42, p. 32. 
26 Lev., VI.42, p. 32 (emphasis added). 
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Hobbes does not seek to overcome, but instead to channel, human competitiveness. In 
De Homine, he also points out that persons of authority must conduct themselves justly 
in the presence of youths, for people “imitate those whom they think worthy”.27 Such 
imitation may be motivated by a desire to outdo others in their moral virtue. 
 
To conclude, this section has demonstrated that, according to Hobbes, society cannot 
transcend competiveness, which is a permanent feature of human nature. Rather than 
envisioning an elimination of most passions, as suggested by Richard Tuck, Hobbes 
merely seeks to suppress particular desires that are contrary to peace. 
 
6.2 Socially beneficial competition in the civil state 
As has been argued in the last section, Hobbes generally holds that the requirements of 
civil peace, which are set out by his political philosophy, can be reconciled with human 
competitiveness. Expanding on this finding, this section will further analyse how com-
petitiveness can be channelled into socially beneficial endeavours. 
 
Hobbesian interpreters differ regarding how they view competitiveness in the civil state. 
According to Michael Oakeshott, the sovereign power imposes rules on previously un-
conditional competition so that everyone can pursue their personal desires without hav-
ing to risk violent death.28 Similarly, Sorell reasons that “[t]he state can inhibit the dis-
positions, make it dangerous for people to behave aggressively”.29 Thomas Spragens 
suggests that Hobbes regards it as the principal task of politics to contain the natural 
                                                
27 De Hom. XIII.7, p. 67. 
28 Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association, p. 38. 
29 Sorell, Hobbes, p. 125. 
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forces that bring about the war of all against all in the natural condition.30 All of these 
interpreters seem to agree that Hobbes regards competitiveness as a fundamental fact 
about human nature which needs to be kept in bounds, thus allowing individuals to live 
out their passions without threatening each other’s lives. This reading implies a negative 
assessment of human competitiveness. In the words of David Gauthier, the role of the 
commonwealth consists of “cutting the costs of human interaction”.31 
 
Other scholars have proposed more positive readings of the role of competitiveness in 
the civil state. Robert Shaver argues that glory-seekers in this condition can engage in 
competition for civil honours, the peaceful exchange of which is facilitated by the sov-
ereign.32 Similarly, Philip Pettit points out that the state provides new possibilities of 
behaviour that were not available in the state of nature.33 Gabriella Slomp holds that “by 
defining common standards of meum and tuum, of right and wrong, or good and bad, 
etc., [the sovereign can] open up new fields of comparison between people, ranging 
from property to arts, from games to public morality”.34 The institution of property, in 
particular, is supposed to encourage the production of goods, so that competition ceases 
to be a zero-sum-game in which gains by some necessarily correspond with others’ 
losses.35 Moreover, Slomp suggests that such competition benefits the ‘commodious liv-
ing’ of all, because it leads to the development of industry, navigation, arts, science, and 
technology, trade, etc., which are lacking in the natural condition.36 
 
                                                
30 Spragens, The Politics of Motion, p. 193. For a similar view, see Wolin, “Hobbes and the Culture of 
Despotism”, p. 29. 
31 Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, pp. 319f. 
32 Shaver, “Leviathan, King of the Proud”, pp. 67-70. 
33 Pettit, Made with Words, pp. 130f. 
34 Slomp, Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory, p. 67. 
35 Slomp, Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory, p. 67. 
36 Slomp, Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory, p. 67. 
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It is, of course, true that the sovereign is meant to make laws and use coercion to limit 
rivalry among subjects. Thus, Hobbes points out in Leviathan that  
the people are to be taught to abstain from violence to one another’s person by private 
revenges, from violation of conjugal honour, and from forcible rapine and fraudulent 
surreption of one another’s goods.37 
However, it seems that the commonwealth does not merely allow subjects to pursue 
their personal desires without having to risk their lives, but also provides new outlets for 
competitiveness. In this way, the sovereign may direct the subjects’ actions towards the 
common good. Hobbes expresses this position, for instance, in his analogy between the 
purpose of civil laws and the function of riverbanks in De Cive: 
Water stagnates and corrupts when it is closed in by banks on all sides; when it is open 
to all sides it spreads, and the more outlets it finds the freer it is. So with the citizens: 
they would be without initiative if they did nothing except at the law's command; they 
would be dissipated if there were no legal restrictions, and the more things left unregu-
lated by the laws, the more liberty they enjoy. Both extremes are faulty; for laws were 
invented not to extinguish human actions but to direct them; just as nature ordained 
banks not to stop the flow of the river but to direct it. The extend of this liberty is to be 
measured by the good of the citizens and of the commonwealth.38 
Similarly, Hobbes states in Leviathan that the purpose of civil laws is not “to bind the 
people from all voluntary actions”.39 In addition, he points out in this work that good 
laws are those which promote the “good of the people”.40 
 
The case of property rights illustrates how civil laws can be employed to limit and direct 
the subjects’ actions in a way that is conducive to the common good. Hobbes repeatedly 
stresses that property does not exist in the natural condition, because this institution de-
pends on the sovereign power.41 What is more, he suggests that by protecting private 
                                                
37 Lev., XXX.12, p. 224. 
38 De Cive, XIII.15, p. 151. 
39 Lev., XXX.21, p. 229. 
40 Lev., XXX.20, p. 229. 
41 EL, XX.2, p. 110, XXIV.2, pp. 136f, XXVII.8, p. 168; De Cive, I.11, p. 29, IV.4, p. 60, VI.1, p. 76, 
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property against fellow subjects and foreign enemies, the state provides the basis for 
peaceful competition for wealth and the accumulation of economic goods. As Hobbes 
argues in The Elements of Law, introducing a common measure of meum and tuum is a 
means to prevent violence and rapine.42 In De Cive, he states that “[s]overeigns can do 
no more for the citizens’ happiness [felicitas] than to enable them to enjoy the posses-
sions their industry has won them, safe from foreign and civil war”.43 Similarly, Hobbes 
expresses in Leviathan that it is the sovereign’s duty to provide for the people’s safety, 
by which “is not meant a bare preservation, but also all other contentments of life, 
which every man by lawful industry […] shall acquire to himself”.44 
 
Property rights do not only make it safe for individuals to pursue their personal desires, 
but also seem to be conducive to the common good. For instance, Hobbes argues in Le-
viathan that the strength of the commonwealth consists of the accumulated wealth of its 
members.45 In a similar vein, he points out in the Dialogue that kings who are of sound 
judgement recognise that it is in their own interest to 
make such Laws as the people can endure, and may keep them without impatience, and 
live in strength and courage to defend their King and Country, against their potent 
neighbours.46 
Hence, civil laws could encourage the accumulation of wealth, which also provides the 
sovereign with means for defending the state against its enemies.47 
 
                                                                                                                                          
VI.15, p. 85, XII.7, p. 136; Lev., XIII.13, p. 78, XVIII.10, p. 114, XXIV.5, p. 160. 
42 EL, XX.10, p. 113. 
43 De Cive, XIII.6, p. 144. Cf. De Cive, X.1, p. 116; XII.9, p. 138. 
44 Lev., XXX.1, p. 219. Cf. Lev., XVII.13, p. 109. 
45 Lev., intr. 1, p. 3; XIX.4, p. 120. Cf. Lev., XVIII.20, pp. 117f. 
46 Dialogue, p. 144 (capitalisation in the original). 
47 For further consideration of Hobbes’s views on the requirements of defence, see sec. 8.1. 
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Civil honours are another instrument which can be used to limit and direct the subjects’ 
actions. In De Cive, Hobbes suggests that, in order to increase prosperity, the sovereign 
should stimulate industry and give recognition to the various arts.48 In the Anti-White, 
he states that “in every branch of art the engineers, the geometers, the philosophers and 
all the poets who excelled in their skills attained a fitting reputation”.49 Hobbes devel-
ops his views on civil honours in Leviathan, where he argues that 
of civil honour the foundation is in the person of the commonwealth, and dependeth on 
the will of the sovereign, and is therefore temporary and called civil honour; such as are 
magistracy, offices, titles, and in some places, coats and scutcheons painted; and men 
honour such as have them, as having so many signs of favour in the commonwealth, 
which favour is power.50 
In accordance with the claim that the sovereign is the source of civil honours, Hobbes 
also points out in Leviathan that rulers have the right 
to give titles of honour, and to appoint what order of place and dignity each man shall 
hold, and what signs of respect, in public or private meetings, they shall give to one an-
other.51 
Hobbes’s views on civil honours suggest that subjects can pursue their desire for glory 
in accordance with the common good, which is not the case in the state of nature. In this 
condition, the only source of honour appears to be the trade of war.52 
 
Yet Hobbes is conscious of the fact that rulers do not always succeed in channelling the 
passions into socially beneficial endeavours, as is evident from his comments on duels 
in Leviathan. Following his discussion of piracy, he points out that 
                                                
48 De Cive, XIII.14, p. 150. 
49 AW, XXXVIII.14, p. 474. Cf. Dialogue, pp. 92f. 
50 Lev., X.36, p. 53 (emphasis in the original). 
51 Lev., XVIII.15, p. 115. Cf. Lev., XX.3, p. 128. 
52 See sec. 3.1. 
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at this day, in this part of the world, private duels are and always will be honourable, 
though unlawful, till such time as there shall be honour ordained for them that refuse, 
and ignominy for them that make the challenge.53 
In the chapter on crimes and excuses, Hobbes further specifies that although duels are 
punishable as a capital crime, somebody who refuses to take part in a duel “is subject to 
contempt and scorn, without remedy, and sometimes by the sovereign himself thought 
unworthy to have any charge or preferment in war”.54 Thus, Hobbes’s position is that, at 
present, people are encouraged to take part in duels by an inconsistent policy of pun-
ishments and rewards. However, he also holds that duels could be prevented if the sov-
ereign ordained civil honours for abstaining from private revenge. 
 
To conclude, this section has shown that, although people in the civil state are no longer 
hostile towards one another, they still compete for honour and other goods. Thereby, it 
has become apparent that the state does not only allow human beings to compete with-
out having to risk their lives, but also provides opportunities for socially beneficial 
competition. At least, this is the case in a well-governed commonwealth. 
 
6.3 The passions of emulation and envy 
Hobbes’s views on socially beneficial competition in the civil state, which have been 
reconstructed in the last section, are further echoed by his assessment of emulation and 
envy. As the analysis of these passions in this section will demonstrate, competition 
amongst subjects is not necessarily motivated by material interests. Rather, rivalry may 
also be driven by an intrinsic human desire to outdo other people. 
 
                                                
53 Lev., X.49, p. 55. 
54 Lev., XXVII.35, p. 201. 
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Emulation and envy are rarely discussed in the literature on Hobbes. Leo Strauss notes 
that, although Hobbes’s definitions of these passions are based on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 
he does not retain Aristotle’s view that emulation is noble while envy is base.55 Stephen 
Holmes finds that, in Behemoth, Hobbes considers envy as one of the causes the English 
Civil War.56 Moreover, Holmes suggests that this other-regarding passion diverts the 
mind from material concerns.57 While these observations are certainly helpful, they do 
not fully account for Hobbes’s various statements on emulation and envy. 
 
Hobbes provides formal definitions of these passions in The Elements of Law, Levia-
than, and De Homine. For instance, he states in the first of these works: 
EMULATION is grief arising from seeing one’s self exceeded or excelled by his concur-
rent, together with hope to equal or exceed him in time to come, by his own ability. But, 
ENVY is the same grief joined with pleasure conceived in the imagination of some ill 
fortune that may befall him.58 
Similar definitions are included in the later works, where Hobbes also points out that 
envy makes people “supplant or hinder a competitor”.59 These definitions suggest that 
both passions are the counterpart of glory, to which Hobbes generally refers to as a joy 
resulting from the perception of one’s own abilities and superiority over other people.60 
Therefore, Hobbes’s views on these passions seem to lend further credence to the claim 
that he regards competitiveness as part of the human makeup, rather than as being due 
to external circumstances (such as scarcity of resources).61 Other passages also suggest 
                                                
55 Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, pp. 39, 133. Cf. Aristotle, “Rhetoric”, trans. W. Rhys 
Roberts, in The Complete Works of Aristotle: the Revised Oxford Translation, Vol. 2, ed. Jonathan 
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57 Holmes, “Introduction“, p. xxx. 
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59 Lev., VI.48, pp. 32f. Cf. De Hom., XII.11, p. 61. 
60 See sec. 3.1. 
61 A discussion of these two different views on the causes of competitiveness, i.e. either external circum-
stances or an intrinsic desire to outdo others, is provided in sec. 3.1. 
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that emulation and envy provide an intrinsic motivation for human competitiveness. In 
his analogy between life and a race in The Elements of Law for example, Hobbes refers 
to these passions as the endeavours “to overtake the next” and to “supplant or over-
throw”, respectively.62 In addition, he states that “injury, how light soever the damage, 
is always grievous, as putting us in mind of our disability to help ourselves; and into 
envy of the power to do us wrong”.63 In Leviathan, Hobbes also points out that passions 
such as envy and emulation may arise from difference of opinion.64 
 
The passion of envy, in particular, helps to explain why people’s desires for certain 
goods provoke enmity between them. For instance, Hobbes expresses in Leviathan that 
riches without liberality “expose men to envy, as a prey”.65 While material goods can 
thus occasion envy, the latter gives rise to a desire to harm another person. In the bees-
and-ants-argument in Leviathan, Hobbes further argues that 
men are continually in competition for honour and dignity, which these creatures [i.e. 
bees and ants] are not; and consequently, amongst men there aristeth, on that ground, 
envy and hatred, and finally war.66 
This suggests that glory-seeking individuals envy one another, which could provoke ha-
tred and hostility. The same claim is made in the earlier versions of the bees-and-ants-
argument, which also refer to the passion of envy.67 Hobbes, thereby, seems to conceive 
of the latter as a cause of rivalry distinct from material interests. This is also suggested 
by his claim that one of the advantages of monarchy over other forms of government is 
that “a monarch cannot disagree with himself out of envy or interest”.68 
                                                
62 EL, IX.21, p. 59. 
63 EL, XXIV.2, p. 138. 
64 Lev., XXX.26, p. 232. 
65 Lev., X.4, p. 50. Cf. De Hom., XI.7, p. 49. 
66 Lev., XVII.7, p. 108. 
67 EL, XIX.5, p. 105; De Cive, V.5, p. 71. 
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Envy certainly plays a role in Hobbes’s description of the state of nature. In the Latin 
Leviathan, he cites Cain’s murder of Abel as an example of the war of all against all, 
and mentions that it was motivated by envy.69 Moreover, this passion helps to explain 
why competitiveness in the state of nature develops into outright hostility. Hobbes ar-
gues in Leviathan that “if one plant, sow, build, or possess a convenient seat, others may 
probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossess and deprive 
him”.70 This may be due to the scarcity of resources in the state of nature, as is often 
suggested, yet it may likewise be caused by an intrinsic desire to outdo other people and 
a consequential envy for their possessions. While both interpretations seem plausible, 
Hobbes’s remarks ultimately do not allow for any definite statement on this matter. 
 
In De Cive, Hobbes refers to both emulation and envy as natural causes of conflict that 
prevent people from peaceful co-existence in the natural condition: 
[H]owever many come together in a coalition of defence, nothing will be gained if they 
fail to agree on the best way of doing it, and each one use his resources in his own fash-
ion. The reason is that, having conflicting ideas, they will obstruct each other, or if in the 
expectation of victory or booty or revenge, they do achieve sufficient agreement for an 
action, they will still be divided afterwards by differences of purpose and policy or by 
envy and rivalry (natural causes of conflict), that they will refuse to help each other or to 
keep peace among themselves, unless compelled to do so by common fear.71 
Note that Michael Silverthorne translates aemulatio and invidia in this passage as “envy 
and rivalry”. However, Hobbes's definitions of aemulatio and invidia in De Homine cor-
respond with the earlier definitions of emulation and envy in The Elements of Law and 
Leviathan. Therefore, “emulation and envy” seems to be a more accurate rendering.72 In 
the quoted passage, Hobbes’s argument appears to be that, even though people in the 
state of nature can form alliances in order to achieve a victory, make booty, or take re-
                                                
69 Lev., XIII.11, p. 77, n. 7. 
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venge against a common enemy, they will subsequently fall back into rivalry among 
themselves, whereby everyone envies and emulates everybody else. 
 
Yet envy and emulation do not only cause enmity in the state of nature, they also seem 
to perpetuate competitiveness in the civil state. Indeed, a number of passages in 
Hobbes’s works suggest that these passions continue to fuel rivalry amongst members 
of the commonwealth. However, it appears that emulation may be channelled into so-
cially beneficial endeavours. Hobbes already points out in his introduction to The Histo-
ry of the Grecian War that Thucydides’ great work was inspired by his wish to emulate 
the historian Herodotus.73 In Leviathan, Hobbes argues that 
to receive benefits, though from an equal or inferior, as long as there is hope of requital, 
disposeth to love; for in the intention of the receiver, the obligation is of aid and service 
mutual; from when proceedeth an emulation of who shall exceed in benefitting [the oth-
er], the most noble and profitable contention possible, wherein the victor is pleased with 
his victory, and the other revenged by confessing it.74 
Thus, Hobbes praises emulation in the mutually beneficial exchange of favours between 
individuals. Furthermore, he argues in Leviathan that admirers of ancient Greece and 
Rome wrongly “imagine their great prosperity not to have proceeded from the emula-
tion of particular men, but from the virtue of their popular form of government”.75 This 
seems to suggest that he regards emulation amongst subjects, who seek to excel one an-
other in the use of their own abilities, as the true cause of prosperity. 
 
However, some of Hobbes’s comments on envy and emulation also show that com-
petiveness in the civil state is not always socially beneficial, but could also provoke a 
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return of hostility. Again, this is already apparent in his introduction to Thucydides. En-
dorsing the latter’s comments on democracy, Hobbes points out that 
upon divers occasions [Thucydides] noteth the emulation and contention of the dema-
gogues for reputation and glory of wit; with their crossing of each other’s counsels, to 
the damage of the public.76 
This statement has echoes in Hobbes’s later works. For instance, he argues in Leviathan 
that members of a public assembly may disagree “to such a height as may produce civil 
war”.77 In De Cive, he argues that ambitious subjects, who envy those in a position of 
power, “passionately expect opportunities for revolution”.78 As Holmes notes, Hobbes 
also regards envy as one of the causes of the English Civil War.79 
 
To conclude, emulation and envy help to explain why people continue to rival each oth-
er in the civil state. Hobbes’s statements on these passions indicate that competitiveness 
does not arise because of external circumstances in the state of nature, but rather is due 
to an intrinsic desire to outdo others. While emulation may be channelled into socially 
beneficial endeavours, however, it seems that both passions could also provoke a return 
of hostility, such as when ambitious subjects envy the sovereign. 
 
6.4 Competitiveness and the return of hostility 
Although Hobbes maintains that human competitiveness can be channelled into socially 
beneficial endeavours, he also considers it as a source of danger. This section examines 
under what conditions it could provoke a return of hostility in the civil state. 
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As mentioned in sec. 6.3, Hobbes suggests on a few occasions that the envy and emula-
tion of members of public assemblies, or other ambitious subjects, could provoke civil 
war. This view is also expressed in The Elements of Law, where he claims that members 
of sovereign assemblies pursue their own benefits and honour: 
[I]n assemblies, those that are of different opinions […] are apt to fall out amongst 
themselves, and to cross the designs of commonwealth for one another’s sake: and when 
they cannot have the honour of making good their own devices, they yet seek the honour 
to make the counsels of their adversaries to prove vain. And in this contention, when the 
opposite factions happen to be anything equal in strength, they presently fall to war.80 
Thus, Hobbes holds that contention among members of an assembly, who are competi-
tors for honour, can motivate attempts to undermine collective action, or provoke fac-
tion and hostility. Similarly, he points out in De Cive that a defeated speaker “makes 
every effort to ensure that his opponent’s policy works out badly for the country; for so 
he sees that his opponent will lose his glory and he will recover his”.81 This suggests 
that competitiveness is detrimental if it interferes with public affairs. 
 
However, it needs to be said that Hobbes does not merely point to dangers arising from 
rivalries between members of a public assembly, but also considers detrimental effects 
of the passions of kings. For instance, he argues in The Elements of Law that 
such monarchs, as affect war for itself, that is to say, out of ambition, or of vain-glory, 
or that make account to revenge every little injury, or disgrace done by their neighbours, 
if they ruin not themselves, their fortune must be better than they have reason to ex-
pect.82 
In other words, kings should not make wars only to satisfy their own desires. In De 
Cive, Hobbes also expresses that it is a great disadvantage of all kinds of common-
wealths that sovereigns may put innocent subjects to death because of anger, greed, or 
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private feuds.83 Similarly, he admits in Leviathan that there is a certain risk that a king 
might deprive a subject of all his or her possessions.84 Hobbes also expresses in this 
work that sovereigns are sometimes profligate and may venture into costly wars, for no 
monarch or assembly is “free from human passions and infirmities”.85 In addition, he 
states that princes emulate one another, and that “kings and other persons of sovereign 
authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies”.86 
 
The picture emerging from these passages is that monarchs are not free from passions, 
but compete with other sovereigns, and possibly with their own subjects, for honour, 
wealth, and other goods. Hence, Hobbes does not only regard the competitiveness of 
parliamentarians, but also that of kings, as potentially having detrimental effects. How-
ever, he also suggests that this is not a necessary feature of monarchy, since it is in a 
ruler’s own interest to avoid things such as, for instance, unnecessary wars.  
 
Hobbes pays particular attention to the passions of kings in the context of his claim that 
human beings can never be content, but continually strive to attain further goods. He 
argues that this also applies to those people who already possess the greatest powers, 
honours, and riches. Thus, he points out in The Elements of Law: 
Of those […] that have attained to the highest degree of honour and riches, some have 
affected mastery in some art; as Nero in music and poetry, Commodus in the art of a 
gladiator. And such as affect not some such thing, must find diversion and recreation of 
their thoughts in the contention either of play, or business.87 
In the Anti-White, where Hobbes claims that people generally desire honours and riches 
as a means for attaining further goods, he also refers to kings in this context: 
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If the hope and opportunity of seizing other realms are offered them, kings (whose pow-
er is very great in this life) also seek these things, as Alexander; if they have no such 
hope, they turn to the arts, i.e. [sic] to public affairs, as Augustus; or to music, as Nero; 
or to gladiatorial shows, as Commodus; or to licentious pleasure, as Heliogabalus, Nero 
and many others.88 
Thus, Hobbes holds that monarchs only seek military honours if they have hope for at-
taining them, as they may also distinguish themselves in other fields. In a similar vein, 
Hobbes states in Leviathan that the “perpetual and restless desire of power after power, 
that ceaseth only in death”89 also applies in the case of monarchs: 
[K]ings, whose power is greatest, turn their endeavours to the assuring it at home by 
laws or abroad by wars; and when that is done, there succeedeth a new desire, in some 
of fame from new conquest, in others of ease and sensual pleasure, in others of admira-
tion or being flattered for excellence in some art or other ability of the mind.90 
All of these passages advance the view that kings can live out their passions in fields 
that do not have detrimental effects for the state. Yet Hobbes is, of course, well aware 
that some monarchs pursue military honours. As he later argues in the Dialogue, statute 
laws are useful as they make it more difficult “for such Kings as for the Glory of Con-
quest might spend one part of their Subjects Lives and Estates, in Molesting other Na-
tions, and leave the rest to Destroy themselves at Home by Factions”.91 
 
In accordance with his reservations about military honours, Hobbes is also wary of the 
popularity of generals. In De Cive, he notes that people follow a leader of rebellion “be-
cause they admire his courage and military skill”.92 In Leviathan, he argues that “all 
men that are ambitious of military command, are inclined to continue the causes of war, 
and to stir up trouble and sedition”.93 Furthermore, Hobbes reasons that the popularity 
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of a military commander “breed[s] in the soldiers both desire, and courage, to recom-
mend themselves to his favour”.94 While he acknowledges that a general’s popularity 
could thus encourage beneficial competition among his soldiers, Hobbes also regards it 
as a potential threat to the commonwealth: 
But this love of soldiers (if caution be not given to the commander’s fidelity) is a dan-
gerous thing to sovereign power, especially when it is in the hands of an assembly not 
popular. It belongeth, therefore, to the safety of the people, both that they be good con-
ductors, and faithful subjects, to whom the sovereign commits his armies.95 
In Leviathan, Hobbes mentions Julius Caesar as an example of a popular army com-
mander who then acquired political power.96 In Behemoth, he reasons that, after a suc-
cessful military campaign, “it will be in [an army general’s] power, either to take the 
government upon himself, or to place it where he himself thinks good”.97 Thereby, 
Hobbes specifically refers to the case of Oliver Cromwell. These examples show that a 
military commander’s popularity may be dangerous for the sovereign. 
 
Furthermore, Hobbes repeatedly stresses that a subject’s ambition for public office is a 
cause of rebellion. In The Elements of Law, he points out that this desire cannot be satis-
fied in non-democratic commonwealths, which must provoke the discontent of rich and 
powerful individuals who are excluded from the conduct of public affairs.98 Likewise, 
Hobbes claims in De Cive that people dislike monarchy “because [in this form of gov-
ernment] they are not called to play a role in the government of the Country”.99 Drawing 
an analogy between public and military affairs, he argues in Leviathan that 
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to lose the opportunity to pit your wits against another man, however enjoyable such 
contests may be to clever debaters, is not such a disadvantage for them, unless we shall 
say that it is a disadvantage for brave men to be forbidden to fight, for the simply reason 
that they enjoy it.100 
Hobbes also states in Leviathan that people who have a high opinion of their wisdom in 
matters of government seek to acquire public offices, because “without public employ-
ment in council or magistracy the honour of their wisdom is lost”.101 In addition, he 
maintains in Leviathan that civil wars arise “from the contention of those that for an of-
fice of so great honour and profit [i.e. the sovereign's office] may become competi-
tors”.102 This shows that, according to Hobbes, competitiveness could endanger the civil 
peace if it lets powerful subjects contend for the sovereign’s office. 
 
Hobbes generally holds that subjects ought not to compare themselves with the sover-
eign. In The Elements of Law, we read that “sovereignty […] comprehendeth so much 
honour, riches, and means whereby to delight the mind, as no private man’s wealth can 
attain unto”.103 Likewise, Hobbes states in Leviathan that “the honour of the sovereign 
ought to be greater than that of any or all of the subjects”.104 In De Cive, he suggests 
that “the wrath of Kings is directed only at those who cause trouble by ill-judged advice 
or insolent language, or are personally opposed to them”.105 This seems to suggest that 
ambitious subjects who challenge the sovereign could provoke the latter’s hostility. In 
Leviathan, Hobbes also expresses that rivalry between popular subjects and the sover-
eign can affect the latter’s will to govern for the common good, as “that sovereign can-
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not be imagined to love his people as he ought that is not jealous of them, but suffers 
them by the flattery of popular men to be seduced from their loyalty”.106 
 
What is more, Hobbes argues in Leviathan that rulers should not give money or other 
preferment to ambitious subjects in order to win their allegiance, for this could trigger 
competitive dynamics that further damage the state. His reasoning is that 
when the stubbornness of one popular man is overcome with reward, there arise many 
more (by the example) that do the same mischief, in hope of the like benefit; and as all 
sorts of manufacture, so also malice increaseth by being vendible.107 
Likewise, Hobbes argues in Behemoth that princes who try to buy the obedience of their 
subjects with preferment create “a market where honour and power is to be bought with 
stubbornness”.108 These statements suggest that competitiveness is only conducive to 
the common good if the sovereign creates the right incentives, such as when he encour-
ages the arts and sciences or the accumulation of wealth by trade and industry. 
 
Even if subjects concentrate on private affairs, such as acquiring goods through their 
own industry, this is not entirely without risks. In De Cive, Hobbes thus suggests that 
immoderate private wealth implies faction, “for everything obeys money”.109 This 
statement is echoed in De Homine, where he also mentions that the Roman politician 
Lucullus “defined the wealthy man as one that can support an army of his own”.110 In 
some of his writings, Hobbes also condemns the immoderate riches of great cities.111 
His reasoning seems to be that subjects who control a great city have sufficient re-
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sources to challenge the sovereign power. In addition, Hobbes suggests in Leviathan 
that wealth could be an incentive for crimes: 
[S]uch [people] as value themselves by the greatness of their wealth adventure on 
crimes, upon hope of escaping punishment by corrupting public justice or obtaining par-
don by money or other rewards.112 
Similarly, Hobbes points out in Leviathan that crimes proceeding from presumption of 
strength, riches, or friends are particularly severe, “for presumption of impunity by 
force is a root from whence springeth, at all times and upon all temptations, a contempt 
of all laws”.113 Thus, subjects should only be permitted moderate riches, because other-
wise their wealth may pose a challenge to the sovereign authority.  
 
To conclude, Hobbes holds that human competitiveness could, under certain conditions, 
provoke rebellion and civil war. As this section has shown, he is particularly wary of the 
competition for glory in democratic assemblies, the ambition for public office, and the 
quest for military honours. Yet it seems that all kinds of competition could provoke a 
return of hostility if they are not sufficiently controlled by the sovereign. For instance, 
the accumulation of excessive riches may encourage disobedience. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
Although the commonwealth is meant to establish civil peace, its subjects still compete 
with each other for honours, riches, and authority. This chapter has shown that, ulti-
mately, people in the civil state remain the same creatures that Hobbes describes as nat-
ural enemies. In particular, it has been argued that he regards competitiveness as a per-
manent feature of human nature, which is largely fuelled by an intrinsic desire to outdo 
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others. Yet unlike people in the state of nature, subjects of the commonwealth can dis-
tinguish themselves without having to risk their lives. Moreover, this chapter has shown 
that Hobbes also envisions opportunities for socially beneficial competition that are not 
available in the natural condition. Thus, it seems that he does not merely assess compet-
itiveness in negative terms, but also considers positive effects of certain forms of com-
petition, including prosperity and achievements in the arts and sciences. 
   
At the same time, Hobbes emphasises that human competitiveness could, under certain 
conditions, provoke a return of hostility to the commonwealth. For example, if subjects 
compete with the sovereign, envy his honour and authority, become popular army 
commanders, or accumulate immoderate wealth, this could undermine the sovereign 
authority and eventually lead to rebellion and civil war. In general, Hobbes seems to be 
wary of human competitiveness whenever it interferes with public affairs. Thus, it has 
been argued in this chapter that the sovereign needs to set the right incentives, and con-
trol competition amongst subjects, in order to preserve the civil peace. 
 
Hobbes’s views on this subject, thereby, appear to distinguish his thought from the lib-
eral conception of economic competition, which does not seem to consider the possibil-
ity that the competition of private individuals could provoke hostility and civil war. 
Likewise, Hobbes’s perspective appears to differ from Schmitt’s view that political en-
mity, which concerns the relations between organised totalities, is strictly separate from 
personal rivalry, economic competition, and intellectual contention.114 Following this 
discussion of competitiveness in the civil state, the next chapter will further consider 
Hobbes’s views on the return of hostility in the event of rebellion. 
                                                
114 Cf. sec. 1.1. 
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7. The status and punishment of the rebel 
This chapter considers the status of the rebel in Hobbes’s political philosophy. The first 
section shows that Hobbes regards utterances as sufficient evidence of a treacherous de-
sign. In particular, it is argued that those who call the sovereign a tyrant reveal their hos-
tility to the commonwealth. The second section further analyses in which sense the re-
bel becomes a public enemy. It is shown that Hobbes insists on this legal status in order 
to establish a basis for punishing individuals who defy the sovereign authority. The 
third section examines how rulers can effectively exercise their sovereignty in the face 
of rebellion. It is suggested that Hobbes envisions the sovereign to hold authors of sedi-
tion responsible, while pardoning other participants of an insurgence in order to win 
back their allegiance as subjects. This might prevent the outbreak of civil war, in the 
event of which the commonwealth would be effectively dissolved. The fourth section 
re-examines recent scholarship on Hobbes’s so-called ‘reply to the fool’ and proposes 
an alternative interpretation. It is argued in this section that Hobbes seeks to persuade 
his audience that authors of sedition, who reveal their denial of justice by calling the 
sovereign a tyrant, ought to be treated as enemies of mankind. 
 
7.1 ‘Bare words’ as evidence of hostility 
In marked contrast to his account of the natural condition (where people treat one an-
other as enemies on the ground of distrust) Hobbes generally emphasises the importance 
of evidence and testimony in the civil state.1 In De Cive and Leviathan, he expresses 
that it is a law of nature that a judge hears the testimony of witnesses before deciding a 
                                                
1 As was shown in sec. 3.2, Hobbes conceives of distrust as the opposite of assurance, and regards it as 
permissible in the state of nature to treat others as enemies on the ground of suspicion. 
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matter of fact.2 Hobbes considers witnesses crucial in a trial, as only they will have per-
ceived with their senses whether or not a crime has been committed.3 
 
Hobbes is generally critical of decision-making bodies that attempt to judge matters of 
fact without considering the required evidence. In the Dialogue, he argues against the 
view that a jury can establish testimony, because “there cannot possibly be any Judge of 
Fact besides the Witnesses”.4 As he further states with particular reference to the crime 
of treason, “the Jury has no more to do than to consider the Legality of the Witnesses, 
the Harmony of their Testimonies, or whether the words were spoken advisedly”.5 Simi-
larly, Hobbes questions whether parliamentary assemblies can competently judge mat-
ters relating to other commonwealths. In this vein, he points out in De Cive that “[v]ery 
few people have any knowledge of these things [i.e. foreign affairs] in a large assembly 
of men who are for the most part inexperienced, not to say incompetent”.6 In order to 
aid his judgement on matters of foreign policy, the sovereign should therefore not rely 
on the opinions of an assembly, but send out spies to other countries, and employ coun-
sellors who are well acquainted with foreign affairs.7 
 
In particular, Hobbes finds it necessary to acquire knowledge of enemy designs in order 
to counter potential threats.8 In his discussion of the sovereign’s office in De Cive, he 
                                                
2 De Cive, III.23, p. 52; Lev., XV.33, p. 98. 
3 Jeremy Waldron argues that Hobbes accepts a version of what John Rawls has called ‘the principle of 
publicity’, i.e. the idea that political order should not be grounded in arbitrary or false beliefs, but 
instead requires that people know the truth about their political arrangements. This is because, 
according to Waldron’s reading of Hobbes, “any attempt to base [sovereign authority] on falsehood or 
myth or mystery […] will leave political allegiance terribly vulnerable to the ability of actual 
individuals to figure things out for themselves”. See Jeremy Waldron, “Hobbes and the Principle of 
Publicity”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2001), pp. 447-474, 454. 
4 Dialogue, pp. 31 (capitalisation in the original). 
5 Dialogue, p. 76 (capitalisation in the original). 
6 De Cive, X.10, pp. 122f. Cf. Lev., XIX.5, p. 120. 
7 De Cive, XIII.8, p. 146; Lev., XXV.14, p. 170. 
8 For further consideration of Hobbes’s views on intelligence in international relations, see sec. 8.1. 
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emphasises that the latter needs “to detect the Designs of neighbouring states” in order 
to protect the commonwealth.9 In Leviathan, Hobbes points to the political utility that 
the sacrament of confession has for the Roman Church: 
[F]rom auricular confession they obtain, for the assurance of their power, better 
intelligence of the designs of princes and great persons of the civil states than these can 
have of the state ecclesiastical.10 
Other statements in Hobbes’s works also indicate the importance of getting to know en-
emy plans in advance. In Behemoth, Hobbes recalls that Cromwell had intelligence of 
the (then exiled) king’s designs through a traitor.11 He also mentions how a newly built 
Dutch fleet was taken as evidence for a plan to attack the English navy.12 
 
Hobbes’s most pronounced statement on the need to make judgements on the basis of 
evidence can be found in the Dialogue, where he argues that it is a sin 
if rashly, and relying upon his own Natural sufficiency, [the sovereign] make War, or 
Peace without Consulting with such, as by their Experience and Employment abroad, 
and Intelligence by Letters, or other means have gotten the Knowledge in some measure 
of the strength, Advantages and Designs of the Enemy, and the Manner and Degree of 
the Danger that may from thence arise.13 
Thus, Hobbes maintains that the sovereign ought to rely on intelligence when making 
war and peace with other states. Likewise, rulers should “consult […] with [men] of 
Military Condition” before attempting to subdue a rebellion.14 
 
From De Cive onwards, Hobbes stresses that enemies commonly try to hide their de-
signs. For instance, he states that deliberations in democratic assemblies have “the dis-
                                                
9 De Cive, VI.10, p. 80 (capitalisation in the original). 
10 Lev., XLVII.11, p. 479. 
11 Behemoth, p. 184. 
12 Behemoth, p. 177. 
13 Dialogue, pp. 20f (capitalisation in the original). 
14 Dialogue, p. 21 (capitalisation in the original). 
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advantage that the commonwealth’s policies which it is normally of the highest im-
portance to keep secret, are revealed to enemies before they can be put into effect”.15 
This seems to suggest that certain policies might be subverted if enemies get to know 
them in advance. In Leviathan, Hobbes likewise points to the dangers to the common-
wealth that arise from public deliberations.16 In addition, he mentions the great crime of 
“revealing […] the secrets of the commonwealth to an enemy”.17 
 
This emphasis on the importance of secrecy seems to imply that it might sometimes be 
impossible to discover the enemy’s plans before they are put into practice. However, a 
passage in the Introduction of Leviathan suggests that Hobbes nonetheless considers it 
possible to detect hostile designs with the help of introspection: 
And though by men’s actions we do discover their designs sometimes, yet to do it 
without comparing them with our own, and distinguishing all circumstances by which 
the case may come to be altered, is to decipher without a key, and be for the most part 
deceived, by too much trust, or by too much diffidence […].18 
In later chapters in Leviathan, Hobbes actually expresses great confidence regarding the 
chances of detecting a hostile design. In particular, he points out in this regard that au-
thors of sedition, who endeavour to deceive their neighbours and “think their designs 
are too subtle to be perceived”, have a false opinion of their own wisdom.19 
 
In Book 4 of Leviathan, Hobbes uses the key of introspection to decipher designs of the 
Church and the schoolmen, thereby identifying them as a “confederacy of deceivers”.20 
Interpreting various ecclesiastical doctrines as evidence of a great conspiracy, Hobbes 
                                                
15 De Cive, X.14, p. 124. 
16 Lev., XXV.15, p. 171. 
17 Lev., XXVII.37, p. 201. 
18 Lev., intr. 3, p. 4. 
19 Lev., XXVII.16, p. 195. 
20 Lev., XXIV.1, p. 411. Cf. sec. 4.3. 
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claims that the Roman Church’s universal dominion over the Christian world only came 
about because sovereigns lacked “insight into the designs of their teachers”.21 He main-
tains that these designs become apparent if one applies the qui bono principle, for 
“amongst presumptions there is none that so evidently declareth the author as doth the 
benefit of the action”.22 In other words, the very doctrine of universal dominion reveals 
that its ecclesiastical proponents only pursued their own advantage. What Hobbes seems 
to suggest here is that the Church’s claim to universal dominion reveals its hostility, be-
cause it implies a challenge to the authority of Christian sovereigns. 
 
Concerning Hobbes’s analysis of the political designs of the Church, there seems to be 
an interesting parallel to Machiavelli. The latter argued in The Prince that the pope’s 
power is not grounded in military capability, but “sustained by ancient religious institu-
tions, which have been sufficiently strong to maintain their rulers in office however they 
live and act”.23 In a similar vein, Hobbes interprets religious institutions as a means for 
securing the Roman Church’s temporal power.24 Unlike Machiavelli, however, he does 
not limit his analysis to the worldly possessions of the papal state, but is primarily con-
cerned with claims to universal ecclesiastical dominion. In his Historia Ecclesiastica, 
Hobbes describes in even greater detail than in Leviathan how generations of popes em-
ployed frauds and secret machinations to pursue their own interests. For instance, he 
claims that the crusades served the purpose of reducing the power of Christian sover-
eigns.25 Hobbes also emphasises the power of religious institutions, specifically refer-
                                                
21 Lev., XLVII.18, p. 480. 
22 Lev., XLVII.1, p. 477. 
23 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, eds. and trans. Quentin Skinner and Russell Price (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), ch. 11, p. 40. 
24 Hobbes had access to Machiavelli’s works in the Hardwick Library. See Hamilton, “Hobbes’s Study 
and the Hardwick Library”, p. 450. On Hobbes’s familiarity with the ‘reason of state’ literature more 
generally, also see Noel Malcolm, Reason of State, Propaganda and the Thirty Years’ War: An 
Unknown Translation by Thomas Hobbes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007). 
25 Hist. Eccl., p. 549. 
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ring to the ecclesiastical foundation of universities as “a machine for capturing king-
doms”.26 In addition, he argues in the Historia Ecclesiastica that popes use the promise 
of salvation and the threat of purgatory to manipulate their friends and enemies, and re-
states that confession turns every subject into a spy.27 Thereby, he apparently takes the 
use of such stratagems as evidence for the Church’s hostility to the state. 
 
With regard to authors of sedition, Hobbes’s view appears to be that they reveal their 
hostility to the commonwealth through their private judgement of good and evil, which 
equals a pretence to the power of judicature. In a discussion of the notion of lawful ty-
rannicide in The Elements of Law, Hobbes reasons that 
howsoever [a sovereign] might deserve punishment, yet punishment is unjust without 
judgment preceding, and judgment unjust without power of judicature, which a subject 
hath not over his sovereign.28 
Thus, subjects cannot commit tyrannicide without judging the sovereign worthy of pun-
ishment, which implies a breach of law. Similarly, Hobbes expresses in his controversy 
with Bishop Bramhall that “to judge of what is good and evil in others, belongs not to 
him, but to those whom the sovereign power appointeth thereunto”.29 To illustrate this 
point, Hobbes draws a parallel with Adam’s unlawful judgement of God's command-
ment not to eat from the forbidden tree of knowledge of good and evil.30 
 
In De Cive, Hobbes invokes the same analogy to Adam’s original sin when he discusses 
the intentions of those who incite others to rebellion: 
                                                
26 Hist. Eccl., p. 545. 
27 Hist. Eccl., pp. 551, 553. 
28 EL, XVII.10, p. 168. 
29 QLNC, p. 269. 
30 QLNC, p. 269. 
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[A]nyone whom [authors of sedition] want killed as a Tyrant, rules either by right or 
without right. If without right, he is a public enemy [hostis] and is rightly killed, though 
this should not be called Tyrannicide but hosticide. If he holds power rightly, the divine 
question applies: Who told you that he was a Tyrant, unless you have eaten of the tree of 
which I told you not to eat? For why do you call him a Tyrant whom God made a King, 
unless you, a private person, are claiming for yourself a knowledge of good and evil?31 
This reflects Hobbes’s position that the word ‘tyranny’ does not denote a kind of gov-
ernment, as Aristotle argues, but merely the speaker’s dislike of his or her sovereign.32 
His rhetorical question seems to imply that in the moment subjects judge the sovereign 
a tyrant, they no longer obey his absolute power of judicature.33 
 
The view that subjects reveal their hostility through the act of calling the sovereign a 
tyrant appears to be related to Hobbes’s opposition to the conventional notion of lawful 
tyrannicide, which he criticises in all of his main political works. In the chapter on re-
bellion in De Cive, for example, he states that this doctrine puts every monarch at “risk 
of being condemned by the judgement, and murdered by the hand, of one solitary assas-
sin”.34 In view of this danger, Hobbes apparently seeks to prevent all talk of tyranny by 
declaring it a sufficient proof for a subject’s hostility to the commonwealth. 
 
In Leviathan, Hobbes invokes a different religious analogy to express the same point in 
more general terms. Alluding to the Third Commandment, which forbids using the 
name of God in vain, He expresses that the people need to be taught 
how great a fault it is to speak evil of the sovereign representative […], or to argue and 
dispute his power, or any way to use his name irreverently, whereby he may be brought 
into contempt with his people, and their obedience […] slackened.35 
                                                
31 De Cive, XII.3, p. 133 (emphasis in the original). 
32 De Cive, VII.3, p. 93; Lev, XIX.2, pp. 118f; Lev., R&C 9, p. 492. 
33 In addition, Hobbes’s analogy indicates that the forbidden act of judging the sovereign could ultimately 
provoke the breakdown of the political order. Cf. sec. 4.4. 
34 De Cive, XII.3, pp. 133f. 
35 Lev., XXX.9, p. 223. Cf. Ex. 20:7 
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Like the earlier statements in The Elements of Law and De Cive, this passage points to 
utterances that undermine the sovereign’s authority as the origin of disobedience and 
rebellion. A few pages later, Hobbes specifically mentions the doctrine of lawful tyran-
nicide, which “make[s] it lawful and laudable for any man [to kill the monarch], provid-
ed, before he do it, he call him a tyrant”.36 This clearly demonstrates what gravity 
Hobbes ascribes to the speech act of calling the sovereign a tyrant. 
 
In accordance with his views on the power of language,37 he apparently seeks to estab-
lish that those who reveal their hostility through their utterances are hostes (public ene-
mies), against whom the sovereign could apply his right of war. In De Cive, Hobbes 
thus argues that the crime of lèse-majesté (high treason) consists of 
a deed or word by the citizen or subject by which he reveals that he no longer intends to 
obey the man or council to whom the sovereign power in the commonwealth has been 
committed.38 
Considering that the traitor does not merely violate any particular law, but the grounds 
of political obligation (as defined by the laws of nature), Hobbes further insists in De 
Cive that he can be treated as a public enemy.39 Similarly, he expresses in Leviathan 
that lèse-majesté covers ‘facts of hostility’ against the state, including “all endeavours 
by word or deed to diminish the authority of the [sovereign]”.40 
 
In his discussion of high treason in the Dialogue, Hobbes rejects an alternative position 
expressed by the common lawyer and former chief justice Edward Coke. In his work 
Third Institutes, Coke claims that the legal status of rebellious traitors is not hostis (a 
                                                
36 Lev., XXX.14, p. 225. 
37 Cf. sec. 4.2. 
38 De Cive, XIV.20, p. 165 (emphasis added). 
39 De Cive, XIV.21-22, p. 166. 
40 Lev., XVII.36, pp. 201f (emphasis added). 
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public enemy) but inimicus (a private enemy).41 Hobbes finds this argument “not […] 
worthy of the meanest lawyer”,42 and considers it manifest that traitors are public ene-
mies. In this regard, he emphasis the importance of hostile designs:  
Then for the Nature of Treason by Rebellion; is it not a return to Hostility? What else 
does Rebellion signifie? William the Conquerer Subdued this Kingdom; some he Killed; 
some upon promise of future obedience he took to Mercy, and they became his Subjects, 
and swore Allegiance to him; if therefore they renew the War against him [the 
sovereign], are they not again open Enemies; or if any of them lurking under his Laws, 
seek occasion thereby to kill him, secretly, and come to be known, may he not be 
proceeded against as an Enemy, who though he had not Committed what he Design's, 
yet had certainly a Hostile Design? Did not the long Parliament declare all those for 
Enemies to the State that opposed their Proceedings against the late King?43 
Against Coke, Hobbes maintains that “not only the killing [of the monarch], but the De-
sign is made High Treason [by the law]”.44 Furthermore, Hobbes insists that there is no 
need of proof by an open deed, because apart from the act of treason itself, actions are 
generally too ambiguous to provide clear evidence. Thus, he points out: 
[H]ow a Jury from providing, or buying of Armour, or buying of Gunpowder, or from 
any other overt Act, not Treason in itself, can infer a Design of Murdering the King, 
unless there appear some words also, signifying to what end he made such Provision, I 
cannot easily conceive.45 
This leaves Hobbes with the position that a speech act is the best possible proof. He de-
fends this view against Coke’s claim that ‘bare words’ may be sufficient evidence for 
the crime of heresy, yet not for high treason.46 Strictly speaking, Hobbes reasons, statute 
law “maketh not the words High Treason, but the Intention, whereof the words are but a 
Testimony”.47 Yet this specification does not seem to make much of a difference. After 
                                                
41 Edward Coke, “The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England“ [first published in 1644], in 
The Selected Writings and Speeches of Sir Edward Coke, vol. 2, ed. Steve Sheppard (Indianapolis, IN: 
Liberty Fund, 2003), pp. 944-1052, 973. 
42 Dialogue, p. 72. 
43 Dialogue, p. 73 (emphasis added, capitalisation in the original). 
44 Dialogue, p. 74 (capitalisation in the original). In Lev., XXX.13, p. 224, and Dialogue, p. 84, Hobbes 
advances the same view with regard to breaches of the natural law and the crime of murder.  
45 Dialogue, p. 76 (capitalisation in the original). 
46 Dialogue, pp. 74f. 
47 Dialogue, pp. 75 (capitalisation in the original). 
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all, Hobbes effectively argues that the sovereign retains the right to treat subjects as en-
emies if they reveal their traitorous designs through their utterances. 
 
To conclude, Hobbes holds that, in the civil state, all judgements should be based on 
evidence. Although enemies often operate in secret, Hobbes considers it possible to de-
tect their designs if one applies the qui bono principle. In particular, he argues that ‘bare 
words’ may be sufficient evidence of high treason, because words can reveal an inten-
tion to defy the sovereign’s authority. Thus, it seems that subjects become public ene-
mies if they declare the sovereign a tyrant and incite others to rebellion. 
 
7.2 The legal status of rebels and their punishment 
Despite Hobbes’s insistence that rebels are public enemies (hostes), their legal status 
remains somewhat ambiguous. If a rebel effectively renounces his subjection by reveal-
ing his hostility to the commonwealth, as was suggested in the last section, it is unclear 
how the sovereign could still inflict legal punishments on such individuals. 
 
Hobbes generally holds that, as a matter of natural law, punishment should not be or-
dained to revenge past evils, but in view of future goods. Specifically, the purpose of 
punishment is to correct an offender, or direct a wider audience.48 In Leviathan, he de-
fines punishment as an evil inflicted “to the end that the will of men may thereby be bet-
ter disposed to obedience”.49 Regarding rebellious subjects in particular, Hobbes repeat-
edly emphasises that they have to be severely punished. In The Elements of Law, he ex-
presses that the sovereign has a duty “to ordain severe punishments, for such as shall by 
                                                
48 EL, XVI.10, pp. 91f; De Cive, III.11, p. 49; Lev., XV.19, p. 96. 
49 Lev., XXVIII.1, p. 203. 
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reprehension of public actions, affect popularity and applause amongst the multitude”50 
Similarly, Hobbes argues in De Cive that sovereigns must “suppress factious citizens as 
forcefully as they can”.51 In Leviathan, he points out that 
the severest punishments are to be inflicted for those crimes that are of most danger to 
the public, such as are those which proceed from malice to the government established, 
those that spring from contempt of justice, [and] those that provoke indignation in the 
multitude […].52 
Considering Hobbes’s characterisation of such particularly dangerous crimes that need 
to be severely punished, he seems to be referring to the actions and utterances of authors 
of sedition, i.e. those individuals who incite others to rebellion. 
 
Yet penalties for such people, whom Hobbes considers public enemies, are difficult to 
reconcile with the theory of punishment in Leviathan. According to the latter, the right 
to punish is derived from the natural right that the sovereign retains from the natural 
condition. As Hobbes further suggests in this regard, “the subjects did not give the sov-
ereign that right [to punish], but only (in laying down theirs) strengthened him to use his 
own […], for the preservation of them all”53. Thus, he seems to conceive of the sover-
eign’s right to punish as an implication of the social contract, in which everyone but the 
sovereign supposedly renounced his or her natural right to all things.54 
 
In general, it seems to follow from Hobbes’s theory that, even if subjects have no obli-
gation to assist in enforcing their own punishment, legal penalties presuppose subjection 
to the sovereign.55 In Leviathan, Hobbes, indeed, draws a sharp distinction between le-
                                                
50 EL, XVIII.7, p. 176. 
51 De Cive, XIII.12, pp. 148f. 
52 Lev., XXX.23, p. 230. 
53 Lev., XXVIII.2, p. 204. 
54 Cf. sec. 5.3.  
55 As has been shown in sec. 5.3, Hobbes holds that subjects are permitted to resist their own punishment 
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gal penalties and ‘acts of hostility’ that do not meet the requirements of his definition, 
including evils that are not inflicted by public authority, excessive harm, and punish-
ment without law.56 Hobbes also argues in this context that 
harm inflicted upon one that is a declared enemy falls not under the name of 
punishment, because seeing they were either never subject to the law, and therefore 
cannot transgress it, or having been subject to it and professing to be no longer so, by 
consequence they deny they can transgress it, all the harms that can be done them must 
be taken as acts of hostility.57 
Given that rebels effectively cease to be subjects, according to Hobbes, it seems to 
follow that the sovereign cannot inflict legal punishments on them. 
 
However, the fact that rebels cannot be punished on the grounds of the civil law does 
not preclude any kind of penalty. Rather, as Hobbes expresses in Leviathan, it implies 
that rebels are subject to an extra-legal jurisdiction: 
But in declared hostility all infliction of evil is lawful. From when it followeth, that if a 
subject shall, by fact or words, wittingly and deliberately deny the authority of the 
representative of the commonwealth, (whatsoever penalty hath been formerly ordained 
for treason) he may lawfully made to suffer whatsoever the representative will. For in 
denying subjection he denies such punishments as by the law hath been ordained, and 
therefore suffereth as an enemy of the commonwealth […]. For the punishments set 
down in the law are to subjects, not to enemies; such as are they, that having been by 
their own act subjects, deliberately revolting, deny the sovereign power.58 
Thus, rebels do not enjoy legal certainty and suffer at the sovereign’s will, regardless of 
what penalties have previously been ordained for their crimes. In this vein, Hobbes also 
responds to Bishop Bramhall’s objection that rebels should be punished as disloyal trai-
tors rather than as public enemies.59 In the Answer, Hobbes points out that “the traitor 
loseth the privilege of being punished by a precedent law; and therefore may be pun-
                                                                                                                                          
as long as they do not challenge the sovereign authority. In this case, people would reveal their 
hostility toward the state and are likely to lose their status as subjects. 
56 See Lev., XXVIII.5-23, pp. 204-206. 
57 Lev., XXVIII.13, p. 206. 
58 Lev., XXVIII.13, pp. 206f. 
59 Answer, p. 291. 
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ished at the king’s will, as Ravaillac was for murdering Henry IV of France”.60 As this 
passage demonstrates, Hobbes conceives of the difference between legal and extra-legal 
punishment in terms of privileges granted or not granted to an offender.61 Yet he also 
states in the Answer that “a rebel is still a subject de jure, though not de facto”,62 which 
may suggest that rebels still commit an offence against the civil law. 
 
Hobbes’s discussion of treason in De Cive indicates that he mainly insists on the ap-
plicability of the sovereign’s right of war against rebels in order to resolve a problem of 
law enforcement. In particular, he seems to maintain that rebels cannot be legally pun-
ished for high treason, because this crime consists of the rejection of their political obli-
gation, and a transgression of the entire system of civil law: 
If a sovereign prince made a civil law in the form: do not rebel!, he would achieve 
nothing. For unless the citizens are previously obligated to obedience, i.e. not to rebel, 
every law is invalid; and an obligation which binds one to do something which one is 
already obligated to do is superfluous.63 
Hobbes does not deny that there are civil laws against lèse-majesté (high treason). In-
deed, he discusses the legal definition of this crime in De Cive, Leviathan, and the Dia-
logue.64 However, Hobbes holds that rebels can only be effectively ‘punished’ with ref-
erence to the natural law, which allows for the application of the sovereign’s right of 
war against subjects who have revealed their hostility to the state. 
 
Hobbes’s discussion of exile in Leviathan lends further credence to the suggestion that 
he only invokes the legal status of rebels in order to establish a basis for their punish-
ment. Affirmatively citing Cicero on this point, Hobbes argues that a banished person is 
                                                
60 Answer, p. 294. 
61 Cf. sec. 8.2. 
62 Answer, p. 294. 
63 De Cive, XIV.21, p. 166 (emphasis in the original). Cf. Lev., XXX.4, p. 220. 
64 See sec. 7.1. 
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a lawful enemy of the state, and that exile should therefore not be regarded as punish-
ment but as refuge from danger.65 In the quoted passage from the speech Pro Caecina, 
Cicero spells out the implications of this conception of exile: 
[A]s men wished to avoid imprisonment, execution, or infamy, which are penalties 
appointed by the laws, they flee to banishment as to the altar, though, if they chose to 
remain in the city and to submit to the rigour of the law, they would lose their rights of 
citizenship sooner than they lost their lives; but because they do not choose, their rights 
of citizenship are not taken from them, but are abandoned and laid aside by them.66 
This suggests that people either renounce their citizenship through escaping from pun-
ishment, or are deprived of their rights and thereafter punished with death. 
 
In a similar vein, Hobbes repeatedly expresses the view that, far from getting to enjoy 
any privileges, banished subjects who have escaped punishment are exposed to great 
dangers. In The Elements of Law, he thus points out that “exile perpetual, is a release 
from subjection, forasmuch as being out of the protection of the sovereignty that ex-
pelled him, he hath no means of subsisting but from himself”.67 In other words, ban-
ished persons (or at least those who are in perpetual exile) return to the state of nature 
where they have to rely on their own strength and resources in order to preserve them-
selves. Consequently, it seems that such people must also retain their natural right to all 
things. Yet as Hobbes clearly expresses in De Cive, this does not imply any privileges, 
because to banished subjects, “freedom is given as a punishment”.68 
 
                                                
65 Lev., XXVIII.21, p. 207. This view seems to reflect Hobbes’s own decision to go into exile to escape 
persecution for his political views In 1640 Hobbes moved to Paris, as he apparently feared being 
punished for his defence of absolute and undivided sovereignty in The Elements of Law. Although this 
work had not been published, the manuscript was widely circulated and discussed in political circles. 
See John Aubrey, “Life of Hobbes”, in Lev., ed. Edwin Curley, pp. lxv-lxxi, lxvii. 
66 Cicero, “For Aulus Caecina”, in The Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero, Vol. 2, trans. C. D. Yonge 
(London: George Bell & Sons, 1856), pp. 35-76, 64f. 
67 EL, XXI.14, p. 125. 
68 De Cive, VIII.9, p. 105. 
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In Leviathan’s discussion of exile, Hobbes expresses a somewhat different view. He ar-
gues that, in order to be a proper punishment, banishment must be accompanied by a 
deprivation of lands and goods.69 This is because, according to Hobbes, “the mere 
change of air is no punishment”.70 In making this argument however, he seems to refer 
to exiles that are allowed to live in another country, whereas in the earlier works his 
concern was with individuals that return to the natural condition. The latter possibility is 
also mentioned in Leviathan, namely in a passage that is widely known as the ‘reply to 
the fool’. There Hobbes argues that someone who denies justice cannot be admitted into 
any commonwealth, and if being “left or cast out of society, he perisheth”.71 In the ap-
pendix to the Latin Leviathan, Hobbes also suggests a close connection between ban-
ishment and death. Regarding heresy, he states that God (as the author of nature) has “a 
right to expel the blasphemer from the whole earth, i.e., to kill him”.72 
 
A similar view on banishment can be found in the Dialogue’s discussion of the crime of 
Praemunire (i.e. the assertion of papal jurisdiction in England). In this context, Hobbes 
provides a summary of Edward Coke’s position on outlawry, which 
is equivalent to Capital [punishment]: For [the outlaw] lives secretly at the Mercy of 
those that know where he is, and cannot with the like Peril to themselves, but discover 
him. And it has been much disputed before the time of Queen Elizabeth, whether he 
might not be lawfully killed by any Man that would, as one might kill a Wolf.73 
In addition, Hobbes states that outlawry is “like the Punishment amongst the old Ro-
mans of being barred the use of Fire and Water”.74 Thereby, Hobbes might be drawing 
                                                
69 Lev., XXVIII.13, pp. 207f. 
70 Lev., XXVIII.13, p. 207. 
71 Lev., XV.5, p. 92. Cf. the discussion of Hobbes’s ‘reply to the fool’ in sec. 7.4. 
72 Lev., Appendix II.40, p. 530. 
73 Dialogue, p. 104 (capitalisation in the original). Cf. Coke, “The First Part of the Institutes of the 
Common Laws of England” [first published in 1628], in The Selected Writings and Speeches of Sir 
Edward Coke, vol. 2, ed. Steve Sheppard (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2003), pp. 554-744, 712f. 
74 Dialogue, p. 104 (capitalisation in the original). 
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on a passage by the jurist Paulus from the Digest of Roman law. Paulus mentions the 
interdict of fire and water as one implication of the loss of citizenship, which occurs 
when the Roman Senate declares a rebel hostis (a public enemy).75 
 
Understood thus, the punishment of former subjects as enemies appears to be a func-
tional equivalent to legal penalties. Both legal and extra-legal penalties are ultimately 
meant to deter crimes, which is what Hobbes seems to have in mind when he repeatedly 
calls for severe, exemplary punishments for those who incite others to rebellion.76 In 
addition, such an extra-legal jurisdiction may serve the purpose of subverting the plans 
of rebels before they get the chance to put them into practice. According to Hobbes, the 
right of war generally permits pre-emptive action against anyone who constitutes a 
threat.77 The goals of deterrence and pre-emption are compatible on account of 
Hobbes’s theory of punishment, which holds that all penalties ought to be ordained in 
view of future goods, and particularly to secure the obedience of subjects.  
 
To conclude, this section has confirmed that Hobbes regards rebels as public enemies 
(hostes). He apparently insists on this status in order to justify severe, extra-legal penal-
ties for those subjects who defy the sovereign authority and denounce the grounds of 
political obligation. Yet it has also been suggested that these extra-legal punishments 
serve as a functional equivalent to legal jurisdiction. 
 
                                                
75 Digest of Justinian, Vol. 1, Latin text edited by Theodor Mommsen with aid of Paul Krueger, English 
translation edited by Alan Watson (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), IV.V, 
5, p. 140. Quentin Skinner suggests that Hobbes draws heavily on the Digest, particularly in the 
conceptual apparatus of Leviathan. See Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, Vol. III: Hobbes and 
Civil Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 179. 
76 See EL, XVIII.7, p. 176; De Cive, XIII.12, pp. 148f; Lev., XXX.23, p. 230. 
77 See sec. 3.2. 
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7.3 Exercising sovereign authority in the face of rebellion 
The last section has shown that rebels can, according to Hobbes, be treated as public 
enemies. This section further considers how the sovereign can effectively exercise his 
authority during an insurgence. It will be suggested that Hobbes recommends a strategy 
of divide and conquer for breaking up an ongoing rebellion. 
 
Hobbes was certainly aware that making war upon subjects is highly controversial and 
likely to provoke further hostilities. At least, this is suggested by his account of the 
events leading to the outbreak of the English Civil War in Behemoth: 
I believe the English would never have taken well that the Parliament should make war 
upon the King, upon any provocation, unless it were in their own defence, in case the 
King should first make war upon them; and, therefore, it behoved them to provoke the 
King, that he might do something that might look like hostility.78 
In other words, members of the Parliament party sought to provoke acts of hostility by 
the king in order to win the people’s support. This example suggests that exercising the 
right of war against those who challenge the sovereign’s authority does not necessarily 
conduce to supressing a rebellion, but may also stir up rebellion. In particular, it seems 
plausible that a sovereign who is accused of tyrannical government only lends further 
credence to this allegation if he makes war on his own subjects. 
 
In order to examine whether Hobbes provides a solution for this problem, it may be 
fruitful to consider one passage from Leviathan that is sometimes cited in support of the 
claim that Hobbes grants subjects a right of rebellion. Bishop Bramhall, who accused 
                                                
78 Behemoth, p. 28. 
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Leviathan of being a ‘rebel’s catechism’, was among the first to express this view.79 The 
said passage appears in the chapter on the liberty of subjects: 
[I]n case a great many men together have already resisted the sovereign power unjustly, 
or committed some capital crime for which every one of them expecteth death, whether 
have they not the liberty then to join together, and assist, and defend one another? 
Certainly they have; for they but defend their lives, which the guilty man may as well do 
as the innocent. There was indeed injustice in the first breech of their duty; their bearing 
of arms subsequent to it, though it be to maintain what they have done, is no new unjust 
act. And if it be only to defend their persons, it is not unjust at all. But the offer of 
pardon taketh from them to whom it is offered the plea of self-defence, and maketh their 
perseverance in assisting or defending the rest unlawful.80 
Susanne Sreedhar argues that––despite acknowledging that rebellion is ‘indeed injus-
tice’––Hobbes regards it as morally permissible for a group of rebellious subjects to 
continue in their collective resistance, especially since they cannot expect pardon.81 As 
Sreedhar correctly notes, Hobbes indeed seems to refer to rebels in the above quotation. 
This is because there are crucial similarities with another passage in The Elements of 
Law’s chapter on rebellion. However, the parallel statement in the earlier work also 
casts doubt on Sreedhar’s argument for a right to rebellion: 
The presence of bodily pain disposeth not to sedition; the fear of it doth. As for 
example: when a great multitude, or heap of people, have concurred to a crime worthy 
of death, they join together, and take arms to defend themselves for fear thereof. So also 
the fear of want, or in present want the fear of arrests and imprisonment, dispose to 
sedition.82 
The context of this passage suggests that Hobbes is not concerned with whether or not 
resistance against the sovereign is morally permissible, but rather identifies causes of 
                                                
79 John Bramhall, “The Catching of Leviathan, or of the Great Whale” [1658], in Leviathan: 
Contemporary Responses to the Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes, ed. G.A.J. Rogers (Bristol, UK: 
Thoemmes Press, 1995), pp. 115-179, 145. More recently, Susanne Sreedhar has defended the view 
that Hobbes grants subjects a right of rebellion. See Sreedhar, Hobbes on Resistance, pp.136-143. It is 
telling that both Bramhall and Sreedhar, Hobbes on Resistance, pp. 156f, refuse to accept Hobbes’s 
claim that rebels become public enemies of the state, and thus lose their status as subjects. 
80 Lev., XXI.17, p. 143 (emphasis added). 
81 Sreedhar, Hobbes on Resistance, pp. 138f. 
82 EL, XXVII.2, p. 163. 
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rebellion in order to show how civil war can be avoided.83 In this vein, he also points 
out that there would be no rebellion without pretence of right, nor without the organisa-
tion of rebels into one single body, which gives them hope of success.84 This indicates 
that Hobbes considers group resistance not as a right, but as a factor that the sovereign 
needs to take into account in his government of the commonwealth. 
 
The same is likely to be true for the above quotation from Leviathan. In particular, it 
seems that Hobbes’s specification that the offer of pardon takes away the plea of self-
defence does not so much, as Sreedhar suggests, give rebels an additional reason to re-
sist the sovereign. Rather, granting pardon to some participants of an insurgence while 
declaring others an enemy might allow the sovereign to effectively exercise his authori-
ty in face of a rebellion. Sreedhar identifies the distinction between subjects and ene-
mies as problematic in practice, and takes this as support for her view that rebels do not 
really become enemies of the state.85 However, as was previously shown, Hobbes gen-
erally does not conceive of membership of the commonwealth in static terms, but holds 
that the sovereign establishes and maintains the distinction between insiders and outsid-
ers on the grounds of his right of war and peace.86 This right to discern subjects from 
enemies appears to be of particular significance in times of rebellion. 
 
Hobbes states in all of his accounts of the natural law that peace should be granted to 
everyone who repents their former hostilities.87 Regarding the right to discharge penal-
                                                
83 Hobbes clearly states in EL, XXVII.1, pp. 162f, that without the subjects’ discontent, pretence of right, 
and hope of success “there can be no rebellion”. His intention in this passage seems to be to explain 
how rebellion, which he compares to sickness of the commonwealth, can be avoided. This seems to be 
related to the more general view of Hobbes that the main practical benefit of political philosophy is 
that it allows us to avoid the evils that would follow from civil war. See sec. 4.2. 
84 EL, XXVII.4, pp. 164f, XXVII.11, p. 169. Cf. De Cive, XII.11, p. 138. 
85 Sreedhar, Hobbes on Resistance, p. 157. 
86 See sec. 5.3. 
87 EL, XVI.9, p. 91; De Cive, III.10, p. 48; Lev., XV.18, p. 96. 
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ties, he argues in Leviathan that the sovereign may pardon all breaches of law that are 
offences against the state, such as the crime of high treason.88 At the same time, as has 
been mentioned in sec. 7.2, Hobbes insists that the sovereign has a duty to discourage 
rebellion by ordaining severe punishments.89 The following passage from Leviathan 
shows how pardon and severe penalties can go together: 
[In the case of] crimes of infirmity (such as those which proceed from great provocation, 
from great fear, great need, or from ignorance whether the fact be a great crime or not), 
there is place many times for lenity, without prejudice to the commonwealth; and lenity, 
when there is such place for it, is required by the law of nature. The punishment of the 
leaders and teachers in a commotion, not the poor and seduced people, when they are 
punished, can profit the commonwealth by their example. To be severe to the people is 
to punish that ignorance which may in great part be imputed to the sovereign, whose 
fault it was they were no better instructed.90 
A plausible reading of this passage seems to be that, by declaring leaders of a rebellion 
an enemy, the sovereign singles out and attributes responsibility to these individuals. At 
the same time, the ‘poor seduced people’ are to be excused on the basis of their igno-
rance. This is in accordance with Hobbes’s accounts of the causes of rebellion. In all of 
his main political works, he points out that authors of sedition, who pursue their own 
ambition, incite a multitude of ignorant people to take up arms against the sovereign.91 
Given that Hobbes generally conceives of pardon as granting of peace, this strategy 
could be used to restore participants of a rebellion as obedient subjects.92 
 
                                                
88 Lev., XXX.15, p. 226. However, he also states in this regard that sovereigns cannot pardon all offences 
against private persons. Equity demands that such crimes are only pardoned upon the consent of those 
who have been harmed. By contrast, offences against the state do not affect any private person in 
particular, and can therefore simply be pardoned by the sovereign. For Hobbes’s distinction between 
these two kinds of offences see Lev., XXVII.36-54, pp. 201-203. 
89 EL, XXVIII.7, p. 176; De Cive, XXIII.12, pp. 148f; Lev., XXX.23, p. 230. 
90 Lev., XXX.23, p. 230 (emphasis added). 
91 EL, XXVII.11-12, p. 169; De Cive, XII.10-11, pp. 138; Lev., XXIX.20, p. 218. 
92 Hobbes’s views on how the sovereign should use his right of war and peace in the face of rebellion may 
also be informed by the view that leaders are morally responsible. Llyod argues that there is a 
‘hierarchy of responsibility’ with regard to the sovereign, who bears sole responsibility for breaches of 
the natural law, yet she does not consider whether this also applies to leaders and participants of a 
rebellion. See S.A. Lloyd, Morality in the Philosophy of Hobbes: Cases in the Law of Nature 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 7, 282, 284-287. 
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In recommending a strategy of divide et impera (divide and conquer),93 Hobbes might 
be drawing on Roman sources, and particularly on Sallust’s history of the Catilinarian 
conspiracy. In both The Elements of Law and De Cive, Hobbes refers to Catiline as the 
archetype on an author of sedition, arguing that he had great oratory skills but little wis-
dom.94 This demonstrates Hobbes's familiarity with the work. As part of his historical 
account of this rebellion, Sallust describes how the Roman Senate 
pronounced Catiline and [his co-conspirator] Manlius enemies [hostis] and appointed a 
day before which the rest of their crowd (apart from those condemned of capital 
charges) could put down their arms with impunity.95 
This passage is echoed in Hobbes’s above statements on rebellion, pardon, and the pun-
ishment of leaders in The Elements of Law and Leviathan. In the same way as the Ro-
man Senate declared Catiline and Manlius public enemies with the intention of restoring 
peace, the Hobbesian sovereign may condemn the authors of sedition and offer pardon 
to the rest in order to win back their allegiance as subjects. 
 
Understood thus, the right of war and peace seems to provide the sovereign with an in-
strument for breaking up an ongoing rebellion. It has been noted before that Hobbes ad-
vocates a series of political discriminations in the administration of justice, intended to 
keep ambitious and rebellious subjects under control.96 Yet as the above stated reading 
suggests, these discriminations do not only concern the treatment of rebel leaders. Ra-
ther, Hobbes also seems to suggest that the ignorant multitude of individuals that take 
part in an insurgence should be excused by the sovereign. Therefore, it may be said that 
the measures recommended by Hobbes amount to a strategy of divide and conquer. The 
                                                
93 Many historians refer to divide et impera (divide and conquer) as a maxim of Roman statecraft. See, for 
example, William E. Dunstan, Ancient Rome (Lanham, MD : Rowman & Littlefield), p. 55. 
94 EL, XXVII.13, p. 169; De Cive, XII.12, p. 139. 
95 Sallust, Catiline’s War, The Jugurthine War, Histories, 36.2-3, p. 24. 
96 Baumgold, Hobbes’s Political Theory, pp. 113f. 
 175 
latter might allow the sovereign to effectively exercise his authority in the face of rebel-
lion, and thus prevent the outbreak of civil war.  
 
In this regard, it is important to note the distinction between rebellion and civil war that 
Hobbes draws in all of his main political works. It is true that he sometimes writes as if 
there was no such distinction. Thus, he refers to “times of sedition and civil war” in The 
Elements of Law and De Cive.97 When he is more precise, however, Hobbes describes 
rebellion or sedition as a situation in which the commonwealth is weakened, and civil 
war as a condition in which the state is effectively dissolved. For instance, he expresses 
in The Elements of Law that the sovereign power is dissolved into two factions in the 
event of civil war.98 In Leviathan, Hobbes argues that civil war implies a return to the 
state of nature, because there is no longer “a common power to fear”.99 In both of these 
works, he also compares sedition to sickness and civil war to death.100 
 
This suggests that the sovereign might still be able to exercise his authority in the face 
of rebellion, whereas the outbreak of civil war implies that he has lost his power over 
the commonwealth. Indeed, Hobbes argues in De Cive that sovereigns ought to 
encourage obedient citizens, and to supress factious citizens as forcefully as they can; 
for this is the only way by which public power [potentia publica], and with it the 
citizens’ quiet, can be preserved.101 
This passage points to a fundamental tenet of Hobbes’s political philosophy, i.e. the 
idea that sovereign power ultimately relies on the subjects’ obedience, which comes out 
most clearly in De Cive. Earlier in the same chapter, Hobbes already states that “the 
                                                
97 EL, XVII.1, p. 93; De Cive, VI.13, p. 82. 
98 EL, XXIV.8, p. 140. 
99 Lev., XIII.11, p. 77. Cf. Lev., XVIII.20, pp. 117f. 
100 EL, XXVII.1, pp. 162f; Lev., intro. 1, p. 3. 
101 De Cive, XIII.12, p. 149. 
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power [potentia] of the citizens in the power of the commonwealth, that is, his power 
who holds the sovereignty”.102 In addition, he points out: 
In every commonwealth, the Man or Assembly to whose will individuals have subjected 
their will […] is said to hold sovereign authority [summam potestatem] or sovereign 
power [summum imperium] or dominion [dominium]. This Authority [Potestas], this 
right to give Commands [Jus imperiandi], consists in the fact that each of the citizens 
has transferred all his own force and power [potentia] to that man or Assembly.103 
Hobbes sometimes refers to power as potentia, i.e. a matter of physical force, and at 
other times describes it as potestas, i.e. a matter of rights and authority.104 However, 
both seem to converge in his concept of sovereignty. The latter effectively identifies the 
ruler’s supreme authority (summa potestas) with the commonwealth’s united force (po-
tentia), which is under the sovereign’s command due to the subjects’ obedience. Hence, 
coercive power and the subjects’ consent cannot be in contradiction.105 
 
Given this conception of sovereign power, rebellion may be understood as a test case 
for whether or not a state has dissolved into civil war. A sovereign who retains his au-
thority (i.e. his command over the subject’s united strength and resources) should be 
able to use his right of war and peace in order to break up an insurgence. He may, as 
suggested above, punish rebel leaders and restore the ‘poor seduced people’ as obedient 
subjects. If a sovereign is no longer able to respond to a rebellion in this way, however, 
this may signify the end of sovereignty and the advent of civil war. Thereby, Hobbes’s 
views on how sovereign authority can be exercised in the face of rebellion may be con-
trasted with Schmitt’s concept of sovereignty. In Political Theology, Schmitt argues: 
                                                
102 De Cive, XIII.2, p. 143. 
103 De Cive, V.11, p. 73 (emphasis and capitalisation in the original). 
104 Cf. Luc Foisneau, “Le Vocabulaire de Pouvoir: Potentia, Potestas”, in Hobbes et Son Vocabulaire: 
Études de Lexicographie Philosophique, ed. Yves Charles Zarka (Paris: J. Vrin, 1992), pp. 83-102. 
105 This relationship between the state’s power and the subjects’ obedience seems to work both ways. On 
the one hand, people submit themselves to a sovereign in hope of protection. On the other hand, 
subjects are no longer obliged to obey the sovereign if his power can no longer defend the 
commonwealth, such as after a successful enemy invasion. See sec. 5.1. 
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“Sovereign is he who decides on the exception [Ausnahmezustand]”.106 This statement 
is somewhat ambiguous, yet it becomes clearer in light of Schmitt’s declared opposition 
to a merely juristic definition, and his corresponding intention to set out the nature of 
sovereignty against the reality of societal life. More specifically, Schmitt argues that 
sovereignty consists of the “authority to suspend valid law”.107 In this context, ‘excep-
tion’ means neither anarchy nor normal jurisprudence, but a situation in which the state 
persists despite the suspension of its ordinary legal order.108 
 
There is an obvious parallel to Hobbes’s views on rebellion, which may––in Schmitt’s 
terms––be understood as a state of exception.109 Hobbes also envisions the sovereign to 
revert to extra-legal measures in such an exceptional situation. Schmitt himself claims 
that Hobbes was a ‘decisionist’ who attempted to give sovereignty a legal form that 
“lies in the concrete decision, one that emanates from a particular authority”.110 Yet as 
Tom Sorell and Stephen Holmes point out, Hobbes does not merely conceive of sover-
eignty in terms of the authority to decide, but with reference to the natural law.111 In-
deed, Hobbes points out in Leviathan’s account of the sovereign’s office that the latter 
is obliged by the laws of nature to procure the safety of the people.112 This suggests that, 
unlike Schmitt, Hobbes conceives of sovereignty in terms of a ruler’s ability to estab-
lish, maintain, and restore peace. With regard to rebellion in particular, this would imply 
                                                
106 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, translated by George 
Schwab with a foreword by Tracy B. Strong (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 1. 
107 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 9. 
108 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 12. 
109 Tom Sorell suggests that Hobbes’s entire project can be described as a politics of emergency, for it 
mainly seeks to prevent civil war. See Sorell, Emergencies and Politics: A Sober Hobbesian Approach 
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110 Schmitt, Political Theology, pp. 33f. 
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112 Lev., XXX.1, p. 219. 
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that sovereign is he who can terminate a state of exception. As was shown above, a sov-
ereign may be able to do so by using a strategy of divide and conquer. 
 
To conclude, Hobbes understands group resistance as a challenge to a ruler’s authority. 
The section has developed a reading according to which the sovereign may still exercise 
his authority in a state of exception, namely by using his right of war and peace as an 
instrument for breaking up an ongoing rebellion. Attributing responsibility to rebel 
leaders while pardoning the rest seems to be crucial in this regard, as it might allow the 
sovereign to win back the subjects’ allegiance, on which his power relies. 
 
7.4 Hobbes’s ‘fool’ as an enemy of mankind 
The passage about the fool in Chapter 15 of Leviathan has attracted much attention 
among twentieth-century commentators. After Hobbes introduces the natural law that 
prescribes the keeping of covenants (which he calls justice), he considers the position of 
a fool who “hath said in his heart: ‘there is no such thing as justice’”.113 The fool does 
not deny that people make and keep covenants, also accepting that the breach of 
covenants is injustice, but he “questioneth whether injustice […] may not sometimes 
stand with that reason which dictate to every man his own good”.114 This section will 
consider how the fool passage relates to Hobbes’s views on enmity. 
 
Often the fool passage has been interpreted as an argument against the rationality of 
free-riding. Hobbes’s apparently rather unsuccessful attempt to refute the position that 
the breach of covenants sometimes conduces to one’s benefit gained special signifi-
                                                
113 Lev., XV.4, p. 90. 
114 Lev., XV.4, p. 90. 
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cance in the context of the debate on the ‘received view’.115 Howard Warrender, who 
holds that there is more to the laws of nature than prudence and self-interest, advances 
the view that the fool passage reveals a conflict between political obligation and rational 
self-interest in Hobbes’s political philosophy. Warrender finds that this conflict can on-
ly be resolved if the laws of nature are understood as divine commands.116 
 
Other commentators, notably David Gauthier and Jean Hampton, defend the view that 
Hobbes seeks to develop a moral system for utility-maximising individuals, yet criticise 
his ‘reply to the fool’ for being implausible, or in contradiction with other tenets of his 
thought. Gauthier finds the ‘reply’ unconvincing, but holds that Hobbes’s theory con-
tains the elements for refuting the fool’s position.117 According to Hampton, Hobbes 
adopts a different account of rationality to establish that it is rational to keep covenants. 
However, she argues, if this account was applied to the state of nature, it would be im-
possible for people to agree on the social contract in the first place.118 
 
From a similar perspective, Gregory Kavka provides a more positive assessment of 
Hobbes’s ‘reply’. Emphasising the difference between first- and second-performer con-
tracts and the principle of disaster-avoidance, as opposed to utility-maximisation, he 
finds that “Hobbes’s reply succeeds generally but fails in special cases in which the 
risks due to violation are both low (compared to the potential gains) and calculable”.119 
Thus, although Kavka is less critical than other interpreters and seeks to rescue 
                                                
115 Cf. sec. 2.4. 
116 Howard Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, p. 276. For a somewhat similar position, see 
Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan, p. 118. 
117 Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, pp. 161f. Cf. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan, pp. 87-89. 
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Hobbes’s ‘reply’, he ultimately admits that the breach of covenants may still be rational 
under certain conditions, which is essentially the fool’s position.120 
 
In recent years the debate on the ‘reply’ has moved away from abstract philosophical 
reflection on reason and morality to more directly political considerations. A number of 
Hobbesian interpreters suggest that Hobbes is, in this passage, not arguing against free-
riding in general, but more specifically, seeks to discourage rebellion.121 In particular, 
Kinch Hoekstra has proposed an important reinterpretation that identifies the fool with 
the author of sedition who publicly justifies rebellion against the sovereign.122 Hoekstra 
exploits an ambiguity in Hobbes’s characterisation of the fool, namely the fact that the 
latter is said to deny justice both “in his heart” and “sometimes also with his tongue”.123 
This may suggest that the fool either secretly or openly rejects the obligation to keep 
covenants. According to Hoekstra, the possibility of a ‘silent fool’ would require ascrib-
ing to Hobbes a position that is obviously false, i.e. that it is never rational to break a 
covenant. The alternative possibility of what he calls an ‘explicit fool’ seems more 
plausible, since a fool that declares his doctrine “gives notice that he is not to be trusted 
in covenants, and so diminishes the benefit he can reap therefrom”.124 
 
Hoekstra’s reading is appealing as it suggests how this passage could be linked with 
Hobbes’s views on the causes of rebellion that he expresses in other parts of his writ-
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ings, particularly the claim that language is a “trumpet of war and sedition”.125 Moreo-
ver, considering Hobbes’s statement that the fool “declares he thinks it reason to de-
ceive those that help him”,126 he clearly does not seem to be entirely silent. However, a 
number of problems remain with Hoekstra’s interpretation. First, it is unclear how the 
Hobbesian fool can both deny justice and justify rebellion. S.A. Lloyd cogently ob-
serves that such an expressed position made it very unlikely that anyone would join the 
fool in his attempt to overthrow the sovereign, for an ‘explicit fool’ who publicly denies 
justice effectively declares his willingness to betray his co-conspirators.127 
 
Second, Hoekstra’s reading has difficulties in accommodating the fact that Hobbes 
identifies the fool who denies justice with the fool who “hath said in his heart that there 
is no God”.128 Unlike the Hobbesian fool, the biblical fool does not publicly deny the 
existence of God, as Hoekstra himself acknowledges.129 What is more, as Peter Hayes 
points out, some of the authors of sedition whom Hoekstra identifies as ‘explicit fools’, 
and particularly those in Behemoth, are not atheists but ecclesiastics.130 
 
A third problem concerns the fool’s deceptive intent and the likelihood of its disclosure. 
Hoekstra appears to understand ‘deception’ as cheating,131 and indeed this seems to be 
the only way how the notion of deception can be reconciled with his idea of an ‘explicit 
fool’. In other passages in Leviathan, however, Hobbes uses the word in the sense of 
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making somebody believe something that is untrue.132 This points to the possibility that 
the fool is neither entirely silent nor honestly declares his doctrine, but says one thing 
and believes another. Lloyd shows that there are crucial parallels between Hobbes’s 
characterisation of the fool who hopes to get away with deceiving everybody else and 
his claim that authors of sedition have great oratory skills but little wisdom.133 Yet it 
remains unclear how the fool’s true beliefs are ‘declared’ by what he says in order to 
incite others to rebellion, and why people might nonetheless allow him into society.134 
Hoekstra’s reading brushes aside this problem by assuming that the fool openly denies 
justice, rather than using speech strategically for reaching his goals.135 
 
Fourth, Hoekstra’s interpretation does not provide a convincing answer to the question 
of Hobbes’s audience. Traditional readings assumed that Hobbes is genuinely respond-
ing to an objection to his political theory, hence the much-used phrase ‘reply to the 
fool’. Yet Hoekstra rejects this possibility as, on his interpretation, Hobbes could only 
seek to discourage the fool from publicly declaring his doctrine.136 Without giving any 
further reasons, Hoekstra also rules out the option that Hobbes is addressing the people 
in order to encourage them “to treat the explicit Fool as a fool and menace”.137 Instead, 
Hobbes is supposed to speak to the sovereign, whose responsibility it is to regulate 
which doctrines are to be publicly proclaimed.138 Hobbes indeed advances this view in 
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the chapter on the sovereign’s duties,139 as Hoekstra correctly notes. Yet Hoekstra does 
not conclusively show that this is also his concern in the fool passage. 
 
Based on the findings of sections 7.1 and 7.2, it is possible to develop an alternative 
reading of this passage that helps to resolve these problems in Hoekstra’s interpretation. 
As was suggested above, authors of sedition may reveal their hostility through speech 
acts that defy the sovereign authority, such as when they call him a tyrant. This equals 
an unlawful attempt to administer justice. Therefore, Hobbes also maintains that utter-
ances are sufficient evidence of the crime of high reason, as a consequence of which 
offenders can be treated as public enemies. Hobbes is critical of talk of tyranny, above 
everything else, because such accusations invoke the conventional notion of lawful ty-
rannicide, which he condemns as one of the causes of rebellion.140 
 
Hoekstra rightly emphasises the importance of ‘bare words’, which reveal the fool’s 
hostility. However, it seems that the fool does not simply publicly announce his doc-
trine, but only ‘declares’ his denial of justice insofar as it can be inferred from speech 
acts such as the one of calling the sovereign a tyrant. A passage from Leviathan’s ‘Re-
view & Conclusion’ suggests that this may indeed be Hobbes’s position: 
[B]ecause the name of tyranny signifieth nothing more or less than the name of 
sovereignty (be it in one or many men), saving that they that use the former word are 
understood to be angry with them they call tyrants, I think the toleration of a professed 
hatred of tyranny is a toleration of hatred to the commonwealth in general […]. 
Similarly, Hobbes points out elsewhere that the reason why people call a government 
tyrannical is “that they are governed, not as every one of them would himself, but as the 
                                                
139  See Lev., ch. XXX. 
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public representant […] thinks fit”.141 These statements seem to suggest that talk of 
tyranny reveals a fundamental aversion towards the foundations of the commonwealth, 
particularly the obligation to keep the social contract in which all subjects renounced 
their right to govern themselves. It is this obligation that people manifestly oppose when 
they believe that they are in a position to judge good and evil for themselves, which 
they do, according to Hobbes, when they declare the sovereign a tyrant. 
 
This reading also helps to explain why Hobbes suggests that the fool’s denial of justice 
also “tak[es] away the fear of God”.142 Hobbes, as was shown in sec. 4.4, draws an 
analogy between Adam’s original sin to eat from the forbidden tree of knowledge of 
good and evil, and the author of sedition’s sin of judging the sovereign. In addition, he 
compares talk of tyranny with a breach against the Third Commandment, which forbids 
using God’s name in vain.143 These analogies show that people who invoke the word of 
God in order to stir up a rebellion can still sin against the laws of nature. 
 
Regarding the fool’s deceptive intent, the proposed interpretation suggests that he 
makes others believe that the sovereign is a tyrant in order to reach his private goals. 
Authors of sedition succeed, or at least are not excluded from society, if other people 
accept the propositional content of their utterance. However, those who reason properly 
would recognise that ‘tyrant’ is what Hobbes calls ‘inconstant name’, i.e. a word that 
does not merely signify an image or conception of an object of sense, but also the “na-
ture, disposition, and interest of the speaker”.144 On this basis, they would be able to 
discern the fool’s denial of justice from his speech act, as suggested above. 
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Although Hobbes argues from De Cive onwards that enemies seek to hide their designs, 
he also holds that the latter can be discovered from their utterances with the help of in-
trospection and the qui bono principle.145 In Leviathan’s chapter on crimes, he suggests 
that this applies, in particular, to those who initiate a rebellion:  
[S]uch as have a great opinion of their own wisdom take upon them to reprehend the 
actions, and call in question the authority, of them that govern, and so to unsettle the 
laws with their public discourse, as that nothing shall be a crime but what their own 
designs require shall be so. It happeneth also to the same men to be prone to all such 
crimes as consist in craft and in deceiving their neighbours; because they think their 
designs are too subtle to be perceived. These I say are effects of a false presumption of 
their own wisdom. For of them that are the first movers in the disturbance of the 
commonwealth […], very few are left alive long enough to see their new designs 
established, so that the benefit of their crimes redoundeth to posterity […] which argues 
they were not so wise as they thought they were.146 
This discussion of crimes that people commit upon a false assessment of their own wis-
dom bears a striking resemblance to the fool passage.147 Hobbes’s characterisation of 
such individuals, moreover, lends further credence to our interpretation, for these people 
question the sovereign’s authority, and initiate a rebellion, “with their public discourse”. 
Yet the above quotation differs from the fool passage in that Hobbes does therein not 
consider the possibility that people succeed in deceiving their neighbours, due to the 
latter’s error. This feature of the fool passage indicates that Hobbes may be addressing a 
wider audience in order to convince them how they ought to treat the fool. 
 
An interpretation that highlights the prescriptive implications of the fool passage would 
also be better in line with its context in Leviathan. Given that the chapters on the natural 
law generally set out how people should act in order to establish lasting peace, it seems 
plausible to read Hobbes’s statements in terms of how everyone ought to treat those 
who effectively reveal their denial of justice. This would be in accordance with the oth-
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er laws of nature, most notably Hobbes’s discussion of the fifth law that prescribes 
complaisance in Leviathan. As he argues in this context, 
a man that (by asperity of nature) will strive to retain those things which to himself are 
superfluous and to others necessary, and (for the stubbornness of his passions) cannot be 
corrected, is to be left or cast out of society.148 
This passage clearly implies how individuals who disobey the natural laws should be 
treated in order to secure peace for everybody else. Likewise, Hobbes’s statement in the 
fool passage that “all men that contribute not to [the fool’s] destruction forbear him only 
out of ignorance of what is good to themselves” may be intended as a plea to everyone 
not to make the error of admitting those who deny justice into society. 
 
There is an interesting parallel to another passage in the preface to De Cive, where 
Hobbes seeks to persuade his audience that they should not believe those who defend 
the notion of lawful tyrannicide, but instead regard them as enemies: 
As for those who refuse to be subject to the civil Magistrate and want exemption from 
public burdens and yet demand to be in a commonwealth and to be protected by it from 
violence and wrongs, I hope that you will regard them as enemies [hostes] and 
saboteurs and not gullibly accept all that they put before you openly or securely as the 
Word of God. I will speak more plainly. If any preacher or confessor or casuist says that 
this doctrine is consistent with the Word of God: that a sovereign may rightly be killed, 
[…] or that citizens may rightly take part in any rebellion, conspiracy or covenant 
prejudicial to their commonwealth, do not believe him, but report his name.149 
Like the fool passage, this statement highlights the two possibilities that people either 
believe those individuals who pursue their own interests by justifying rebellion against 
the sovereign, or treat them as enemies. Specifically, Hobbes suggests that those who 
claim that tyrannicide is lawful should be reported to the authorities. 
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Even if Hobbes is addressing a wider audience, however, his discussion may also work 
as a deterrent against possible authors of sedition. As Kavka convincingly argues, the 
success of Hobbes’s ‘reply to the fool’––if it is indeed understood in this way––depends 
on whether or not “society is sufficiently punitive to seriously punish violators that it 
does identify and catch”.150 This condition would be met if Hobbes were to succeed in 
persuading a wider audience how they should treat those that effectively deny justice, 
and declare their hostility to the state, through their rebellious speech acts. 
 
Hence, Hobbes’s argument could at the same time address a wider audience and serve 
as a deterrent against authors of sedition. He does not simply threaten the fool with 
death, as Patrick Neal claims.151 Nor does he depict the fool a madman or Antichrist, as 
Patricia Springborg suggests in view of the passage’s possible religious symbolism.152 
Rather, it seems that the fool has to fear being banished from the commonwealth. Un-
like exiles that can find refuge in another country,153 however, those who deny justice 
must return to the natural condition. Thus, Hobbes states that the fool 
cannot be received into any society that unite themselves for peace and defence but by 
the error of them that receive him; nor when he is received, be retained in it without 
seeing the danger of their error […].154 
In other words, the fool should not be admitted into any commonwealth. This view is in 
accordance with the universal scope of Hobbes’s laws of nature, and particularly with 
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the universalist tone of his discussion of justice in Leviathan. As Hobbes points out ear-
lier in the same chapter, this natural law––which prescribes the keeping of covenants––
is required for achieving “the peace of mankind”.155 Indeed, Hobbes’s argument seems 
to imply that those individuals who effectively declare their denial of justice do not, as 
some interpreters suggest, merely become enemies of one particular state.156 Rather, 
their disposition is contrary to the grounds of political obligation in general. If there is 
one thing that all commentators agree upon, it is the fact that as a consequence of his 
denial of justice, the fool cannot be trusted to keep his covenants.157 
 
For this reason, there is a striking resemblance between the Hobbesian fool and the fig-
ure of the enemy of mankind. Cicero famously referred to pirates, in particular, as a 
common enemy of all (communis hostis omnium). After noting in that fidelity is re-
quired even in times of war, he argues that pirates have a special status, because their 
oaths cannot be trusted.158 Later writers adapted this notion, thereby using the somewhat 
different phrase ‘enemy of mankind’ (hostis humani generis). Gentili states, in this vein, 
that pirates have a different status than lawful enemies, for a war with them “has never 
been terminated by agreement or brought to an end by a treaty of peace”.159 Either they 
saved their lives by victory, or they were defeated and punished with death.160 Thus, 
Gentili also highlights the fundamental untrustworthiness of such enemies. In addition, 
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he suggests that the damage of piracy extends to human society as a whole, implying 
that “war should be made against pirates by all men”.161 
 
The notion of enemies of mankind appears in several ancient, medieval, and early mod-
ern sources.162 Cicero’s view that pirates are common enemies of all was, in particular, 
seems to have been widely shared at Hobbes’s time, being, for instance, also expressed 
in Edward Coke’s Institutes of the Common Laws.163 Yet it is important to note that this 
notion was not a clearly defined legal concept restricted to piracy, but somewhat ambig-
uous and largely rhetorical in nature. Thus, the ‘enemy of mankind’ concept was also 
applied to tyrants such as Nero, and writers in the Christian Middle Ages used the 
phrase to refer to the devil.164 In the early-modern period, the Spanish jurist Balthazar 
de Ayala explicitly likened the status of pirates and robbers to that of rebels, who are no 
lawful enemies even though the right of war could be applied against them.165 Likewise, 
Gentili tars pirates, proscribed persons, and rebels with the same brush, for they all lack 
a right to make war and recognition under the law of nations.166 
 
Considering Hobbes’s endorsement of Cicero’s conception of exile as an escape form 
punishment in Leviathan,167 however, he might also be directly drawing on Cicero’s In 
Verrem. In the fourth speech of the prosecution against Verres, Cicero accuses the for-
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mer governor of Sicily of having acted like pirates are accustomed to do, i.e. with the 
intention to make booty.168 It is in this context that Cicero first mentions that pirates are 
the common enemy of all.169 Thus, the pirate’s emblematic lack of fidelity could also be 
found in citizens, in particular those like Verres who betray the allegiance of Rome. 
Similarly, the Hobbesian fool is not literally a pirate but a subject who, in the pursuit of 
his private good, must reveal his fundamental untrustworthiness. Therefore, Hobbes ap-
parently suggests that he should be treated as an enemy of mankind.170 
 
Carl Schmitt alludes to the ‘enemy of mankind’ concept in his book on Hobbes’s Levia-
than. He claims that Hobbes advances a notion of the enemy that also informed the cab-
inet wars between absolute monarchies on the European Continent.171 In a later work, 
Schmitt argues that this type of ‘conventional’ enmity characterised conflicts within the 
confines of the jus publicum Europaeum (i.e. the system of positive international law 
that developed in Europe following the Peace of Westphalia). In his book on Leviathan, 
Schmitt contrasts this supposedly terrestrial conception with 
a concept of enemy that had been derived from sea and trade wars, namely, the concept 
of a nonstate enemy that does not distinguish between combatants and noncombatants 
and hence is truly ‘total’.172 
Schmitt associates this maritime conception, which reminds of the idea of the piratical 
‘enemy of mankind’, with the seafaring English nation. Thus, he also finds that the 
“evolution of England proceeded in a direction contrary to the concept of the state ad-
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vanced by Hobbes [...] in respect to government, law, and war“.173 As this reading of the 
fool passage suggests, however, the notion of an enemy of mankind was neither restrict-
ed to maritime conflicts, nor foreign to Hobbes’s thought. 
 
To conclude, this section has proposed a reading according to which the fool in Levia-
than is neither entirely silent nor openly denies justice. Rather, the fool’s conviction can 
be inferred from his rebellious utterances, and particularly the speech act of calling the 
sovereign a tyrant. Moreover, it has been suggested that, in the fool passage, Hobbes 
seeks to establish how society ought to treat those who effectively reveal their denial of 
justice. In this regard, there is a striking parallel between the Hobbesian fool and the 
figure of the enemy of mankind, who cannot be trusted to keep faith. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
From De Cive onwards, Hobbes argues that the sovereign can apply his right of war 
against subjects who reject the grounds of political obligation, such as when they com-
mit the ‘original sin’ of calling the sovereign a tyrant. In making this claim, Hobbes 
seems to envision an extra-legal jurisdiction on the basis of which severe, exemplary 
punishments can be inflicted upon rebel leaders. At the same time, he holds that other 
participants of an insurgence should be pardoned. By using such a strategy of divide and 
conquer, a ruler might be able to effectively exercise sovereignty in the face of rebel-
lion. Conversely, it may be said that a sovereign’s inability to restore peace in society 
may signify the end of sovereignty and the advent of civil war. 
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In accordance with his argument for the applicability of the sovereign’s right of war, 
Hobbes insists that the rebel is not merely inimicus (i.e. a private enemy within the con-
fines of the civil law), but hostis (i.e. a public enemy who has de facto ceased to be a 
subject). Unlike other enemies of the state, however, there can be no reconciliation with 
authors of sedition. In the well-known passage about the fool, Hobbes appears to sug-
gest that rebel leaders reveal their denial of justice in the pursuit of their private ambi-
tion, and should therefore be excluded from society. Thus, it was argued that Hobbes 
effectively depicts rebel leaders as enemies of mankind, whose fundamental untrustwor-
thiness precludes their admission into any kind of human association. 
 
Considering that Hobbes attributes this exceptional status to rebel leaders, they appear 
to be the real ‘outsiders’ in his political thought. The fact that such individuals might 
live among other subjects within a state’s territory is merely contingent, because they 
ought to be excluded from all well-ordered commonwealths. By contrast, people who 
happen to live in other countries are not necessarily ‘outsiders’ but, as the next chapter 
will show, could become ‘insiders’ in the aftermath of successful enemy invasions. As 
will become apparent, the possibility to decompose and reassemble states implies that 
international hostility does not necessarily lead to mutual annihilation. 
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8. International enmity and reconciliation 
This chapter examines the role of foreign enemies in Hobbes’s political philosophy. The 
first section reconsiders the well-known analogy between the state of nature and interna-
tional relations. It is argued that Hobbes regards wars of aggression as a possibility that 
states need to take into account in order to secure themselves against their enemies. 
However, he also holds that international hostility can ultimately be overcome if indi-
viduals re-establish a protection-obedience relationship after a successful foreign inva-
sion. The second section examines the status of sovereigns in his theory of international 
relations. It is shown that the self-preservation of rulers is always at stake in the making 
of foreign policy. Therefore, it seems that sovereigns have prudential reasons to obey 
the natural laws, which Hobbes identifies with the law of nations. The third section fur-
ther analyses his views on the limits of international hostility. As will be demonstrated, 
Hobbes does not envision the possibility of wars of annihilation between different 
commonwealths. Moreover, it appears that no matter what desires sovereigns pursue in 
making war, practicing restraint is conducive to reaching their ends. 
 
8.1 International enmity and the dissolution of states 
The analogy between the state of nature and international relations has attracted much 
attention in our time. Hannah Arendt first advanced the view that, due to the desire for 
power after power that Hobbes posits in Leviathan, states can only preserve themselves 
by constantly extending their authority.1 Following Arendt on this point, International 
Relations (IR) theorist Hans Morgenthau associated Hobbes's political thought with an 
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“an urge toward expansion that knows no rational limit”.2 Proponents and critics of Re-
alism in IR have since identified Hobbes as a forerunner of this school of thought who 
regarded international relations as free from objective moral principles, inherently un-
stable, and dominated by power politics and the struggle for survival.3 
 
As one eminent critic of this reception of Hobbes has put it, this reading of the analogy 
would suggest that the state “is little more than Hobbesian man writ large”.4 Yet many 
scholars have called attention to important differences between states and individuals. 
For instance, Mark Heller finds that Hobbes does not regard the international state of 
nature as disastrous as the interpersonal one, because––unlike individuals––states do not 
have equal capabilities to destroy one another.5 Other commentators, such as Tom So-
rell, also suggest that there is considerable room for cooperation among Hobbesian 
commonwealths, in particular with regard to international trade.6 
 
In addition, it has been noted that Hobbes does not seem to treat states as unitary actors, 
but pays much attention to domestic constraints on foreign policy. Stanley Hoffmann 
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suggests, in this vein, that every commonwealth has a domestic interest in self-restraint, 
“since, should it implicate its population in all-out wars of extermination, the duty of 
obedience of the subjects to the state would disappear”.7 This possibility may also ex-
plain why “there is, in Hobbes, no anticipation of the nation in arms”, as Donald Han-
son observes.8 Other Hobbesian interpreters, such as Murray Forsyth, find that the laws 
of nature considerably modify the international state of nature, which therefore becomes 
more tolerable than the war of all against all in the natural condition.9 
 
Furthermore, it has been argued that Hobbes’s reception as a forerunner of Realism in 
IR is anachronistic. According to David Armitage, Hobbes only came to be regarded as 
a theorist of international anarchy after political scientists and international lawyers es-
tablished a clear analytical distinction between the domestic and international realms in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.10 Gabriella Slomp also notes that a conception of 
‘the domestic’ and ‘the international’ as self-enclosed worlds, which many IR theories 
presuppose, does not pertain to Hobbes's political philosophy.11 Rob Walker argues that 
Hobbes leaves open many questions regarding the interaction of commonwealths in the 
international state of nature, such as whether a great power could change the nature of 
the system from anarchy to hierarchy, or what constraints the international system im-
poses on individual states. In the absence of such considerations, Hobbes “can scarcely 
be counted as a serious theorist of international relations at all”.12 
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329-354, 351. On the influence of domestic factors on foreign policy, also see Williams, The Realist 
Tradition, p. 42. 
9 Forsyth, “Thomas Hobbes and the External Relations of States”, pp. 446-448; May, Limiting Leviathan, 
pp. 196-199; and Tuck, “The Utopianism of Leviathan”, pp. 134f. 
10 David Armitage, “Hobbes and the Foundations of Modern International Thought”, p. 231. 
11 Slomp, “The Politics of Motion“, pp. 34-36. 
12 R.B.J. Walker, “Hobbes, Origins, Limits”, in International Political Theory After Hobbes: Analysis, 
Interpretation and Orientation, eds. Raia Prokhovnik and Gabriella Slomp (Basingstoke, UK: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 168-188, 180. 
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Indeed, it is worth keeping in mind that the analogy between the state of nature and in-
ternational relations serves Hobbes primarily as an example of life in the natural condi-
tion. In The Elements of Law, he only refers to the relations between Native American 
families and Germanic tribes as instances of the state of nature.13 De Cive contains a 
wider range of examples, including the observation that mutual distrust (which charac-
terises the war of all against all) can also be encountered in international relations. In 
this context, Hobbes states that “all commonwealths, even if they are at peace with their 
neighbours, still defend their borders with garrisons of soldiers, their cities with walls, 
gates and guards”.14 In Leviathan, Hobbes likewise mentions hostile relations among 
commonwealths, alongside civil war and the experience of the New World, as an exam-
ple of the natural state of war that would materialise in the absence of a common pow-
er.15 This suggests that his references to international relations are largely instrumental 
for putting forth an argument on the need of an absolute sovereign power. 
 
What is more, analysis of the relevant passages clearly shows that international relations 
and the state of nature are not meant to be identical in all respects. For instance, Hobbes 
acknowledges in De Cive that there are times of international peace: 
[T]hose who have not grown together into unity of person are, as shown above at v.6, in 
a state of enmity with each other. Never mind that they are not always fighting (for en-
emies too make truces); hostility is adequately shown by distrust, and by the fact that the 
borders of their commonwealths, Kingdoms and empires, armed and garrisoned, with 
the posture and appearance of gladiators, look across at each other like enemies, even 
when they are not striking each other.16 
Interpreting armed borders and the appearance of gladiators as evidence of a natural 
state of war between commonwealths, Hobbes leaves open the possibility that there can 
                                                
13 EL, XIV.12, p. 80. 
14 De Cive, pref. 11, p. 10. 
15 Lev., XIII.12, p. 78. 
16 De Cive, XVII.27, pp. 231f (capitalisation in the original). 
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be periods without actual warfare. His definition of the state of war surely implies that 
enemies are willing to attack one another.17 Yet it seems that they may also be deterred 
from putting their intention into practice by the very defensive devices that Hobbes 
takes as evidence of hostility. Elsewhere in De Cive, Hobbes argues that international 
peace must be fragile and uncertain because commonwealths are not restrained by a 
common power.18 This confirms that there can, indeed, be times of peace. However, 
states must ultimately rely on their own power to defend themselves. 
 
Hobbes’s discussion of the international state of nature in Leviathan also clearly indi-
cates that war between commonwealths does generally not have the same catastrophic 
effects on most people as the war of all against all in the natural condition: 
[K]ings and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in con-
tinual jealousies and in the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing 
and their eyes fixed on one another, that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the 
frontiers of their kingdoms, and continual spies upon their neighbours, which is a pos-
ture of war. But because they uphold thereby the industry of their subjects, there does 
not follow from it that misery which accompanies the liberty of particular men.19 
As previously in De Cive, Hobbes argues that international relations is a state of war in 
which actors distrust one another, and have to rely on their own capacities to defend 
themselves. However, he also emphasises in the above passage that the international 
state of nature is compatible with peace inside the commonwealth. 
 
While Hobbes does not develop the analogy between the state of nature and internation-
al relations beyond the quoted passages, his more detailed comments on defence suggest 
that states have better chances than individuals to sustain themselves in a condition of 
                                                
17 See sec. 3.3. 
18 De Cive, X.17, p. 126. 
19 Lev., XIII.12, p. 78 (emphasis added). 
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anarchy. In The Elements of Law, he makes some remarks on what is necessary for de-
fending the commonwealth. In particular, he points out that 
before men have sufficient security in the help of one another, their number must be so 
great, that the odds of a few which the enemy may have, be no certain and sensible ad-
vantage.20 
Likewise, Hobbes describes insufficient numbers as an incentive for aggression in De 
Cive.21 In the corresponding passage in Leviathan, he argues that 
[t]he multitude sufficient to confide in for our security is not determined by any certain 
number, but by comparison with the enemy we fear, and is then sufficient, when the 
odds of the enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment, to determine the event 
of war, as to move him to attempt.22 
In other words, roughly equal sizes between commonwealths deter foreign enemies 
from invading their neighbours. This consideration marks a clear difference between 
international relations and Hobbes’s account of the natural condition, where equal 
strength and vulnerability tempt individuals to attack one another. 
 
Hobbes also stresses in all of his main political works that the population’s joined force 
and resources must be truly united by a sovereign authority. Thus, he points out in The 
Elements of Law that defence “consisteth partly in the obedience and unity of the sub-
jects”.23 Similarly, he argues in De Cive that the people need to be forced to employ 
their joined resources for mutual defence.24 As Hobbes further spells out in Leviathan, 
enemies that are small but united can easily overthrow great multitudes: 
[I]f their actions be directed according to their particular judgements and particular ap-
petites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither against a common 
enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For being distracted in opinions concern-
                                                
20 EL, XIX.3, p. 104. 
21 De Cive, V.3, p. 70. 
22 Lev., XVII.3, p. 107. Cf. Lev., XX.15, p. 132. 
23 EL, XXVIII.9, p. 177. Cf. EL, XIX.4, p. 104. 
24 De Cive, V.4, p. 70. 
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ing the best use and application of their strength, they do not help, but hinder one anoth-
er, and reduce their strength by mutual opposition to nothing; whereby they are easily, 
not only subdued by a very few that agree together, but also when there is no common 
enemy, they make war upon each other, for their particular interests.25 
Thus, even sufficiently large groups can only enjoy relative security if they are truly 
united by a sovereign. This view is echoed in Hobbes’s later account of the international 
state of nature in the Dialogue, according to which 
mutual fear may keep [commonwealths] quiet for a time, but upon every visible ad-
vantage they will invade one another, and the most visible advantage is then, when the 
one Nation is obedient to their King, and the other not […].26 
Hobbes’s contention, that the disobedience of subjects is such an obvious weakness that 
it must encourage attacks by foreign enemies, seems to imply that, conversely, secure 
domestic peace can have a pacifying effect on international relations.27 
 
Despite his statements regarding unity and sufficient numbers, Hobbes does not seem to 
envision a total mobilisation of the population. Rather, passages in his works suggest 
that there is a division of labour amongst subjects of the commonwealth. This can be 
clearly seen in the discussion of defence in De Cive: 
To be forearmed is to be equipped with troops, weapons, a navy and fortifications in a 
state of readiness before danger threatens, and with funds already accumulated. For it is 
late, and may be impossible, to conscript soldiers and procure armaments after suffering 
a defeat. […] Those too who think it is time enough to exact the funds for providing the 
troops and other army expenses when danger begins to appear, are surely failing to con-
sider how difficult it is to scrape together such an amount of money all at once.28 
                                                
25 Lev., XVII.4, p. 107. 
26 Dialogue, p. 12. 
27 Perhaps this provides an explanation for Hobbes's claim in De Cive that, if political philosophy was as 
far advanced as the science of geometry, humanity “would enjoy such secure peace that (apart from 
conflicts over space as the population grew) it seems unlikely that it would ever have to fight again”. 
See De Cive, epistle 6, p. 5. For a discussion of Hobbes’s statements on overpopulation and the con-
sequential lack of space as a cause of war, see Paolo Pasqualucci, “Hobbes and the Myth of ‘Final 
War’”, Journal of the History of Ideas 51 (1990), pp. 647-657. 
28 De Cive, XIII.8, p. 145. 
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Thus, Hobbes suggests that most subjects will contribute to the common defence by 
paying their taxes, rather than through active military service. The account of the sover-
eign’s right of war in Leviathan likewise refers to subjects who provide funds for sus-
taining an army instead of being conscripted themselves.29 In view of such a division of 
labour, public funds appear to be an indicator for the strength and unity of a common-
wealth. This reading finds some support in Hobbes’s statement in the Dialogue that 
“want of publick Treasure inviteth Neigbhour Kings to incroach”.30 
 
The idea that unity and sufficient numbers provide relative security for states seems to 
presuppose that they have mutual intelligence. As was shown in sec. 7.1, Hobbes actual-
ly regards spying as a common practice and maintains that it is part of the sovereign’s 
office to acquire knowledge of other states. A passage in De Cive even suggests that in-
telligence is equally important for defence as armament: 
Two things are necessary to a people's defence: to be Forewarned and to be Forearmed. 
For the state of commonwealths towards each other is a natural state i.e. a state of hostil-
ity. Even when the fighting between them stops, it should not be called Peace, but an in-
termission during which each watches the motion and aspect of its enemy and gauges its 
security not on the basis of agreement but by the strength and designs of the adversary.31 
This emphasis on intelligence supports Hobbes’s contention that a commonwealth’s 
unity and resources encourage or deter enemy attacks. Considering that states are sup-
posed to monitor each other’s moves, the international state of nature seems to be char-
acterised by a higher degree of predictability than the interpersonal one. 
 
Yet despite these differences between international relations and the natural condition, 
various passages make it clear that war between states remains a constant possibility. 
                                                
29 Lev., XVIII.12, p. 114. 
30 Dialogue, pp. 16f (capitalisation in the original). 
31 De Cive, XIII.7, pp. 144f (emphasis and capitalisation in the original). 
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For instance, Hobbes argues in The Elements of Law that sovereigns ought to avoid un-
necessary wars, thereby leaving open the possibility that some wars may, indeed, be re-
quired for the state’s defence.32 As he points out in De Cive, rulers 
may […] do anything that seems likely to subvert, by force or craft, the power of for-
eigners whom they fear; for the rulers of commonwealths are obliged to do all they can 
to ensure that the calamities they fear do not happen.33 
In Leviathan, Hobbes argues that, like families in the state of nature, states endeavour to 
weaken or subdue their neighbours in order to anticipate enemy attacks: 
[A]s small families did then [in the natural condition], so now cities and kingdoms […] 
for their own security enlarge their dominions upon all pretences of danger and fear of 
invasion or assistance that may be given to invaders, [and] endeavour as much as they 
can to subdue or weaken their neighbours, by open force and secret arts for want of oth-
er caution, justly (and are remembered for it in after ages with honour).34 
Thus, Hobbes holds that fear can lead states to adopt imperialist and expansionist poli-
cies. The quotation further suggests that such wars are just, which recalls Hobbes view 
that the right of war permits pre-emptive action.35 
 
Hobbes does not derive the desire for expansion from the striving for power after power 
which he posits in Leviathan.36 Rather, his view that commonwealths sometimes seek to 
invade one another, which is clearly expressed in The Elements of Law and De Cive, 
appears to be grounded in historical experience. Hobbes was certainly familiar with 
conquests in ancient times through his translation of Thucydides’ The History of the 
Grecian War.37 Moreover, he notes in Leviathan that Athens, 
                                                
32 EL, XXIX.9, p. 177. 
33 De Cive, XIII.8, p. 146. Cf. De Cive, epistle 2, p. 4. 
34 Lev., XVII.2, p. 107. Cf. Lev, XXIX.3, p. 211. 
35 Cf. sec. 3.2. 
36 There seems to be no textual basis for Hannah Arendt’s aforementioned claim that, on Hobbes’s ac-
count, states can only preserve themselves by constantly extending their authority. For a different cri-
tique of this view, also see Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes, p. 442. 
37 This work contains plenty of references to attempted and successful conquests by both Greek and non-
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by the overthrow of the Persian armies, had gotten the dominion of the sea, and thereby, 
of all the islands and maritime cities of the Archipelago (as well of Asia as Europe), and 
were grown wealthy.38 
In addition to Athenian imperialism, Hobbes's writings mention conquests by the Ro-
mans,39 Alexander the Great,40 and Germanic tribes.41 The Norman acquisition of Eng-
land also features in many of his later works,42 and Behemoth reveals Hobbes’s famili-
arity with contemporary wars, such as Oliver Cromwell's conquest of Ireland.43 The 
claim in Leviathan that sovereignty is “subject to violent death by foreign war”44 seems 
to reflect this historical experience of conquest and state expansion. 
 
That Hobbes considers enemy invasions a possibility to be reckoned with is further sug-
gested by the fact that all of his main political works discuss the case of sovereignty ac-
quired by conquest.45 As was shown in sec. 5.1, Hobbes holds that subjects retain the 
right to submit themselves to an invading power when their old sovereign can no longer 
protect them. In addition, he suggests that a conqueror can establish a relationship of 
reciprocal trust with those whom he accepts as his subjects. Thereby, Hobbes identifies 
sovereignty by institution with sovereignty acquired by conquest. Statements in his later 
writings, moreover, suggest that he regards conquest as the actual origin of most com-
                                                                                                                                          
Greek political communities. See e.g. History 1, pp. 17, 19, 21, 27, 72, 99, 116, 185, 263, 277, 329-
332, 364f, 435, 455; History 2, pp. 63, 101f, 128, 134, 187, 193, 197, 201f, 210, 314f, 323, 368. 
38 Lev., XLVI.7, p. 455 (emphasis in the original). 
39 De Cive, XIII.4, p. 150; Lev., XIX.23, p. 126; Behemoth, pp. 31, 33f; Dialogue, pp. 136, 139. 
40 AW, XXXVII.8, p. 467; Lev., XXXIII.20, p. 257; Dialogue, p. 16. 
41 Lev., XXX.25, p. 232. 
42 Lev., XXIV.6, p. 161, XXIV.8, p. 162, XXIX.3, p. 211, R&C 8, p. 492; Behemoth, p. 119; Dialogue, 
pp. 73, 137, 146. 
43 Behemoth, p. 163. 
44 Lev., XXI.21, p. 144. Cf. Lev., XX.19, p. 135. 
45 This also provides an answer to R.B.J. Walker’s above-mentioned objection that Hobbes does not con-
sider if a great power could change the nature of the international system from anarchy to hierarchy. 
See Walker, “Hobbes, Origins, Limits”, p. 180. On Hobbes’s account, the constitution of hierarchy af-
ter a successful foreign invasion simply marks the end of the conquered state’s sovereignty. Hence, 
there would also be no longer international relations between the two states. 
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monwealths. For instance, he points out in the Dialogue that great monarchies, such as 
England, France, and Spain, developed on the basis of conquests.46 
 
Hobbes does apparently not regard pre-existing cultural identities and differences as an 
insuperable obstacle to reconciliation.47 In Leviathan, he states that “strangers (that is, 
men not used to live under the same government, nor speaking the same language) do 
commonly undervalue one another”.48 Yet he points out in the same breath that the op-
pression of subjects proceeds “not necessarily from the subjection to a stranger’s gov-
ernment, but from the unskillfulness of the governors, ignorant of the true rules of poli-
tics”.49 In addition, there may be a shift of identities. As Hobbes highlights in Levia-
than, the Romans used to give “sometimes to whole nations and sometimes to principal 
men of every nation they conquered, not only the privileges but also the name of Ro-
mans.”50 In Behemoth, Hobbes also states (with particular reference to England and 
Scotland) that political unity due to the subjection to a common sovereign is ultimately 
more important than pre-existing identities. While he admits that both nations have not 
been fully integrated, he maintains that, being subject to the same sovereign, “they were 
mistaken, both English and Scots, in calling one another foreigners”.51 
 
Furthermore, it seems that Hobbes generally prefers an explicitly political conception of 
group identity, which reflects his conception of the state as an artificial construct. As he 
argues in The Elements of Law, a people is not only a multitude of individuals that hap-
                                                
46 Dialogue, p. 138. 
47 On Hobbes’s views on reconciliation more generally, see sec. 5.1.  
48 Lev., XIX.23, p. 126. 
49 Lev., XIX.23, p. 126. Cf. Lev., XIX.23 (OL), n. 10, p. 126. Yet in the Dialogue, p. 16, Hobbes refers to 
“Proud and Insolent Strangers that speak another Language, that scorn us, that seek to make us 
Slaves”. This statement is seemingly at odds with Hobbes’s other comments on this matter, as it ap-
pears to suggest that peoples with different cultural identities cannot be reconciled. 
50 Lev., XIX.23, pp. 126f (emphasis added). Cf. sec. 8.3. 
51 Behemoth, pp. 34f. 
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pen to live in one place, but also “a person civil, that is to say, either one man, or one 
council, in the will whereof is included and involved the will of every one in particu-
lar”.52 On a number of occasions, Hobbes also uses the word ‘nation’ as a synonym for 
‘state’ or ‘commonwealth’, rather than as denoting cultural identity.53 
 
To conclude, this section has shown that commonwealths can enjoy significantly greater 
security than individuals do in the natural condition. Despite this, however, aggressive 
and expansionist wars remain a constant possibility in international relations. Hobbes 
takes this into account by elucidating how states can be dissolved and reassembled in 
the aftermath of a successful enemy invasion. Unlike in the war of all against all in the 
natural condition, international hostility, therefore, does not have to result in annihila-
tion, but could also be overcome if the sovereign of one state re-establishes a protection-
obedience relationship with another state’s former subjects. 
 
8.2 The diplomatic recognition of sovereigns 
As the last section has shown, subjects may (under certain conditions) abandon their old 
sovereign and submit themselves to a conqueror in order to save their lives. This raises 
the question of the status of sovereigns in Hobbes’s theory of international relations. 
This section examines how sovereignty is recognised by other states, and what kind of 
treatment rulers can expect if the enemy has defeated their forces. It will be argued that 
Hobbes’s views on these issues help to explain in which sense sovereigns are bound by 
the natural laws, which Hobbes identifies with the law of nations.54 
                                                
52 Hobbes, Elements of Law, XXI.21, 124. 
53 See, for example, EL, XX.18, p. 117, XXIX.10, p. 182; De Cive, epistle 11, p. 6, V.2, p. 69; Lev., 
XVIII.12, p. 114, XXX.7, p. 222, XXX.30, p. 233. 
54 It is often noted that Hobbes identifies the law of nations with the laws of nature, thus rejecting the al-
ternative position according to which international law is derived from customs and agreement of all 
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It has sometimes been suggested that Hobbes regards states as ‘moral persons’. For in-
stance, Carl Schmitt argues in his Nomos that––like all other significant writers in the 
history of international law––Hobbes held that “states live as ‘moral persons’ in a state 
of nature”.55 Thus, Schmitt associates Hobbes with the ‘Westphalian system’ of mutual-
ly recognised sovereign states. As David Boucher helpfully points out, however, 
Hobbes does not seem to consider states as compound moral persons that have a capaci-
ty to will independent of the individuals who institute or represent them.56 Noel Mal-
colm argues, in a similar vein, that Hobbes does not draw a complete parallelism be-
tween commonwealths and individuals, and specifically emphasises that the laws of na-
ture apply to the sovereign rather than to the person of the state.57 Sharon Lloyd also 
observes that Hobbes exclusively blames the sovereign for state actions against the nat-
ural laws, while excusing subjects for whatever they do at his command.58 
 
Associating Hobbes with the so-called ‘Westphalian system’, moreover, seems anach-
ronistic, as he never shows any interest in the contemporary development of positive 
international law.59 If Hobbes rejects the idea that sovereign states are compound moral 
persons and subject to positive international law, however, this raises the question how 
they can recognise one another as artificial persons. This issue seems to be underex-
plored in the literature on Hobbes. William Sacksteder merely notes, but does not fur-
ther elaborate, that enmity between nations “presuppose[s] reciprocal recognition of 
                                                                                                                                          
nations. See, for instance, Armitage, “Hobbes and the Foundations of Modern International Thought”, 
pp. 224-228; Forsyth, “Hobbes and the External Relations of States”, p. 208; Malcolm, Aspects of 
Hobbes, p. 439; Thivet, “Thomas Hobbes: a Philosopher of War or Peace?”, pp. 717f.. 
55 Carl Schmitt, Carl, The Nomos of the Earth, p. 163. Cf. sec. 1.1. 
56 David Boucher, “Resurrecting Pufendorf and Capturing the Westphalian Moment”, Review of Interna-
tional Studies 27 (2001), pp. 557-577, 567. 
57 Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes, pp. 443-446. 
58 S.A. Lloyd, “International Relations, World Government, and the Ethics of War”, in Hobbes Today: 
Insights for the 21st Century, ed. S.A. Lloyd (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 288-
303, 298-301. Also see Lloyd, Morality in the Philosophy of Hobbes, pp. 7, 282, 284-287. 
59 See Armitage, “Hobbes and the Foundations of Modern International Thought”, p. 234. 
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personhood”.60 David Runciman argues (in view of the theoretical apparatus of authori-
sation and representation that Hobbes introduces in Leviathan) that foreign enemies 
perceive the threats or actions that individuals commit on the state’s behalf, but would 
be unable to, thereby, discern the artificial person of the state.61 
 
Yet Hobbes himself does apparently not consider the recognition of another state's per-
sonality as problematic. Throughout his works he uses phrases that suggest that com-
monwealths can in practice be identified with their holders of sovereign power. For in-
stance, he writes in The Elements of Law about “such commonwealths, or such mon-
archs, as affect war for itself”.62 In De Cive, he refers to “the will of the commonwealth, 
or of the holder of sovereign power”.63 Moreover, he points out “how absurd it is that a 
commonwealth or its sovereign should commit to an enemy the governance of its citi-
zens’ consciences”.64 Leviathan contains phrases such as “the dominions of several 
princes and states.65 Hobbes also uses similar expressions in Behemoth, such as when he 
writes about “the authority of Kings and States”.66 In the Dialogue, he distinguishes be-
tween the sovereign’s courts and “Courts of the Forraign States, and Princes”, which 
seems to imply the recognition of another state’s jurisdiction.67 
 
Furthermore, Hobbes’s remarks on international diplomacy suggest that he assumes that 
states recognise each other’s personalities in practice. In The Elements of Law, he ar-
gues that it is a law of nature “[t]hat all messengers of peace, and such as are employed 
                                                
60 Sacksteder, “Mutually Acceptable Glory”, pp. 111f. 
61 Runciman, Pluralism and the Personality of the State, p. 17. 
62 EL, XXVIII.9, p. 177. 
63 De Cive, VIII.5, p. 104. 
64 De Cive, XVII.27, p. 231. 
65 Lev., XXXIX.5, p. 316. 
66 Behemoth, p. 53. Cf. Behemoth, p. 176. 
67 Dialogue, p. 110 (capitalisation in the original). 
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to procure and maintain amity between man and man, may safely come and go”.68 This 
seems to presuppose that such messengers are recognised as representatives of another 
political entity. In Leviathan, Hobbes discusses the role of public ministers who are ap-
pointed by the sovereign and act in the name of the commonwealth, including “[p]ublic 
ministers abroad […] that represent the person of their own sovereign to foreign 
states”.69 In addition to such considerations, Behemoth provides a number of examples 
of international diplomacy from the Interregnum. For instance, Hobbes describes how 
(after the victory of the Parliament party in the Civil War) the Rump “received ambas-
sadors from Portugal and from Spain, acknowledging their power”.70 
 
How states recognise each other’s sovereignty can be further clarified with reference to 
the legal notion of justus hostis (‘just enemy’). Alberico Gentili provides a paradigmatic 
formulation of this idea in De iure belli. Unlike Hobbes, Gentili insists that only public 
authorities that have an equal status under the law of nations can properly wage war. 
Thus, he defines hostis (the enemy) as “a person with whom war is waged and who is 
the equal of his opponent”.71 In addition, Gentili states that the term 
is sometimes extended to those who are not equal, namely, to pirates, proscribed per-
sons, and rebels; nevertheless it cannot confer the rights due to enemies, properly so 
called, and the privileges of regular warfare.72 
Hence, Gentili holds that the status of a lawful enemy implies the recognition of right 
and a granting of the ‘privileges of regular warfare’. The nature of the latter becomes 
clearer by comparison with unlawful enemies such as pirates, who can, for example, not 
                                                
68 EL, XVI.13, p. 92. 
69 Lev., XXVIII.11, p. 158. 
70 Behemoth, p. 169. 
71 Gentili, De iure belli libri tres, I.II 18, p. 12. 
72 Gentili, De iure belli libri tres, I.IV 41, p. 25. 
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expect any mercy upon defat. Rather, as Gentili points out, they “have either saved their 
lives by victory, or have been conquered and compelled to die”.73 
  
While Hobbes does not refer to just enemies in his main political works, he critically 
comments on the idea that sovereigns are treated differently than other kinds of enemies 
in his Answer to Bramhall. The latter took issue with Hobbes’s position in Leviathan 
that rebels should be treated as enemies [hostes], arguing that a rebellious subject 
“ought to be punished not as a just enemy, but as a disloyal traitor”.74 Thus, Bramhall 
effectively adopts Gentili’s position that lawful and unlawful enemies are treated differ-
ently at war. By contrast, Hobbes insists that the status of a just enemy does not imply 
any privileged treatment, which seems to reflect his view that enmity generally implies 
a willingness to kill or subdue the other.75 Hobbes states: 
An open enemy and a perfidious traitor are both enemies. Had not his Lordship [Bram-
hall] read in the Roman story, how Perseus and other just enemies of that state were 
wont to be punished?76 
How leaders of the enemy used to be treated is described by many Roman sources, an 
extensive summary of which can be found in Gentili’s De iure belli.77 For instance, Per-
seus of Macedon, whom Hobbes mentions above, was imprisoned after Rome had con-
quered his kingdom. In view of such examples, Gentili argues “that it is not right that 
captive leaders of regular enemies should be slain, unless their death is justified by spe-
cial reasons”.78 In contrast to this view, Hobbes rejects the idea that just enemies enjoy 
any privileged treatment, such as sparing of their lives, on empirical grounds. His posi-
                                                
73 Gentili, De iure belli libri tres, I.IV 35, p. 22. 
74 Answer, pp. 290f. 
75 Cf. sec. 3.3. 
76 Answer, p. 294. 
77 Gentili, De iure belli libri tres, III.VIII, pp. 322-327. 
78 Gentili, De iure belli libri tres, III.VIII 534, p. 327. 
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tion seems to be that, like all enemies, those who possess public authority have to fear 
for their self-preservation if their forces have been defeated at war. 
 
This suggests that Hobbes assumes de facto rather than de jure recognition of sover-
eignty. As long as rulers exercise authority over their state, the latter’s artificial person-
ality can be identified with the person of the sovereign.79 Yet Hobbes rejects the view 
that rulers are recognised regardless of whether or not they retain their power, and spe-
cifically holds that they do not enjoy any privileged treatment at war. To the contrary, 
some passages in his works indicate that there is a particular danger to the person of the 
sovereign.80 Most notably, Hobbes states in The Elements of Law that “[t]he head al-
ways is that part […] against which the stroke of an enemy most commonly is di-
rected”.81 That the sovereign requires particular protection in times of war is also indi-
cated by a passage in Leviathan’s ‘Review & Conclusion’, according to which subjects 
ought “to protect in war the authority by which he is himself protected in time of 
peace”.82 In Behemoth, Hobbes points out that the fact that a former sovereign is still 
alive poses a security risk to those who have deprived him of his authority.83 
 
At first it may seem that only monarchies can thus be identified with the holder of sov-
ereign power. However, it is important to note that, on Hobbes’s account, the exercise 
of sovereignty is generally transferred to particular individuals in times of war. In The 
Elements of Law, he mentions the office of the Roman dictator and argues that all gen-
                                                
79 On this basis, it also seems possible for Hobbesian states to maintain diplomatic relations, trade with 
one another, and engage in other transactions. 
80 There is an obvious parallel to Hobbes’s views on rebellion. As was shown in sec. 7.3, he maintains 
that sovereigns should attribute exclusive responsibility to authors of sedition while at the same time 
pardoning other participants of an insurgence. 
81 EL, XXIV.2, p. 136. 
82 Lev., R&C 5. p. 490. 
83 Behemoth, p. 133. 
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erals “exercise […] the whole sovereignty” at war.84 Likewise, Hobbes reasons in De 
Cive that democracies and aristocracies “invariably confer full power to conduct a war 
on one man alone; and that power is the most absolute power possible”.85 In Leviathan, 
he even draws a comparison with protectors of an infant king: 
[A]s a child has need of a tutor, or protector, to preserve his person and authority, so al-
so (in great commonwealths) the sovereign assembly, in all great dangers and troubles, 
have need of custodes libertatis [guardians of liberty]; that is of dictators or protectors of 
their authority, which are as much as temporary monarchs, to whom (for a time) they 
may commit the entire exercise of their power; […].86 
If enemies only recognise de facto sovereignty, as was previously suggested, the ques-
tion whether sovereignty is exercised on a temporary or permanent basis is without con-
sequences. Hobbes’s comments suggest that, in times of war, those who have de facto 
control of the state’s forces may be targeted as the holders of sovereign power. This 
could be either a monarch or (in a democracy or aristocracy) a military dictator. 
 
Hobbes’s translation of Thucydides’ History of the Grecian War provides examples of 
enemies specifically targeting a de facto holder of sovereign power in a democracy, ra-
ther than the state’s entire population. For instance, we read in this work that Sparta re-
quested the extradition of the Athenian statesman and military commander Pericles, 
whom they made responsible for waging war against them: 
[T]hey thought if Pericles were banished, the Athenians would the more easily be 
brought to yield to their desire. Nevertheless, they hoped not so much that he should be 
banished, as to bring him into the envy of the city; as if the misfortune of him were in 
part the cause of the war. For being the most powerful of his time, and having the sway 
of the state, he was in all things opposite to the Lacedaemonians; not suffering the Athe-
nians to give them the least way, but inciting them to the war.87 
                                                
84 EL, XX.17, p. 116. Cf. EL, XXI.9, p. 122. 
85 De Cive, X.17, p. 126. 
86 Lev., XIX.9, p. 122 (emphasis in the original). 
87 History 1, pp. 130f. 
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According to this passage, Pericles was abhorred due to his de facto authority and influ-
ence on the Athenian decision to make war against Sparta. Hobbes himself adopts a 
similar position when he mentions in De Cive that Pericles used speech as a “trumpet of 
war”,88 thus emphasising the responsibility of a particular individual. 
 
Hobbes’s views on the de facto recognition of sovereignty and the specific targeting of 
sovereign representatives at war may be related to his claim that rulers are bound by the 
natural laws, which he identifies with the law of nations.89 In particular, it appears that 
the sovereign’s life is always at stake in the making of foreign policy, so that he has 
strong prudential reasons to obey the laws of nature. Rulers, for instance, have to avoid 
unnecessary wars in order not to endanger their self-preservation. This also helps to ex-
plain why Hobbes claims in De Cive that subjects do not sin if they go to war at the 
sovereign’s command.90 Other passages similarly indicate such a ‘hierarchy of respon-
sibility’, as Lloyd has shown.91 While Lloyd emphasises that people should not be re-
sponsible for personal wrongdoings in response to government commands, however, 
this reading highlights that sovereigns are liable with their lives and liberty. 
 
Understood thus, Hobbes’s naturalist conception of the law of nations is in contradiction 
to the ‘Westphalian system’ of mutually recognised sovereign states. According to 
Schmitt’s account, one fundamental feature of the jus publicum Europaeum (i.e. the sys-
tem of international law that developed in the aftermath of the Peace of Westphalia) was 
that that rulers were not criminalised for making war. As was previously mentioned, 
Schmitt suggests that Hobbes likewise regarded states as moral persons who recognise 
                                                
88 De Cive, V.5, pp. 71f. 
89 For Hobbes’s comments on the laws of nature and the law of nations, see EL, XXIX.10, p. 182; De 
Cive, XIV.4, p. 156; and Lev., XXX.30, p. 233. 
90 De Cive, XII.2, p. 133. 
91 Lloyd, “International Relations, World Government, and the Ethics of War”, pp. 288-303. 
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each other’s equal rights to wage war. Contrary to Schmitt’s suggestion, it seems that 
Hobbes only assumes recognition of de facto sovereignty. Moreover, he emphasises that 
sovereign representatives are personally liable for state actions, with rulers being likely 
to lose their lives and liberty if their forces have been defeated at war. 
 
To conclude, this section has shown that Hobbes’s theory of international relations at-
tributes great importance to the status of sovereigns. In particular, Hobbes maintains 
that the self-preservation of holders of sovereign power is always at stake in the making 
of foreign policy, implying that rulers have prudential reasons to obey the laws of na-
ture. This also helps to explain in which sense sovereigns are personally bound by the 
natural laws, which Hobbes identifies with the law of nations.92 
 
8.3 Limits of international hostility 
The last section has suggested that holders of sovereign power have prudential reasons 
to obey the laws of nature, for their self-preservation is always at stake in the making of 
foreign policy. This section will further examine whether there are limits of hostility 
between states due to the prudential reasoning of sovereign representatives. Thereby, 
analysis focuses on the three causes of quarrel that Hobbes posits in Leviathan, i.e. gain, 
glory, and fear,93 which also seem to apply to international conflicts. 
 
                                                
92 Larry May, Limiting Leviathan, pp. 187-190, has attempted a defence of international criminal law on 
the grounds of Hobbes’s account of the laws of nature. However, this analysis shows that Hobbes does 
clearly not envision an enforcement of the prescriptions of the natural law through international insti-
tutions, such as the International Criminal Court. Rather, what he seems to have in mind is closer to 
his own notion of ‘natural punishment’ (cf. sec. 4.4), i.e. the idea that people will suffer at the hands 
of their enemies if they fail to obey the laws of nature. 
93 Lev., XIII.6-7, p. 76. 
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To begin with the first motive, gain, there are passages in Hobbes’s works that refer to 
commonwealths waging war solely for the purpose of acquiring economic goods. For 
instance, he states in De Cive’s chapter on the sovereign’s duties that 
great commonwealths, particularly Rome and Athens, at certain times so enlarged their 
country from the spoils of war, foreign tribute and the acquisition of territory by arms, 
that they did not impose taxes on the poorer citizens; in fact they actually distributed 
money and land to individuals. But we should not take enrichment by these means into 
our calculations. For as a means of gain, military activity is like gambling; in most cases 
it reduces a person's property; very few succeed.94 
While Hobbes notes that commonwealths in the past prospered as a result of wars for 
gain, he also compares such endeavours with gambling. An illustration of the risks in-
volved in wars for gain can be found in Behemoth, where Hobbes briefly mentions the 
failed English Siege of Santo Domingo during the Interregnum: 
In the year 1655 the English, to the number of near 10,000, landed in Hispaniola, in 
hope of the plunder of the gold and silver, whereof they thought there was great abun-
dance in the town of Santo Domingo; but were well beaten by the Spaniards, and with 
the loss of near 1,000 men, went off to Jamaica, and possessed it.95 
This example illustrates that wars that are solely fought for gain can be devastating in 
economic terms. Even if such campaigns do not carry a direct security risk, it seems that 
great losses could ultimately endanger the commonwealth’s survival.96 What is more, 
Hobbes argues in Leviathan that there is a less risky, and therefore preferable, way to 
acquire necessary goods from abroad, namely international trade.97 
 
Despite his preference for trade over war as a means for importing goods from abroad, 
Hobbes acknowledges that wars are sometimes necessary to acquire the immovable 
good of territory. In Leviathan, he defines colonies as “numbers of men sent out from 
                                                
94 De Cive, XIII.14, p. 150. Similarly, Hobbes notes in De Cive, epistle 1, p. 3, that the Romans “plun-
dered nearly all the world”. 
95 Behemoth, pp. 185f. 
96 Cf. sec. 8.1. 
97 Lev., XXIV.4, p. 160. 
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the commonwealth, under a conductor or governor, to inhabit a foreign country, either 
formerly void of inhabitants, or made void then by war”.98 This suggests that force must 
sometimes be used for establishing settlements abroad. Hobbes also points out in this 
regard that colonies ought to be founded in order to fight poverty: 
The multitude of poor (and yet strong) people still increasing, they are to be transplanted 
into countries not sufficiently inhabited, where, nevertheless, they are not to exterminate 
those they find there, but constrain them to inhabit closer together, and not range a great 
deal of ground to snatch what they find, but to court each little plot with art and labour 
[…].99 
While Hobbes thus regards it as permissible to acquire new territories by force, he also 
argues for the need of restraint in such endeavours. Specifically, he holds that colonies 
should only be sent out to thinly populated lands; settlers ought to occupy only as much 
territory as they need for their self-preservation; and native inhabitants are not be ex-
terminated. Hobbes does not spell out the reasons for these conditions, yet he seems to 
envision wars that are limited to the purpose of acquiring new lands, therefore allowing 
for the exercise of some restraint towards the native people. 
 
Insofar as resources are needed for the sustenance of an army, making gain may also be 
a subordinate motive in wars that are fought for other reasons. While Hobbes’s works 
contain no reflection on the devastating effects of pillaging armies, some passages seem 
to indicate that he prefers wars to be entirely paid for by the commonwealth that wages 
them. Thus, Hobbes reasons in Leviathan that gold and silver 
have the privilege to make commonwealths move, and stretch out their arms, when need 
is, into foreign countries, and supply not only private subjects that travel, but also whole 
armies with provision.100 
                                                
98 Lev., XXIV.14, p. 164 (emphasis added). 
99 Lev., XXX.19, pp. 228f (emphasis added). 
100 Lev., XXIV.12, p. 164. 
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Given that the value of gold and silver is recognised everywhere, these currencies can 
be used to pay for the sustenance of an army in a foreign country.  In Behemoth, Hobbes 
also considers the possibility that pillaging the local population may be detrimental to 
the main motive of war. This is exemplified by the Scottish invasion of Northern Eng-
land prior to the outbreak of the Civil War, intended to deliver a petition to the king 
who was marching towards Scotland. Thereby, the Scottish army was “giving out all the 
way, that their march should be without damage to the country”.101 
 
The desire for glory is another cause of quarrel in the natural condition that Hobbes also 
considers as a motive of international war. As he notes in both The Elements of Law and 
Leviathan, victories in battle are generally regarded as honourable.102 In this regard, 
however, it is important to note that Hobbes is not concerned with national glory but 
with military honours as pertaining to sovereigns and military commanders. For this 
reason, wars for glory are subject to the prudential reasoning of individuals, who may 
seek civil instead of military honours if there is no opportunity for war.103 
 
Hobbes repeatedly expresses his reservations about wars that are solely motivated by 
glory. For instance, he states in The Elements of Law that 
such commonwealths, or such monarchs, as affect war for itself, that is to say, out of 
ambition, or of vain-glory, or that make account to revenge every little injury, or dis-
grace done by their neighbours, if they ruin not themselves, their fortune must be better 
than they have reason to expect.104 
                                                
101 Behemoth, p. 35. 
102 EL, VIII.5, p. 49; Lev., X.39, p. 53. Cf. Lev., XVII.2, p. 107. 
103 See sec. 6.4. 
104 EL, XXVIII.9, p. 177. 
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As in the case of wars for gain, wars for glory require states and sovereigns to take a 
gamble, and Hobbes suggests that it is likely that such wars ruin those that wage them. 
This point is further elaborated in Leviathan, where Hobbes refers to the 
Bulimia, of enlarging dominion, with the incurable wounds thereby many times received 
from the enemy, and the wens, of ununited conquests, which are many times a burden, 
and with less danger lost than kept.105 
Hence, even if wars for glory end in victory, the conquest of another country may turn 
out to be a burden. In the Dialogue, Hobbes specifically mentions the wars of Alexan-
der the Great as an example of such unsustainable wars for glory: 
The Subjects of those Kings who affect the Glory, and imitate the Actions of Alexander 
the Great, have not always the most comfortable lives, nor do such Kings usually very 
long enjoy their Conquests. They March to and fro perpetually, as upon a Plank sus-
tained only in the midst, and when one end rises, down goes the other.106 
This case illustrates how certain expansionist wars may initially be sources of honour 
for the sovereign, but do not pay off in the long-term. 
 
Further examples of such prudential reasoning can be found in Hobbes’s translation of 
Thucydides’ History of the Grecian War. Regarding a possible Athenian conquest of 
Sicily, for instance, we read in this work that “it were madness to invade such, whom 
conquering you cannot keep; and failing, should lose the means for ever after to attempt 
the same again”.107 Similarly, Hobbes himself appears to suggest on some occasions 
that only madmen commit acts of hostility that do not conduce to their own benefit. For 
example, he points out in The Elements of Law that it would be madness to rebel against 
the sovereign power without hope of success.108 
                                                
105 Lev., XXIX.22, p. 218. 
106 Dialogue, p. 16 (capitalisation in the original). 
107 History 2, p. 124. 
108 EL, XXVII.1, p. 163. Hobbes also states in EL, X.9, p. 63, that “rage and madness of love, are but in-
dignations of them in whose brains are predominant the contempts of their enemies, or their mistress-
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What is more, Hobbes clearly expresses in all of his main political works that the end of 
military honours prescribes certain limitations in the conduct of war. In The Elements of 
Law, he states that “all men in whom the passion of courage or magnanimity have been 
predominated, have abstained from cruelty”.109 In De Cive, Hobbes addresses the issue 
of cruelty with particular reference to the trade of war, which he considers the only 
source of honour available in the natural condition: 
It is a commonplace that laws are silent among arms. This is true not only of the civil 
laws but also of the natural law, if it is applied […] to actions rather than to state of 
mind, and if the war in question is understood to be the war of every man against every 
man. Such is the state of pure nature, though in wars between nations a degree of re-
straint has normally been observed. Thus in early times there was a way of life, which 
was also a kind of trade […]; in those conditions it was not against the law of nature, nor 
without glory, if practiced with courage and without cruelty. Though they would take 
anything else, their way was to spare life and not touch plough-oxen and agricultural 
equipment.110 
In this important passage, Hobbes clearly states that international conflicts are usually 
characterised by a certain degree of restraint. In particular, he suggests that those who 
pursue military honours do not destroy their enemies’ means of living, presumably be-
cause this would prevent them from acquiring the kind of reputation they desire.111 
Likewise, Hobbes claims in Leviathan that people in ancient times who practiced the 
trade of war “observed no other laws therein but the laws of honour, that is, to abstain 
from cruelty, leaving men their lives and instruments of husbandry”.112 
 
                                                                                                                                          
es”. In general, what Hobbes calls ‘madness’ seems to be due to the fact that exceptionally strong pas-
sions inhibit the capacity to reason. See EL, X.9, p. 63; Lev., VIII.16, p. 41. 
109 EL, XIX.2, p. 104. 
110 De Cive, V.2, pp. 69f (emphasis in the original). 
111 Other interpreters, most notably Larry May, also note the prohibition of cruelty. May, Limiting Levia-
than, p. 201, finds that Hobbesian cruelty “has two important components: 1) harm that is unnecessary 
for self-preservation; and 2) disregard for the needs of others”. Although May suggests that there may 
be moth moral and prudential reasons for the prohibition from cruelty, however, he fails to 
acknowledge the link that between abstaining from cruelty and the desire for honour. 
112 Lev., XVII.2, pp. 106f. However, it needs to be said that Hobbes’s statements in Leviathan on this sub-
ject are not entirely consistent. He also states in the chapter on the state of nature that “[f]orce and 
fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues”. See Lev., XIII.13, p. 78. 
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Regarding fear as the third motive of war, it seems that commonwealths do not have to 
annihilate their enemies in order to increase their security. As Hobbes indicates in Levi-
athan, states may rather have the more limited target to “weaken their neighbours”.113 
Elsewhere in this work, Hobbes also reasons that “if a weaker prince make a disadvan-
tageous peace with a stronger, for fear, he is bound to keep it, unless […] there ariseth 
some new and just cause of fear, to renew the war”,114 which may imply that weakening 
a foreign enemy could be sufficient to force them into a peace agreement. 
 
The account of the final battles of the First Anglo-Dutch War in Behemoth provides an 
example of how international wars can be brought to an end through destruction of mili-
tary capacities, and without directly affecting most of the population: 
This victory was great enough to make the Dutch send over ambassadors into England, 
in order to a treaty; but in the meantime they prepared and put into sea another fleet, 
which likewise, in the end of July, was defeated by General Monk, who got now a 
greater victory than before, and this made the Dutch descend so far as to buy their peace 
with the payment of the charge of the war […].115 
Thus, defeats may prompt a state to agree to a peace agreement. Similarly, Hobbes also 
mentions in Behemoth that, after Cromwell’s victories over the Scots during the Inter-
regnum, “there was nothing more to be feared from Scotland”.116 
 
However, other passages in Hobbes’s writings suggest that weakening the enemy is 
usually only a preliminary military goal, and that commonwealths ultimately seek to 
subdue one another. Thus, Hobbes also notes in Behemoth that Cromwell’s victories 
prepared the ground for a reincorporation of Scotland into a united commonwealth with 
                                                
113 Lev., XVII.2, p. 107. Cf. Lev., XXIX.3, p. 211. 
114 Lev., XIV.27, p. 86. 
115 Behemoth, p. 184. 
116 Behemoth, p. 171. 
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England and Ireland.117 Despite being critical of unsustainable wars for glory, such as 
those of Alexander the Great, Hobbes seems to be more positive about conquests that 
succeed in increasing a state’s power and security. He particularly praises Roman ex-
pansionism, such as when he points out in Leviathan that 
the Romans, when they had subdued many nations, to make their government digestible 
were wont to take away that grievance [of being ruled by strangers] as much as they 
thought necessary by giving, sometimes to whole nations and sometimes to principal 
men of every nation they conquered, not only the privileges but also the name of Ro-
mans, and took many of them into the senate and offices of charge, even in the Roman 
city. And this was it our most wise king, king James, aimed at, in endeavouring the un-
ion of his two realms of England and Scotland.118 
Unlike those kings who only invade their enemies for glory, the Romans thus acted pru-
dently by extending citizenship to conquered peoples.119 What is more, Hobbes holds 
that England and Scotland should have been integrated in the same way as the Roman 
provinces.120 As he states in Behemoth, he believes that this would have prevented the 
Scottish quarrel with the king at the beginning of the Civil War.121 
 
Considering that the victor needs to establish a relationship of reciprocal trust with the 
vanquished in order to acquire sovereignty,122 invaders may also not want to inflict the 
greatest possible harm on another nation. Rather, Hobbes’s views on the acquisition of 
sovereignty by conquest suggest that subjects are likely to retain their lives and liberty, 
which may be conducive to the victor’s benefit. Wars can, of course, still cause great 
suffering. Regarding Cromwell’s conquest of Ireland, we read in Behemoth: 
                                                
117 Behemoth, pp. 171-173, 181. 
118 Lev., XIX.23, pp. 126f (emphasis in the original). 
119 Hence, it seems that Hobbes is not generally critical of imperialist expansion, as it is suggested by 
Hanson, “Thomas Hobbes’s ‘Highway to Peace’”, p. 350; and Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes, p. 441. 
120 Lev., XIX.23, pp. 126f. 
121 Behemoth, pp. 33-35. 
122 See sec. 5.1 and 8.1. 
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[W]ith extraordinary diligence and horrid executions, in less than a twelvemonth that he 
stayed there, [Cromwell] subdued in a manner the whole nation; having killed or exter-
minated a great part of them.123 
Through the interlocutor’s voice, Hobbes blames the misery caused by this war on the 
influence of religious doctrines. However, even if the war was unnecessarily cruel, 
Hobbes notes that it was “one step more towards Cromwell’s exaltation to the 
throne”,124 i.e. it principally followed an instrumental rationality. 
 
To conclude, no matter what desires sovereigns pursue in making war, Hobbes’s state-
ments suggest that practising some restraint will conduce to reaching their ends. Hence, 
he seems to assume that there are limits of international hostility due to the prudential 
reasoning of individuals. This even appears to be the case if rulers make war for merely 
personal motives, such as military honours. Yet, above all, this section has shown that 
Hobbes’s political philosophy does not envision the possibility that commonwealths en-
gage in wars of mutual annihilation. Ultimately, individuals are permitted to promise 
obedience to a foreign invader, who ought to grant peace to them (and accept them as 
his subjects) in order to sustain the conquest of another nation. 
 
8.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has confirmed that although Hobbes draws an analogy between the state of 
nature and international relations, there are important differences between both condi-
tions. Despite this, however, he is clear that wars of aggression remain a constant possi-
bility in international relations. Hobbes’s political philosophy takes this into account by 
elucidating how commonwealths could be decomposed and reassembled after a success-
                                                
123 Behemoth, p. 163. 
124 Behemoth, p. 163. 
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ful foreign invasion. Hobbes holds that international hostility can ultimately be over-
come if people establish a protection-obedience relationship with the conqueror. His 
reflections on sovereignty acquired by conquest seem to distinguish his thought from 
modern IR theories that focus on the interaction of pre-given units within the interna-
tional system, rather than on the constitution and dissolution of states. 
 
In addition, this chapter has examined Hobbes’s views on the diplomatic recognition of 
states and the status of sovereign representatives. According to Hobbes, common-
wealths do not, as Schmitt suggests,125 recognise each other as compound moral persons 
that have equal rights and legitimacy to wage war. Rather, Hobbes’s statements indicate 
that states maintain diplomatic relations based on mutual recognition of their de facto 
sovereignty. What is more, he argues that holders of sovereign power are specifically 
targeted in times of war, implying that their life and liberty is at stake in the making of 
foreign policy. Thus, it has been suggested that rulers have prudential reasons to obey 
the laws of nature. This helps to explain Hobbes’s claim that sovereigns are personally 
bound by the natural laws, which he identifies with the law of nations. 
 
These findings point to a vision of international order that crucially differs from the le-
gal order of the jus publicum Europaeum (the system of international law that devel-
oped after the Peace of Westphalia), as described by Schmitt. In particular, Hobbes’s 
reflections on international relations seem to suggest that mutual recognition of de facto 
sovereignty, the personal liability of sovereigns, and the imperative of self-preservation 
are supposed to provide a basis for prudential self-restraint, the coexistence of states, 
and––in the extreme case––the reconciliation of former enemies. 
                                                
125 Cf. sec. 1.1. 
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